Davis v. Gordon Food Serv.

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JAMIE L. DAVIS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. GORDON FOOD SERVICE, INC., and STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE CO., Respondents-Appellees.

No. 22-1944

Court of Appeals of Iowa

February 21, 2024

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Michael D Huppert, Judge.

A claimant appeals from judicial review following denial of his workers' compensation claim. AFFIRMED.

Jacob M. Oeth of Dickey, Campbell &Sahag Law Firm, PLC, Des Moines, for appellant.

Jean Z. Dickson of Betty, Neuman &McMahon, P.L.C., Davenport for appellee.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., Buller, J., and Mullins, S.J. ^[*]

BULLER, JUDGE.

Jamie Davis appeals from judicial review following the workers' compensation commissioner's denial of his claim due to a drug test positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. Davis asserts the commissioner and district court erred in their interpretation of Iowa's private-employer drug-testing law and the presumptions afforded positive drug tests under the workers' compensation statute. We find the district court and commissioner correctly interpreted the relevant statutes and substantial evidence supports the commissioner's factual determinations.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

Davis was a truck driver for Gordon Food Service, Inc. (Gordon Foods), a food distributor. His regular route took him from Des Moines to Sioux City and back, twice each week. At the first stop of his route in Sioux City, Davis usually moved between 200 and 300 pounds of dry goods and frozen food up stairs using a handcart. During one of those stops in August 2018, David was unloading when his back "gave out." He fell to the ground, was unable to stand for more than half an hour, and he required assistance to get back to his truck.

Davis contacted his supervisor and an injury hotline, which directed him to a Sioux City clinic. Doctors at the clinic evaluated Davis for his injury and administered a drug test as required by company policy for any employee injured on the job. Davis tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines. The test utilized a single urine sample, rather than a split sample. Because the sample was not split, Davis could not pursue a second, independent confirmatory test. See Iowa Code § 730.5(7)(b) (2018).^[1] Davis signed a written consent form at the clinic, agreeing the sample had not been tampered with or altered and that it was sealed in his presence. Despite relying on a single urine sample, the physician who analyzed the sample opined that the testing methodology eliminated the potential for false positives. The same physician explained he had no concerns about collection methods or chain of custody, and he believed the test to be valid. After providing the sample, Davis drove himself back to Des Moines.

In Davis's sworn testimony, he admitted he "had problems" with methamphetamine and was not entirely surprised by the positive drug test. He had served time in federal prison for drug-related charges and was on parole at the time of the injury. As part of that parole, he submitted to drug testing twice a month. And the drug-testing at issue in this case led to a federal court finding a parole violation that warranted additional incarceration. In sworn testimony, Davis admitted to using methamphetamine three or four days before he got hurt. He testified that a "meth high" usually lasts "six to eight hours" and affects his mental status, motor functions, coordination, and decision-making. He maintained, however, that he was not "high on meth" the day he was injured, and no one made observations that would indicate otherwise.

Davis filed a petition in arbitration with the Iowa Division of Workers' Compensation against Gordon Foods and its workers' compensation insurance carrier. Both organizations answered denying the claim. The parties stipulated that Davis was injured during the course of employment. The fighting issues, as relevant to this appeal, were whether the testing procedures violated Iowa's private-employer drug-testing law and whether Davis overcame the presumption of intoxication under the workers' compensation statute.

A deputy workers' compensation commissioner found the drug-testing law did not bar admission of the drug tests and Davis did not overcome the presumption of intoxication. Davis appealed to the commissioner, who affirmed that the private-employer drug-testing law "does not apply in workers' compensation cases in Iowa" and that Davis "failed to overcome the section 85.16(2) presumption that [his] intoxication was a substantial factor in causing the work injury."

Davis petitioned for judicial review, challenging application of the privateemployer drug-testing statute and the commissioner's decision on the intoxication presumption. The district court affirmed the commissioner, finding that the privateemployer drug-testing statute does not apply to workers' compensation cases and deferring to the credibility determinations and fact-finding of the commissioner on the intoxication issue. Davis appeals.

