Davis v. Yates

DARRYL DAVIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. SHERRY YATES, et al., Respondents.

Civ. No. 15-6943 (KM) (JBC)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

February 3, 2020

OPINION

KEVIN MCNULTY, U.S.D.J.

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs, Darryl Davis and Steven Grohs, are civilly committed persons currently residing at the Special Treatment Unit ("STU") in Avenel, New Jersey. They are proceeding pro se with an amended civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (DE 31.) Presently pending before this Court is the motion of defendants Sherry Yates and Sarah Davis for summary judgment. (DE 113.) (When necessary for clarity, Darryl Davis will be referred to as "Plaintiff Davis" and Sarah Davis will be referred to as "Defendant Davis.") For the following reasons, the motion will be denied in part and granted in part.

II. BACKGROUND

a. Factual Background

At the STU, the heating system is generally activated each year from October 15^th to April 15^th. (DE 31, ¶ 5; DE 113-2, ¶ 5.) During the winter months of 2014 and into early 2015, the heating system in STU's South housing unit was not functioning properly. (DE 31, ¶¶ 5-24; DE 113-2, ¶¶ 18-25; DE 124-2, at 9.) Plaintiffs allege that the system was turned on in October 2014 and that at some point the ventilation system shut down, allowing cold temperatures from outside to penetrate their housing unit. (DE 31, ¶¶ 23-24; DE 124-2, at 214-16, 239, 241.) Plaintiffs allege that, for several days, their housing unit was "freezing cold." (DE 124-2, at 217, 242, 265, 269.) Plaintiffs state the temperature was so low that they were able to see their breath when they exhaled. (Id. at 217, 242.) Plaintiffs allege that officers in the south housing unit of the STU brought in space heaters and placed them near their desks during this time. (Id. at 216, 241.) Plaintiff Grohs states that as a result of the freezing temperatures, he suffered from dry, cracked skin, cold and flu-like symptoms, and emotional distress. (DE 113-16, at 3-4.) Plaintiff Davis states that he suffered from "cold-like symptoms." (DE 113-10, at 9.)

Plaintiffs allege that in December 2014 Defendant Davis visited the STU's South housing unit and provided residents with extra blankets. (DE 124-2, at 213, 239; DE 113-13, at 2.) Plaintiffs state that they each "personally and verbally" informed Defendant Davis about the freezing temperatures and lack of adequate heat when she visited. (DE 124-2, at 215-16, 241-42.) Plaintiff Grohs contends that when Defendant Davis offered him a wool blanket, he advised her that he was allergic to wool and requested a cotton blanket instead. (Id. at 216.) Defendant Davis allegedly stated she would look into the matter. (Id.) It is undisputed that after Plaintiff Grohs submitted a remedy request form for a non-wool blanket, but the request was refused because his medical chart did not indicate an allergy to wool. (DE 113-2, ¶¶ 30-34; DE 113-13, at 2; DE 124, ¶¶ 30-34.) Ultimately, however, Plaintiff Grohs states he never received any extra blanket, whether cotton or wool. (DE 124-2, at 216.) Plaintiff Davis alleges he never received an extra blanket from Defendant Davis. (DE 31, at ¶ 30; DE 124-2, at 242.)

Defendants' statement of material facts indicates that Defendant Davis visited the STU in December 2014 and provided residents with blankets. Defendant Davis herself, however, testified that she does not recall this visit. (DE 113-7, at 3; DE 124-2, at 167.) Defendant Davis also testified that she "did not distribute extra blankets to residents on South housing." (DE 124-2, at 167.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Yates also visited the South housing unit during the time when the unit was "freezing cold." (DE 31, ¶ 35; DE 124-2, at 241, 239.) Plaintiffs contend that when both Defendant Davis and Defendant Yates visited the housing unit, they would have seen the STU officers' personal space heaters, which were in plain sight. (DE 31, ¶ 53;¹ DE 124, at 216, 241.)

Defendants appear to concede that there were problems with the heating system in the STU during the winter of 2014. (DE 113-1, at 15 ("While the STU suffered heating problems..."); DE 113-2, ¶¶ 18-25 (listing records which indicate request for repairs to the heating system were made on several occasions).) However, Defendants contend that if and when temperatures in the STU declined, internal STU maintenance staff were called to inspect and maintain the unit. (DE 113-8, at 3; DE 113-9, at 3.) Outside contractors were also called to provide maintenance. (DE 113-11, at 2-9.) Defendants state that between the months of November 2014 and March 2015, an outside maintenance company, George S. Hall, Inc. ("GSH"), was called at least nine times to attend to heating issues in the STU. (Id.) Between the months of November 2014 and February 2015, several internal work order requests were also submitted for maintenance of the heating units. (DE 113-12, at 2-11.) Defendants submit that the maintenance records do not indicate they were personally involved with "assigning, reviewing or completing work orders for the STU." (DE 113-2, ¶¶ 15-16; see generally DE 113-11 & DE 113-12.)

