Davis v. Hutchings Children Servs.

213 A.D.3d 1111

184 N.Y.S.3d 411

In the Matter of the Claim of Charlene DAVIS, Appellant,

v.HUTCHINGS CHILDREN SERVICES et al., Respondents.

Workers’ Compensation Board, Respondent.

535032

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: January 13, 2023

Decided and Entered: February 16, 2023

Meggesto, Crossett & Valerino, LLP, Syracuse (Grace Nichols of counsel), for appellant.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Lynch, Clark, Ceresia and Fisher, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Egan Jr., J.P. Appeals from two decisions of the Workers’ Compensation Board, filed September 16, 2021, which, among other things, denied claimant's requests for an extreme hardship redetermination pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 35(3).

In 2010, claimant was injured in two work-related accidents while working as a licensed practical nurse for the employer. She thereafter established two claims for workers’ compensation benefits resulting from injuries to her face and neck in the first accident and to her back in the second accident. In 2013, claimant was classified with a permanent partial disability and a 76% loss of wage-earning capacity, entitling her to 425 weeks of indemnity benefits. In November 2020, prior to the exhaustion of her indemnity benefits, claimant filed an extreme hardship redetermination request (C–35 form) for each claim pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 35(3). The employer's workers’ compensation carrier opposed, contending that the C–35 forms were incomplete and untimely or, in the alternative, that redeterminations were not warranted. Following a hearing on both requests, a Workers’ Compensation Law Judge (hereinafter WCLJ) granted claimant's requests under both claims and reclassified her with a permanent total disability. Upon administrative appeal, the Workers’ Compensation Board, in two decisions, modified the WCLJ's decisions, finding that claimant had failed to demonstrate extreme financial hardship and was not entitled to reclassification. Claimant appeals from both Board decisions.

Claimant initially contends that the Board misinterpreted the statutory meaning of "extreme hardship" in denying her requests. "Given that the issue is one of statutory interpretation, deference need not be accorded to the Board's interpretation, and we are free to ascertain the proper interpretation from the statutory language and legislative intent" ( Matter of Scott v. Visiting Nurses Home Care, 172 A.D.3d 1868, 1870, 101 N.Y.S.3d 767 [3d Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted], lv dismissed 34 N.Y.3d 1011, 115 N.Y.S.3d 206, 138 N.E.3d 1089 [2019] ). "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( Matter of Mancini v. Office of Children & Family Servs., 32 N.Y.3d 521, 525, 93 N.Y.S.3d 652, 118 N.E.3d 191 [2018] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see Matter of Schwabler v. DiNapoli, 194 A.D.3d 1235, 1236, 149 N.Y.S.3d 287 [3d Dept. 2021] ).

Pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 35(3), "[i]n cases where the loss of wage-earning capacity is greater than [75%], a claimant may request, within the year prior to the scheduled exhaustion of indemnity benefits under [ Workers’ Compensation Law § 15(3)(w) ], that the [B]oard reclassify the claimant to permanent total disability or total industrial disability due to factors reflecting extreme hardship." Extreme hardship is not defined in the statute but, "[a]ccording to the legislative history, this provision was intended to provide an exemption for claimants under ‘extreme financial hardship’ " ( Matter of Minichiello v. New York City Dept. of Homeless Servs., 188 A.D.3d 1401, 1403 n, 136 N.Y.S.3d 182 [2020], quoting Governor's Program Bill, Bill Jacket, L 2007, ch 6 at 6). The term "extreme" is defined as "existing in a very high degree" and "exceeding the ordinary, usual or expected" (Merriam–Webster.com Dictionary, extreme [http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/extreme]). The Board, relying on the dictionary definition of extreme, concluded that "the Legislature clearly did not intend that the standard for reclassification be ‘hardship’ alone, but rather, that a claimant must demonstrate financial hardship beyond the ordinary and existing in a very high degree." Although we are not required to defer to the Board's statutory interpretation, given the legislative intent and the plain meaning of the language, the Board's determination that reclassification is warranted to claimants under extreme financial hardship is rational and will not be disturbed (see Matter of Mancini v. Office of Children and Family Servs., 151 A.D.3d 1494, 1496–1497, 57 N.Y.S.3d 725 [3d Dept. 2017], affd 32 N.Y.3d 521, 93 N.Y.S.3d 652, 118 N.E.3d 191 [2018] ; Matter of Catapano v. Jow, Inc., 91 A.D.3d 1018, 1018–1019, 935 N.Y.S.2d 920 [3d Dept. 2012], lv denied 19 N.Y.3d 809, 2012 WL 3742271 [2012] ).

Turning to the merits, the Board's determination as to whether a claimant has demonstrated extreme hardship warranting a reclassification pursuant to Workers’ Compensation Law § 35(3) will not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence (see Matter of Vicente v. Finger Lakes DDSO, 209 A.D.3d 1073, 1075, 175 N.Y.S.3d 761 [3d Dept. 2022] ; Matter of Phillips v. Milbrook Distrib. Servs., 199 A.D.3d 1184, 1186–1187, 159 N.Y.S.3d 160 [3d Dept. 2021] ). In determining whether a claimant has demonstrated extreme hardship so as to qualify for reclassification, the Board considers the claimant's assets, monthly expenses, household income and any other relevant factors (see Matter of Vicente v. Finger Lakes DDSO, 209 A.D.3d at 1074, 175 N.Y.S.3d 761 ; Matter of Phillips v. Milbrook Distrib. Servs., 199 A.D.3d at 1186, 159 N.Y.S.3d 160 ; Workers’ Compensation Bd Release Subject No. 046–938 [Apr. 26, 2017]). Claimant's C–35 forms reflect that, prior to the scheduled exhaustion of her indemnity benefits, her monthly income was $2,716 ($1,416 in indemnity benefits and $1,300 in Social Security disability benefits) and her monthly...