Davis v. Pavlik

STEVEN A. DAVIS, Plaintiff, v. RONALD A. PAVLIK, JR., et al. Defendants.

Case No.: GJH-20-0547

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND Southern Division

December 21, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Steven Davis brings this action against Defendants Chief Ronald A. Pavlik, Jr., in his official capacity as Chief of the Metro Transit Police Department, and Officer Figaro Estime, alleging claims of Excessive Force, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Counts I and II), Deliberate Indifference, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III), Excessive Force and Deprivation of Liberty, in violation of Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights (Count IV), Battery (Count V), and False Arrest (Count VI). ECF No. 2. Pending before the Court is Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, which seeks to dismiss all counts against Defendant Pavlik and to dismiss the False Arrest count against Defendant Estime. ECF No. 21. No hearing is necessary. Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons that follow, Defendants' Motion is granted.¹

I. BACKGROUND²

On April 11, 2018, Plaintiff Steven Davis was riding the Metro and exited the train at the Suitland Metro station in Suitland, Maryland. ECF No. 16 ¶ 9.³ He was carrying several SmarTrip cards and was unsure which one he used to enter the system at the start of his ride. Id. ¶ 12. He looked for a station manager for help, but a station manager was not present. Id. ¶¶ 13-14. Another customer having trouble with his SmarTrip card asked Defendant Officer Figaro Estime for assistance, and, according to Plaintiff, Defendant Estime was "was apparently unable or unwilling to assist." Id. ¶¶ 14-15. After Defendant Estime and another customer got into an argument, customers began exiting the station through the emergency exit gate. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant Estime did not stop them. Id. ¶ 16. Plaintiff followed the other customers through the emergency exit gate, but Defendant Estime stopped him and told him to return to the exit gate and tap his SmarTrip card. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff told him he was not sure which card to use. Id. ¶ 19. Defendant Estime then pulled out his Metro Transit Police Department ("MTPD")-issued pepper spray and repeated the instruction to return to the gate and tap his card. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff returned to the gate and handed one of his cards to Defendant Estime, who tested it and saw it had not been used that day. Id. ¶ 23. Defendant Estime accused Plaintiff of fare evasion and requested his ID. Id. ¶ 24. Plaintiff, holding his wallet open, which contained several SmarTrip cards and his ID, attempted to explain the problem, but Defendant Estime, allegedly without provocation, pepper sprayed Plaintiff twice in the face, beat Plaintiff with an MTPD-issued baton, and arrested him. Id. ¶¶ 27-34. Defendant Estime charged him with theft of Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA") services and possession of counterfeitcurrency with unlawful intent. Id. ¶ 34. On August 14, 2018, Plaintiff was found not guilty of both charges in the District Court of Maryland for Prince George's County. Id. ¶ 38.

On July 10, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint with WMATA and MTPD regarding Defendant Estime's use of force. Id. ¶ 39. On August 16, 2018, Defendant Ronald A. Pavlik, Jr., Chief of MTPD and an officer of WMATA, responded to Mr. Davis's complaint in a letter. Id. ¶ 40. Chief Pavlik stated that, after a thorough investigation, the MTPD determined, "the force used was in compliance with [MTPD's] policies, guidelines, and training standards." Id. ¶ 41. On February 28, 2020, Plaintiff filed an eight-count Complaint in this Court against Defendants WMATA, MTPD, and Officer Estime. ECF No. 1. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 6, 2020. ECF No. 15. Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on May 20, 2020, asserting claims against Chief Pavlik, in his official capacity, in place of Defendants WMATA and MTPD. ECF No. 16. Defendants filed a second Motion to Dismiss on June 9, 2020. ECF No. 21. Plaintiff filed a response on June 23, 2020, ECF No. 23, and Defendants filed a reply on July 6, 2020, ECF No. 24.

The pending Motion to Dismiss seeks dismissal of all counts against Defendant Pavlik based on sovereign immunity and dismissal of the False Arrest count against Defendant Estime for failure to state a claim.