It is undisputed that on April 17, 2017, Plaintiff Grohs signed a settlement agreement in the case of Grohs, et al. v. State of New Jersey, Dep't of Corr., et al., Dkt. No. 2:12-CV-00905 (D.N.J.). (DE 113-14.) What is disputed is whether that settlement agreement releases Grohs's claims in this action. Grohs argues that the settlement and release pertained only to four cases listed in the agreement, and not to this one. (DE 124-2, ¶ 22.)

b. Procedural Background

Plaintiffs initiated this action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County on July 24, 2014. (DE 1.) In addition to Defendant Yates and Defendant Davis, the original complaint named the New Jersey Department of Corrections ("NJDOC") and "SCO John Doe." On August 18, 2015, Defendants removed this action to federal court. (Id.) Plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the action to state court, which was denied. (DE 19.)

On November 13, 2015, Defendant Yates, Defendant Davis, and the NJDOC filed a motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (DE 9.) The motion to dismiss was granted in part and denied in part. (DE 23.) The claims against the NJDOC were dismissed with prejudice since the NJDOC is not a "person" for purposes of Section 1983 liability. (DE 22, at 8.) The claims for monetary damages against both Defendant Yates and Defendant Davis in their official capacities were dismissed with prejudice because a state official sued in his or her official capacity for monetary damages is not a "person" for purposes of Section 1983. (Id.) The claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Yates in her official capacity and the claim for monetary damages against Defendant Yates in her individual capacity were dismissed without prejudice because Plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. (DE 23, at 1.) However, the claim for injunctive relief against Defendant Davis in her official capacity and the claim for monetary damages against Defendant Davis in her individual capacity were permitted to proceed. (Id. at 2.)

In October 2016, Plaintiffs filed an amended complaint against Defendant Davis, Defendant Yates, and "SCO John Doe" seeking monetary damages and injunctive relief. (DE 31, at 3.) The amended complaint raises the following claims: "Count I Asserted, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Against Defendant Yates, Davis and Doe for Violating Plaintiff Davis' and Grohs' Fourteenth Amendment Rights From the Failure to Provide Safe Conditions of Confinement" and "Count II Asserted, Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Against Defendants Yates, Davis and Doe for Violating Plaintiff Davis' and Grohs' Fourteenth Amendment Rights Stemming From Their Abuse of Power." (DE 31, at 13, 31.) On November 25, 2016, Defendant Davis and Defendant Yates filed a motion for partial dismissal of the amended complaint. (DE 33.) Defendants argued that Count II failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and that all claims against Defendant Yates should be dismissed because Plaintiffs had not adequately alleged her personal involvement in the alleged violations. (DE 38, at 4.) The motion was denied. (DE 39.) I noted by the way in that Opinion that "Count II might well be duplicative of Count I. As this matter proceeds, the claims might be streamlined." (Id. at 8.) On August 1, 2019, "SCO John Doe" was dismissed from the case without prejudice upon a joint consent order. (DE 118.)

On July 1, 2019, Defendants filed this motion for summary judgment. (DE 113.) Defendants' motion includes, among other things, a statement of material facts which are said to be undisputed. (DE 113-1, at 13; DE 113-2.) As is proper, each such fact is cited to a specific portion of the evidentiary record appended to the motion. See L. Civ. R. 56.1(a) ("On motions for summary judgment, the movant shall furnish a statement which sets forth material facts as to which there does not exist a genuine issue, in separately numbered paragraphs citing to the affidavits and other documents submitted in support of the motion.").

Plaintiffs filed their opposition to the motion on December 13, 2019. (DE 124.) Plaintiffs' opposition consists of a brief, a declaration of Plaintiff Grohs, exhibits, and Plaintiffs' responsive statement of material facts. (Id.) As is proper, Plaintiffs' responsive statement of material facts cites to specific portions of the evidentiary record. See L. R. Civ. P. 56.1(a). A letter from Plaintiff Grohs's court-appointed pro bono counsel in Grohs, et al., v. State of New Jersey, Dep't of Corr., et al., Dkt. No. 2:12-CV-00905, regarding the settlement agreement in that case is also submitted. (DE 122.)

III. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate where "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any...