Davis v. Wash. State Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs.

BARBARA DAVIS, as Personal Representative of the Estate of G.B., deceased, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES;TOM STOKES, individually and the marital community comprised thereof;JEREMY KIRKLAND, individually and the marital community comprised thereof;JANE DOE STOKES, and the marital community comprised thereof; andJANE DOE KIRKLAND, and the marital community comprised thereof, Defendants.

No. 2:18-cv-00194-SMJ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

July 22, 2020

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING STATUTORY BENEFICIARIES

On July 14, 2020, the Court heard oral argument on the Individual State Defendants' "Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Statutory Beneficiaries," ECF No. 91. This case arises out of the death of G.B., a minor child. Defendants sought dismissal of all Plaintiff's claims brought on behalf of G.B.'s minor siblings, S.D.A. and D.M.A.,¹ on the grounds that because those individuals were adopted after G.B.'s death, they are no longer statutory beneficiaries under the Washington State wrongful death statute. ECF No. 91. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court found S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s adoption did not sever their sibling relationship under the wrongful death statute and thus denied Defendants' motion. This order memorializes and supplements the Court's oral ruling.

BACKGROUND

This case arises out of the tragic death of G.B., a minor child, in April 2015 while in the custody of his aunt. See ECF No. 1-2 at 9-10. The detailed factual background of G.B.'s death was set forth in the Court's November 29, 2018 Order, ECF No. 62, and the Court finds it unnecessary to repeat that general background in full here. At the time of his death, G.B. had three siblings: minors S.D.A. and D.M.A., and Vida Mercedes Cruz. ECF No. 97 at 4. When G.B. died, he as well as well as S.D.A. and D.M.A. were wards of the state. See ECF No. 1-2 at 3-9. On April 16, 2018 G.B.'s grandmother, also on behalf of G.B.'s estate and statutory beneficiaries of the Estate, brought this action against the Washington State Department of Social and Health Services ("DSHS") and two employees. ECFNo. 1-2. On November 14, 2016, S.D.A. and D.M.A. were adopted. ECF No. 93 at 11-12, 13-14. Defendants asked Plaintiff to admit that S.D.A. and D.M.A. were no longer statutory beneficiaries for purposes of the wrongful death statute. ECF No. 91 at 2. When Plaintiff denied the request for admission, Defendants filed Defendants' Motion and Plaintiff later filed Plaintiff's Motion. Id.

LEGAL STANDARD

The Court must grant summary judgment if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is "genuine" if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id.

In ruling on a summary judgment motion, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 657 (2014) (quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970)). Thus, the Court must accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true and draw all reasonable inferences in its favor. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The Court may not assess credibility or weigh evidence. See id. Nevertheless, the nonmoving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleading but must instead set forth specific facts, and point to substantial probative evidence,tending to support its case and showing a genuine issue requires resolution by the finder of fact. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49.

DISCUSSION

Washington law provides a wrongful death action may be pursued: (1) "for the benefit of the spouse, state registered domestic partner, child or children, including stepchildren," or (2) "[i]f there is no spouse, state registered domestic partner, or such child or children, such action may be maintained for the benefit of the parents or siblings of the deceased." Wash. Rev. Code § 4.20.020. The interpretation of this statute is a matter of law. See Matter of Estate of Reid, 401 P.3d 437, 439 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017), review denied, 407 P.3d 1138 (Wash. 2018).

When the Court engages in interpretation, it must "endeavor to determine and give effect to the legislature's intent." In re Estate of Blessing, 273 P.3d 975, 976 (Wash. 2012). If "the statute's meaning is plain on its face," then the Court must give effect to that meaning. Id. The Court discerns a statute's plain meaning by reference to the "ordinary meaning of the language at issue, the context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole." Id. (citing State v. Jacobs, 115 P.3d 281, 283 (Wash. 2005). "When a statutory term is undefined, the court may look to a dictionary for its ordinary meaning." Id. (citing State v. Gonzalez, 226 P.3d 131, 134 (Wash. 2010).