II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

A. Standard of Review

Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Defendant Pavlik on the grounds that he is immune from suit under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. ECF No. 21-1 at 2. A claim of sovereign immunity is appropriately decided through a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction brought under Rule 12(b)(1) because "[s]overeign immunity strips the court of jurisdiction[.]" Smith v. Scalia, 44 F. Supp. 3d 28, 40 n.10 (D.D.C. 2014); see also Smith v.WMATA, 290 F.3d 201, 205 (4th Cir. 2002) ("To the extent [WMATA's] complained-of actions fall within its cloak of immunity, we lack subject matter jurisdiction over such claims."); Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1216 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (noting that "sovereign immunity claims are jurisdictional").

"A district court should grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) 'only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law.'" Upstate Forever v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., 887 F.3d 637, 645 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting Evans v. B.F. Perkins Co., 166 F.3d 642, 647 (4th Cir. 1999)). "The burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction rests with the plaintiff." Demetres v. East West Constr., 776 F.3d 271, 272 (4th Cir. 2015). "When a defendant challenges subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 'the district court is to regard the pleadings as mere evidence on the issue, and may consider evidence outside the pleadings without converting the proceeding to one for summary judgment.'" Evans, 166 F.3d at 647 (quoting Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co. v. United States, 945 F.2d 765, 768 (4th Cir. 1991)). Where jurisdiction "ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause." Steele Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)).

B. Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss the claims against Defendant Pavlik for lack of jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity. ECF No. 21-1 at 2. Plaintiff does not seriously contest this point, only arguing in a footnote that, to the extent Defendant Pavlik is asserting WMATA's sovereign immunity, under Article V, Section 12 of the WMATA Compact, WMATA "may: (a) Sue andbe sued[.]" Md. Code. Ann. Transp. § 10-204(12).⁴ However, while WMATA may "sue and be sued," limitations in Section 80 of the Compact clarify that WMATA "shall not be liable for any torts occurring in the performance of a governmental function." Md. Code. Ann. Transp. § 10-204(80). The "threshold question," therefore, "is whether WMATA's operation of the Transit Police Force constitutes a governmental or a proprietary function within the terms of the Compact." Morris v. WMATA, 781 F.2d 218, 220 (D.C. Cir. 1986).⁵ Governmental functions, as opposed to proprietary ones, are activities that "amount[ ] to 'quintessential' governmental function[s], like law enforcement." Beebe v. WMATA, 129 F.3d 1283, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1997); accord Burkhart v. WMATA, 112 F.3d 1207, 1217 (D.C. Cir. 1997). "WMATA's police activities are an exercise of governmental function" for which WMATA has not waived sovereign immunity. Dant v. District of Columbia, 829 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C. Cir. 1987). Accordingly, WMATA cannot be sued for torts related to the performance of its police activities. Because Plaintiff brought suit here against Chief Pavlik in his official capacity, WMATA's sovereign immunity applies to him as well and bars the claims brought against him. See Gray v. Unidentified Metro Transit Police Officers 1, 2, 3, No. CV DKC 14-2939, 2017 WL 528429, at *3-4 (D. Md. Feb. 9, 2017) ("WMATA officials are immune from suit for law enforcement actions like those underlying this case."). Therefore, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Pavlik are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Moreover, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Pavlik are brought under Section 1983, which states, in relevant part, that "every person" who violates the Constitutional rights ofanother shall be liable to that party. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (emphasis added). "[G]overnment officials sued in their official capacities for monetary damages are not persons under Section 1983." Hawkins v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 311 F. Supp. 3d 94, 108 (D.D.C. 2018) (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). Thus, even if Plaintiff's claims against Defendant Pavlik were not barred by sovereign immunity, they would be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted because Defendant Pavlik, named in his official capacity, is not a person and cannot be sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

III. FALSE ARREST - FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM

A. Standard of Review

Defendants further move to dismiss the false arrest claim against Defendant Estime for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of the complaint. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999). To survive a motion to dismiss invoking 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct...