Davis v. Dist. of Columbia

496 F.Supp.3d 303

Ronda L. DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 10-1564 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed October 19, 2020

David Louis Rose, Rose Advocate for Civil Rights, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiffs Ronda L. Davis, Zacchaeus T. Ajakaiyiye, Elaine Farrar, Verjena Jones.

Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Georgetown University Law Center, Civil Rights Clinic, Washington, DC, Karla McKanders, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Nashville, TN, David Louis Rose, Rose Advocate for Civil Rights, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiffs Sephanie R. Alston, Kimberly Brown, Stephany M. Kagha, Donna Yvetta Lee, Celciel W. Moore, Darius Morris, Janice Smith Washington, Mable Larraine Boler, James E. Byrd, Jr., Gwendolyn Carthens, Sakithia Latrena Davis, Clarence Evans, Gale Austin Fields, Vickie Maria Guion, Carla C. Johnson, John Roland Jordan, Mary Ruth King, Luz A. Lagares, Shirley Mims, Stacy Dave Murry, Nicky Odaka, Moses Ogokeh, Edward L. Randolph, Trina Marcell Robinson, Laura Smart, Darryl Stanfield, Angela Goolshan Khan Thomas, Chanelle Tibbs, Germaine Elanda Walker, Rodney E. Williams, Wanda Marie Williams.

Karla McKanders, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Nashville, TN, David Louis Rose, Rose Advocate for Civil Rights, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiff Omar Francis.

Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Georgetown University Law Center, Civil Rights Clinic, Louise E. Ryder, Law Offices of David A. Branch & Associates, PLLC, Washington, DC, Karla McKanders, Vanderbilt University School of Law, Nashville, TN, David Louis Rose, Rose Advocate for Civil Rights, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiff Ernest Hunter.

Aderson Bellegarde Francois, Georgetown University Law Center, Civil Rights Clinic, Donald M. Temple, Law Offices of Donald M. Temple, Joshua N. Rose, Tully Rinckey PLLC, Washington, DC, David Louis Rose, Rose Advocate for Civil Rights, Chevy Chase, MD, for Plaintiff All Plaintiffs.

Donald M. Temple, Law Offices of Donald M. Temple, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs Cynthia Dudley, Karone Gray, David L. Hailes, Lorraine Kelly.

Grace Graham, Micah Ian Bluming, Richard P. Sobiecki, Chad Wayne Copeland, Mateya Beth Kelley, Michael A. Tilghman, Office of the Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT; DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ CROSS MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

In this putative class action suit, Plaintiffs, who are former employees of the District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency, allege that their terminations from the agency during a large-scale reduction in force were unlawfully discriminatory on the basis of race. This Court previously considered motions for summary judgment from the parties and found in favor of Defendant District of Columbia (the "District"). See Davis v. District of Columbia , 246 F. Supp. 3d 367 (D.D.C. 2017). Plaintiffs appealed. The D.C. Circuit largely affirmed this Court's decision but reversed and remanded with respect to Plaintiffs’ disparate impact claim. See Davis v. District of Columbia , 925 F.3d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 2019). The Court of Appeals ruled that this Court erred in holding that Plaintiffs had not identified a "particular employment practice" susceptible to challenge for its adverse racial impact under Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). Finding that Plaintiffs did identify specific employment practices susceptible to challenge (brought into "better focus" on appeal), the court remanded so that this Court could decide whether, given the identified employment practices, Plaintiffs have shown sufficient statistical evidence to make out a prima facie case of disparate impact under Title VII.

The parties have fully briefed motions for summary judgment on this question. See Def.’s Renewed Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.’s Mot."), ECF No. 169; Pls.’ Mem. Supp. Cross Mot. Summ. J. ("Pls.’ Mem."), ECF No. 170; Def.’s Opp'n, ECF No. 171; Pls.’ Opp'n, ECF No. 172; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 174; Pls.’ Reply, ECF No. 175. For the reasons set forth below, having considered the parties’ arguments in light of the D.C. Circuit's opinion, the Court denies the District's motion for summary judgment. Because the Court bifurcated discovery, see Scheduling Order, ECF No. 59, the parties will now have the opportunity for discovery to address whether the reduction in force was justified by business necessity.

II. BACKGROUND¹

A. Factual Background

The District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency ("CFSA" or the "Agency") exists "to ensure the safety, permanence, and well-being of abused and neglected children and to strengthen troubled families in the District." Def.’s Resp. to Pls.’ Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.’s Resp. Material Facts") ¶ 1, ECF No. 171-1. Many of CFSA's "frontline functions" are led by the Office of Agency Programs, including investigating reports of child abuse and neglect, temporarily removing children from dangerous situations, and providing direct case management. Id. ¶ 3. District of Columbia law and the consent decree entered in the class action LaShawn v. Bowser mandate the provision of many of these services. See Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ("Def.’s Material Facts") ¶ 1;² see also LaShawn v. Bowser , No. 89-1754 (D.D.C. Feb. 27, 2007), ECF No. 864 (order approving Amended Implementation Plan).

