Davis v. City of Chicago

1

Jerome Davis, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The City of Chicago, Defendant.

No. 19 CV 3691

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

February 13, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Lindsay C. Jenkins, United States District Judge

Plaintiffs here are among the tens of thousands of Chicagoans who have had cars impounded because they were allegedly used in connection with municipal code violations. Plaintiffs sued the City of Chicago, alleging that the impoundment scheme violates state and federal law. Three Plaintiffs-Spencer Byrd, Allie Nelson, and Lewrance Gant-move to certify a class seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. [Dkt. 113.] See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2). The City opposes class certification on several grounds, one of which is that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek that relief. The Court agrees and denies Plaintiffs' motion for class certification.

I. Background

Under Municipal Code of Chicago § 2-14-132 (the “ordinance”), the City impounds vehicles used in the commission of certain municipal violations, including driving without a valid license and drug offenses. [Dkt. 114 at 1; Dkt. 129 at 2.] The owners of impounded vehicles are assessed administrative penalties, plus charges for towing and storage. [Dkt. 129 at 2.] According to Plaintiffs, these charges are assessed without regard to the owners' culpability, and the fees prevent many Chicagoans from ever regaining possession of their cars. [Dkt. 114 at 1.] Since May 2017, over 50,000 vehicles have been impounded pursuant to the ordinance. [Id. at 6.]

Believing that the impoundment ordinance violates federal and state law, Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against the City. The City moved to dismiss the operative First Amended Complaint [Dkt. 33], and the Court granted the motion in part. Davis v. City of Chicago, 481 F.Supp.3d 757 (N.D. Ill. 2020). After conducting discovery, Plaintiffs moved to certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2). [Dkt. 113.] Byrd, Nelson, and Gant propose to become class representatives, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), with respect to their claims that the impoundment ordinance violates the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois constitution and the due process guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and the Illinois constitution. [Dkt. 114 at 2.] The City opposes class certification. [Dkt. 129.]

All three Plaintiffs have had cars impounded pursuant to the ordinance. Byrd's car-containing his carpenter's and mechanic's tools-was impounded in June 2016 because a client he was giving a ride to allegedly had drug paraphernalia on him. [Dkt. 114 at 2-3.] Byrd was told he needed to pay over $6,000 to regain possession of his car; despite his efforts, he remains without his vehicle or tools. [Id. at 3.] In October 2017, while Nelson was out of town, Nelson's granddaughter allowed her boyfriend to drive Nelson's car. [Id. at 3-4.] Police pulled the car over and impounded it, claiming that the boyfriend had marijuana and a gun in his backpack. [Id. at 3-4.] Because Nelson was unable to pay more than $4,000 to retrieve her car, the City disposed of it. [Id. at 4.] In March 2019, Gant lent his car to a friend. [Id.] Police stopped the car for a traffic infraction and learned that Gant's friend had a suspended driver's license; they impounded the car on that basis and because there allegedly was marijuana in plain view. [Id.] Gant would have needed to pay $4,750 to get his car back; when he could not, the City disposed of the car. [Id. at 4-5.]

No Plaintiff alleges that he or she has had additional vehicles impounded, but their reply brief asserted that in January 2023, after the motion for class certification was filed, Gant was threatened with impoundment of his current car. [Dkt. 131 at 17.] The Court reopened discovery at the City's request [Dkt. 140], and the parties filed supplemental briefs. [Dkt 153, 155.] The City explained that the letter threatening enforcement was the result of a clerical error by a police officer during a traffic stop, that the enforcement proceeding against Gant was dismissed when the City realized the error, and that his car was never impounded. [Dkt. 153 at 2-4.] Plaintiffs do not dispute this account, but they note that the City asserted Gant owed at least $3,000, that Gant obtained a lawyer to defend himself in the proceeding, and that the fear of losing another car to the ordinance took a mental toll on Gant for the five months until the proceeding was dropped in June 2023. [Dkt. 155 at 1-5.]

With the additional discovery and supplemental briefing complete, Plaintiffs' motion for class certification is now ripe for decision.

