Davis v. Geithner

919 F.Supp.2d 8

Gregory O. DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.Timothy F. GEITHNER, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 08–447 (RWR).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Jan. 28, 2013.

Uduak James Ubom, Ubom Law Group, PLLC, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Mercedeh Momeni, John Peter Tavana, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD W. ROBERTS, District Judge.

Plaintiffs, seventeen ¹ black police officers at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing (“BEP”) bring this employment action against the Secretary of the United States Department of Treasury (“DOT”) and the plaintiffs' supervisors, Christopher Cooch and David Lindsey, alleging multiple acts of racial discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.² The defendants have moved to dismiss claims in the amended complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The request to dismiss the claim in ¶ 54 of the amended complaint will be largely granted as conceded. Because Title VII claims cannot be brought by federal employees against individual defendants, the request to dismiss Cooch and Lindsey will be granted. The defendants' request to dismiss certain Title VII claims for plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies, treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be granted because there is no genuine dispute about material facts and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Because the defendants do not point to undisputed facts that show that claim preclusion bars the plaintiffs' claims regarding plaintiff Aileen Joy's termination, the defendants' request to dismiss those claims, treated as a motion for summary judgment, will be denied.

BACKGROUND

On March 14, 2008, the plaintiffs filed the original complaint in this action. They later filed an amended complaint against the Treasury Secretary, Cooch, and Lindsey alleging that the defendants had discriminated against the plaintiffs because of their race and color. At the relevant times, Cooch was “the head of the Police Operations Division, and the Police Commander of the Plaintiffs[.]” Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Lindsey was “the Police Chief.” Id. ¶ 7. The plaintiffs were police officers at the BEP located in Southwest, Washington, D.C. Id. ¶ 8.

The plaintiffs claim that the defendants have created a hostile work environment and retaliated against them from 2002 to the present. Id. ¶ 9. The plaintiffs contend that they are being retaliated against for filing “EEOC complaints, grievances, and unfair labor practices complaints against the DOT,” id. ¶ 11, and make a variety of factual allegations to support their claims. For example, the plaintiffs allege that the defendants discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff Gregory Davis by refusing to promote him to vacant positions to which he applied. See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 42, 64, 69–70, 72. The defendants also allegedly discriminated against Davis by refusing to pay him earned overtime pay, id. ¶¶ 59, 61, 67, and denying him other employment opportunities, id. ¶ 57. The plaintiffs also assert that Cooch specifically retaliated against the plaintiffs in a number of ways including attempting to terminate Kenneth Dickens, Aileen Joy, Kerri Williams, and Ricky Russell, id. ¶¶ 26, 28–29, suspending Dickens, id. ¶ 44, and denying the plaintiffs reimbursement for liability insurance that they were entitled to receive, id. ¶ 47.

The plaintiffs allege that the defendants further discriminated against them by excluding them from “early-out retirement” for which they are eligible. Id. ¶ 53. The plaintiffs state generally that they have exhausted their administrative remedies, id. ¶ 2, but specifically note that Davis filed an EEOC complaint regarding his claim that he was owed eight hours of administrative leave, id. ¶ 55, and Davis raised his claim that he was denied overtime pay in October 2004 in an EEOC proceeding, id. ¶ 61.

The amended complaint charges that the defendants violated Title VII by creating a hostile work environment (First and Third counts) and retaliating against the plaintiffs (Second and Fourth counts).

The defendants have moved for partial dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) on several grounds. First, the defendants argue that a number of the plaintiffs' claims should be dismissed because the plaintiffs failed to timely exhaust administrative remedies. Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.' Mem.”) at 1. Second, the defendants contend that a number of the plaintiffs' claims are barred by claim preclusion because they were previously litigated and decided through a collective bargaining process. Id. at 1–2. Third, the defendants move to dismiss the matter against the individually named defendants arguing that they are not proper defendants under Title VII. Id. at 2.

The plaintiffs oppose, arguing that they timely exhausted their administrative remedies for the claims in their amended complaint by either filing claims with an equal employment opportunity (“EEO”) counselor or “Grievances with Management as required by the [terms] of their employment.” Mem. of P. & A. in Supp. of Pls.' Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss (“Pls.' Mem.”) at 3; see also id. at 7–8. The plaintiffs further argue that some of their factual claims are pled to support their hostile work environment claim. Id. at 8–9. With respect to the claims that the defendants assert are barred by claim preclusion, the plaintiffs urge that they seek not to relitigate the claims but to use the factual assertions to support their hostile work environment claim. Id. at 10. The plaintiffs contend that the individual defendants are properly named because the defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity in this case. Id. at 11.

DISCUSSION

A district court can dismiss a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) when the defendant shows that the plaintiff “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint[.]” Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235, 242 (D.C.Cir.2002).

To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (citations

omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations[.]” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. However, “[w]here a complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with’ a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and “assume[s] the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. District of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39 (D.C.Cir.2004). A court may consider “only the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [it] may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C.Cir.1997).

“When ‘matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court’ on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), ‘the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment[.]’ ” Highland Renovation Corp. v. Hanover Ins. Grp., 620 F.Supp.2d 79, 82 (D.D.C.2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(d)). Since both the plaintiffs and the defendants rely on materials outside the pleadings, see Defs.' Mem., Decl. of Frederick Whittington (“Whittington Decl.”); id., Fraternal Order of Police/BEP Labor Comm. v. BEP (2005) (Strongin, Arb.); Pls.' Mem., Affid.³ of Gregory O. Davis, Sr. (“Davis Affid.”), the motion to dismiss will be treated as a motion for summary judgment on the issues of exhaustion of administrative remedies and claim preclusion.

Summary judgment may be granted when “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Moore v. Hartman, 571 F.3d 62, 66 (D.C.Cir.2009). There is a genuine dispute if “a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party” based on the evidence presented. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). “A fact is ‘material’ if a dispute over it might affect the outcome of a suit under the governing law[.]” Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C.Cir.2006) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505). The moving party has the initial burden “of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party is then entitled to summary judgment “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. “In considering a motion for summary...