Defendants do not dispute that S.D.A., D.M.A., and Vida Mercedes Cruz were G.B.'s siblings and thus statutory beneficiaries of G.B.'s estate prior to S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s adoptions. ECF No. 99 at 2. However, Defendants argue that when S.D.A. and D.M.A. were adopted, their sibling relationship with G.B. was severed and they ceased to be statutory beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute. ECF No. 91 at 3-5; ECF No. 99 at 2-3. Thus, the question raised in the instant motions is whether the legislature intended the adoption of decedent's sibling after the decedent's death to sever the familial relationship for purposes of qualifying as a statutory beneficiary under the wrongful death statute.

As a preliminary matter, the Washington state courts have not addressed the precise issue before the Court. At oral argument, the parties each represented that they believe Washington courts have addressed the issue, albeit with differing outcomes. However, as explained below, while the cases each party cites address issues that may be related to the issue before the Court, none answer this particular question of law. In the absence of controlling Washington Supreme Court precedent, the Court must apply the law as it believes the Washington Supreme Court would under the circumstances. See Comm'r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) ("If there is no decision by [the Washington Supreme] court then federal authorities must apply what they find to be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State").

The term "sibling" is not defined in Revised Code of Washington § 4.20.005. The Court further finds, as in Matter of Estate of Reid, that neither the literal language of Revised Code of Washington § 4.20.020 nor the dictionary definition of "sibling" provides clarity on the question at issue. See 401 P.3d at 439 (finding neither literal language of Revised Code of Washington § 4.20.020 nor dictionary definitions of "child" helped to determine whether legislature intended child adopted before biological parent's death to qualify as a statutory beneficiary of that biological parent for wrongful death action). Thus, the Court turns to Washington case law and the text of the statute.

A. S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s sibling relationship with G.B. was not severed by their adoption after G.B.'s death

Reviewing the wrongful death statute and the decisions in Estate of Blessing, 273 P.3d 975, 976 (Wash. 2012), and Leren v. Kaiser Gypsum, 442 P.3d 273, 284 (Wash. Ct. App. 2019), the Court finds that S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s sibling relationship with G.B., which existed at the time of his death, was not severed by their subsequent adoption for the purposes of the wrongful death statute.

The statutory beneficiaries' right to recover under a wrongful death cause of action vests—in a manner akin to a property right—at the time of the wrongful death. See Wood v. Dunlop, 521 P.2d 1177, 1180 (Wash. 1974). Thus, in this case, S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s rights as statutory beneficiaries vested prior to their adoptions,at the time of G.B.'s death. Defendants have not identified any Washington law providing that S.D.A. and D.M.A.'s subsequent adoption while this wrongful death action was pending divested them of this right. In the absence of such precedent from the Washington state courts, this Court declines to create such an expansion on Washington law.

The Court also looks to the decisions in Estate of Blessing and Leren v. Kaiser Gypsum as illustrative of the principles Washington courts look to in reviewing the status of persons as beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute. Estate of Blessing and Leren both resolved questions related to whether stepchildren remain beneficiaries under the wrongful death statute after the relationship between the parent and stepparent ends.² Estate of Blessing, 273 P.3d at 975; Leren, 442 P.3d at 283.

In Estate of Blessing, the Washington Supreme Court found that the step-relationship had continued even though the stepchild's biological parent predeceased the stepparent, and, because the "tie of affinity" between the stepparent and stepchild survived the death of the parent, the stepchild retained her status as a beneficiary under the wrongful death statute. 273 P.3d at 978. In reaching thisconclusion, the court noted that Revised Code of Washington § 4.20.020 employs the term "'stepchildren' without defining or limiting the term," and that there was nothing in the dictionary definition "precluding the plain meaning that a step-relationship could remain intact past the death of the children's natural or adoptive parent." Id. The court also looked to the reasoning in In re Estate of Bordeaux, 225 P.2d 433 (Wash. 1950) that, where the "relationship by affinity" is "continued beyond the death of one of the parties to the...