II. Legal Standards

To certify a class action under Rule 23, the prospective class must satisfy the four requirements of Rule 23(a): numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of representation. Eddlemon v. Bradley Univ., 65 F.4th 335, 338 (7th Cir. 2023). The class must also meet the requirements of the relevant provision of Rule 23(b), here, that “the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate respecting the class as a whole.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(2); see Lacy v. Cook County, 897 F.3d 847, 864 (7th Cir. 2017). Further, the Seventh Circuit has read Rule 23 to contain an implicit requirement that the class be “ascertainable,” meaning that classes are defined “clearly and with objective criteria.” Mullins v. Direct Digit., LLC, 795 F.3d 654, 672 (7th Cir. 2015).

As the Supreme Court has explained and the Seventh Circuit has reiterated, “Rule 23 does not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively demonstrate his compliance with the Rule-that is, he must be prepared to prove that there are in fact sufficiently numerous parties, common questions of law or fact, etc.” Eddlemon, 65 F.4th at 338-39 (citation omitted) (quoting Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 350 (2011)). But while the party seeking certification needs to present evidence, courts must take care not to wade too far into the merits. See id. at 341. “At class certification, the issue is not whether plaintiffs will be able to prove the[ ] elements [of their claims] on the merits, but only whether their proof will be common for all plaintiffs, win or lose.” In re Allstate Corp. Sec. Litig., 966 F.3d 595, 604 (7th Cir. 2020).

Before the Court can consider the class certification, though, it must consider whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction. See Abbott v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 725 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2013). For there to be subject-matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff must have standing, a personal stake in the outcome of the case. See Prairie Rivers Network v. Dynegy Midwest Generation, LLC, 2 F.4th 1002, 1007 (7th Cir. 2021). “[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek (for example, injunctive relief and damages).” Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 73 F.4th 502, 511 (7th Cir. 2023) (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct. 2190, 2208 (2021)). Further, standing “must be secured at each stage of the litigation,” and “as the litigation progresses, the way in which the plaintiff demonstrates standing changes”; this means that a plaintiff must establish standing “in the same way as any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” Prairie Rivers, 2 F.4th at 1007-08 (cleaned up). At the class certification stage, therefore, class representatives must offer evidence, not mere allegations, to show they have standing.

III. Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief

As is proper when seeking to certify a class under Rule 23(b)(2), the primary relief Plaintiffs request is injunctive and declaratory. They

request that the Court permanently enjoin and declare unconstitutional: (1) The City's policy and practice of impounding the vehicles of, and imposing fines and fees on, owners without regard to their guilt or innocence; and (2) the City's policy and practice of requiring the owner of an impounded vehicle to pay an administrative penalty prior to any final judgment, plus fees that accrue only because the City refuses to release the car, in order to regain possession of their vehicle.

[Dkt. 114 at 13.] They also seek five categories of incidental relief, some of which are monetary, such as reimbursements for any fines paid. [Id. at 13-14.] See, e.g., In re Allstate Ins. Co., 400 F.3d 505, 507 (7th Cir. 2005) (“When the main relief sought is injunctive or declaratory, and the damages are only ‘incidental,' the suit can be maintained under Rule 23(b)(2).” (citations omitted)).^[1]Because standing is not dispensed in gross, Dinerstein, 73 F.4th at 511, the Court must analyze whether Plaintiffs have standing to seek injunctive relief before turning to Rule 23's class certification requirements, see Abbott, 725 F.3d at 807.

“To have standing for prospective injunctive relief, a plaintiff must face a ‘real and immediate' threat of future injury as opposed to a threat that is merely ‘conjectural or hypothetical.'” Simic v City of Chicago, 851 F.3d 734, 738 (7th Cir. 2017) (citation omitted) (quoting City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983)). Further, a named plaintiff in a putative class action cannot rely on the likelihood of injury to other class members for standing to seek injunctive relief-he must himself be subject to an imminent risk of injury. See Campbell v. Miller, 373 F.3d 834, 836 (7th Cir. 2004). Thus, to certify the proposed Rule 23(b)(2)...