II. Standard of Review

This case is before us under Iowa Code chapter 17A, the Iowa Administrative Procedure Act. See Iowa Code § 86.26; Chavez v. MS Tech. LLC, 972 N.W.2d 662, 666 (Iowa 2022). Under chapter 17A, we may only interfere with an agency decision if it is erroneous under one of the grounds enumerated in the statute and a party's substantial rights have been prejudiced. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10). For example, we must reverse if the agency's decision was "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Id. § 17A.19(10)(n).

To the extent our review turns on interpretation of the workers' compensation statute, interpretation has not been vested with the agency and we do not defer to the agency's legal conclusions. See id. § 17A.19(10)(c), (11)(b); Chavez, 972 N.W.2d at 666; Ramirez-Trujillo v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 878 N.W.2d 759, 769 (Iowa 2016). Instead, we correct errors at law. Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(c); Green v. N. Cent. Iowa Reg'l Solid Waste Auth., 989 N.W.2d 144, 147 (Iowa 2023).

Our review of the facts is limited to review for substantial evidence. See Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f); Chavez, 972 N.W.2d at 666; Meyer v. IBP, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 213, 218 (Iowa 2006). "Substantial evidence" is "the quantity and quality of evidence that would be deemed sufficient by a neutral, detached, and reasonable person, to establish the fact at issue when the consequences resulting from the establishment of that fact are understood to be serious and of great importance." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(f)(1). In conducting this review, "we give due regard to the commissioner's discretion to accept or reject testimony based on his [or her] assessment of witness credibility." Schutjer v. Algona Manor Care Ctr., 780 N.W.2d 549, 558 (Iowa 2010); accord ConAgra Foods, Inc. v. Moore, No. 21-0339, 2022 WL 1658707, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 25, 2022) ("[T]he reviewing court only determines whether substantial evidence supports a finding according to those witnesses whom the commissioner believed.")

III. Discussion

Davis challenges whether Iowa Code section 730.5's regulation of privateemployer drug-testing applies to workers' compensation proceedings and, if so, whether he was able to rebut the statutory presumption in section 85.16 that he was intoxicated at the time of the injury. We affirm on both issues.

A. Drug Testing Under Section 730.5

Iowa Code section 730.5 is titled: "Private sector drug-free workplaces." The section regulates drug-testing in private workplaces and specifically exempts "the state, a political subdivision of the state, including a city, county, or school district, the United States, the United States postal service, or a Native American tribe." Iowa Code § 730.5(1)(e). One of the requirements imposed by the section is that test administrators must obtain a "split sample" at the time of testing, such that there is sufficient quantity for both the employer's testing sample and a "second, independent confirmatory test" if the employee requests independent testing. Id. § 730.5(7)(b). We must decide whether this provision applies to workers' compensation proceedings; the district court and commissioner held it does not.

Davis argues that section 730.5 applies here based on legislative history, emphasizing the repeal of a provision exempting testing for workers' compensation benefits in 1998 and the silence of the 2017 re-write of chapter 85 on how to drugtest, while simultaneously adding a presumption of disqualification based on test results. See 2017 Iowa Acts, ch. 23, § 1; 1998 Iowa Acts, ch. 1011, § 1; 1987 Iowa Acts ch. 208, § 1; see also Iowa Code § 4.6(3) (noting that we may look to legislative history if we find a statute ambiguous). Davis also points to case law applying section 730.5 in unemployment proceedings before the Employment Appeal Board (EAB), which is housed along with the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner in the Iowa Department of Workforce Development (IWD). See Iowa Code § 84A.1 (describing the department of workforce development's director and divisions); Harrison v. Emp't Appeal Bd., 659 N.W.2d 581, 589 (Iowa 2003) (applying section 730.5 to prohibit denial of unemployment claim based on drug test that did not comply with statute); Eaton v. Iowa Emp't Appeal Bd., 602 N.W.2d 553, 556-57 (Iowa 1999) (same).

Gordon Foods, like Davis, also points to legislative history-but urges the opposite conclusion. Gordon Foods argues the General Assembly was aware of section 730.5 when it added the presumption regarding testing and intoxication in 2017 and maintains the lack of incorporation or cross-reference reflects a deliberate legislative omission. Gordon Foods also contends the interpretation advanced by Davis could not have been intended by...