CFSA experienced significant budgetary pressure in fiscal years 2010 and 2011. In Fiscal Year ("FY") 2010 (October 1, 2009 – September 30, 2010), CFSA's local funds’ budget was reduced by $25.3 million from the previous year. Def.’s Resp. Material Facts ¶ 8. The FY 2010 budget reduced the number of approved full-time employees and, as a result, CFSA implemented personnel reductions to its information technology unit and public information office. Id. ¶¶ 10–11. The D.C. Council further reduced the funds available to CFSA in FY 2011 by $12.1 million. Id. ¶ 11. To address the reduction in funding in FY 2011, CFSA used a reduction in force ("RIF") with an effective termination date of June 11, 2010. Id. ¶ 13. The RIF is the subject of Plaintiffs’ lawsuit.

In the lead up to the termination date, the CFSA Director Roque Gerald sent a memorandum to City Administrator Neil Albert seeking "approval to conduct a Reduction-In-Force (RIF) to abolish one hundred and twenty-three (123) positions within the Child and Family Services Agency." Id. ¶ 16. The parties dispute whether Mr. Gerald's memorandum provided an "agency-wide" list of positions subject to elimination, but they agree that the memorandum proposed elimination of positions across multiple offices in the agency, including in the Office of Agency Programs. See id. ¶¶ 18–19. In the end, CFSA eliminated 123 positions in the RIF, which translated to the separation of 115 employees from the agency. Id. ¶¶ 14–15. In implementing the RIF, the agency reviewed its programs and determined which functions would have the least negative impact if eliminated. Id. ¶ 21. According to the District, "CFSA did not utilize a single uniform criteria, test or requirement for determining which employees would be separated from the Agency in the RIF." Def.’s Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ¶ 15, ECF No. 146-2.³ Instead, positions were selected for elimination after "multiple individual decisions made by the Director working in close consultation with the Chief of Staff, the Deputy Directors in charge of CFSA's various divisions, and other senior level managers in the Agency's executive team." Id. The District points to no objective test that CFSA used to determine which positions would be eliminated.

Specifically, and of particular importance here, the elimination of two types of positions in their entirety—the Social Services Assistant ("SSA") and the Social Worker Associate ("SWA")—accounted for the majority of the 115 employees terminated. See Def.’s Resp. Material Facts ¶ 22; Def.’s Material Facts ¶ 13. The District explains that the elimination of these positions resulted from the agency's conversion of "its workforce to the ‘team model,’ which grouped social workers with a set of skilled partners to serve client needs together." Def.’s Material Facts ¶ 12. According to the District, the SSA and SWA positions were "no longer needed under the new model." Id. ¶ 13. Though the exact percentages are disputed, Plaintiffs object to the elimination of these positions because, according to their calculations, 98 percent of the eliminated SSAs and eleven of the thirteen eliminated SWAs were African-American. Def.’s Resp. Material Facts ¶¶ 23–24.⁴

Plaintiffs hired Dr. Paige Munro, who has a Ph.D. in industrial organizational psychology, to perform a statistical analysis of CFSA's employment actions. See Mot. Summ. J. Ex. H ("Munro Decl.") ¶ 4, ECF No. 146-3.⁵ In July 2012, Dr. Munro submitted her initial expert report based on data provided by the declaration of Stan Spaght, the Human Resources Manager for Compensation/Benefits at CFSA. Id. ¶ 2; Mot. Summ. J. Ex. I ("Munro Report") at 1, ECF No. 146-3. Based on demographic information provided by Mr. Spaght, Dr. Munro calculated that, of the 832 workers at CFSA before the RIF, approximately 689 were African-American and 143 were other races. Munro Report at 1. She then calculated that 107 employees terminated in the RIF were African-American, while only eight were other races. Id. In her initial report, Dr. Munro ultimately concluded that the RIF termination rate for African-Americans was 15.5%, while the same rate for non-African-Americans was 5.6%. Id. at 3–4. She found that these results were statistically significant and violated the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's 4/5ths, or 80 percent, rule.⁶ Id.

The District hired Dr. Stephen G. Bronars, who holds a Ph.D. in economics, to serve as a defense expert. See Mot. Summ. J. Ex. J ("Bronars Report"), ECF No. 146-3.⁷ Dr. Bronars...