Daviss v. City of Denver

TRELLANY Y. DAVISS, and SHARRON L. KEY, Plaintiffs, v. SCHOOL DISTRICT NUMBER 1, in the CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVERa/k/a DENVER PUBLIC SCHOOLS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 14-cv-00795-CMA-KMT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

August 25, 2015

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This matter is before the court on Defendant School District Number 1's ("the District") "Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint" (Doc. No. 23 [Mot.], filed September 18, 2014). Plaintiffs filed their response on October 9, 2014 (Doc. No. 28 [Resp.]), and Defendant filed its reply on October 27, 2015 (Doc. No. 29 [Reply]).

STATEMENT OF CASE

In their Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs state they are both over forty years of age. (See Doc. No. 20 [Am. Comp.] at 2.) Plaintiff Key is a Caucasian female; Daviss is an African American female. (Id.) The District is a public school district that employs "thousands of teachers and other employees at numerous schools throughout the County as well as a variety of other locations." (Id., ¶¶ 3, 8.) Plaintiff Key was hired by the District in 1997 as a Fund Accountant in the General Accounting Department. (Id., ¶ 9.) In 1999 she was promoted to theposition of Auditor III in the Auditing Department (the "Department"). (Id.) Plaintiff Daviss was hired by the District in 1992 as a Bookkeeper. (Id., ¶ 10.) In 1999 she was promoted to the position of Accounting Technician, and in 2001 she was promoted to an Auditor I position in the Department. (Id.) Neither plaintiff was a Certified Public Accountant ("CPA"). (Id., ¶ 11.)

The Department consisted of the two plaintiffs and their supervisor. (Id.) Craig Ramsey, a Caucasian male who was younger than the plaintiffs, was hired as the Auditing Supervisor in 2007. (Id., ¶ 12.) He supervised the plaintiffs from 2007 until mid-2010. (Id.) There was a position in the Department open at the time of Ramsey's hire, and he hired Corina Wagner, a Caucasian female who is younger than the plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 13. ) Ms. Wagner was not a licensed CPA when she was hired, but she obtained her CPA license in the fall of 2009. (Id., ¶ 14.)

Plaintiffs allege Mr. Ramsey began singling out Ms. Wagner for special treatment. (Id., ¶ 15.) Plaintiffs allege they were denied educational and career education opportunities provided to Wagner. (Id.) Plaintiffs complained to Ms. Wagner "concerning perceived discrimination affecting the two of them." (Id.) At some point, Mr. Ramsey made the statement "soon old people will not be able to work because a computer can do everything." (Id., ¶ 21.)

Plaintiffs' primary responsibility in the Department was auditing the School Activity Funds. (Id., ¶ 16. ) In 2010, at Mr. Ramsey's behest, the District undertook an internal reorganization of the Department and moved the auditing of School Activity Funds from the Department to the General Accounting Department. (Id.) As a result, Mr. Ramsey decided to reduce two positions in the Department. (Id., ¶ 17.) Mr. Ramsey also determined that having a CPA license would be among the criteria for remaining employed by the Department. (Id.) This decision was made less than six months after Ms. Wagner obtained her CPA license. (Id.)

Because neither plaintiff had CPA licenses, Mr. Ramsey selected them for "layoff" effective June 30, 2010. (Id. ¶ 18.) The work that had been performed by Plaintiffs was assumed by the General Accounting Department, which hired Keith Murphy, who was younger than Plaintiffs. (Id., ¶ 19.) Since 2010, the Department has hired three "younger" employees, two of whom do not have CPA licenses. (Id.)

Both Plaintiffs assert a claim for age discrimination/hostile work environment in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). (See id., 22-34.) Plaintiff Daviss asserts a claim for race discrimination/hostile work environment. (See id., ¶¶ 35-47.) Plaintiff Key asserts claims for retaliation under the ADEA and Title VII.¹ (See id., ¶¶ 48-56.)

LEGAL STANDARDS

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a defendant may move to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (2007). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1201 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

"A court reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint presumes all of plaintiff's factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1198 (10th Cir. 1991). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaintmust contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Plausibility, in the context of a motion to dismiss, means that the plaintiff pleaded facts which allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. The Iqbal evaluation requires two prongs of analysis. First, the court identifies "the allegations in the complaint that are not entitled to the assumption of truth," that is, those allegations which are legal conclusion, bare assertions, or merely conclusory. Id. at 679-81. Second, the Court considers the factual allegations "to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief." Id. at 681. If the allegations state a plausible claim for relief, such claim survives the motion to dismiss. Id. at 679.

Notwithstanding, the court need not accept conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments. Southern Disposal, Inc., v. Texas Waste, 161 F.3d 1259, 1262 (10th Cir. 1998). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S at 678. Moreover, "[a] pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does the complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Id. (citation omitted). "Where a complaint pleads facts that are 'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.'" Id. (citation omitted).

ANALYSIS

1. First Claim for Relief

A. Age-Based Discrimination

Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' age-based discrimination claim must be dismissed. (Mot. at 4-6.) Specifically, Defendant argues the plaintiffs fail to allege facts sufficient to make a prima facie case for age-based discrimination. (See id. at 4-5.) The cases cited by Defendant in support of this contention, Jones v. Oklahoma City Public Schools, 617 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2010); Sanchez v. Denver Public Schools, 164 F.3d 527 (10th Cir. 1998), address the plaintiffs' burden to establish a prima facie case in response to a summary judgment motion. These cases do not impose a heightened pleading standard upon a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination. Instead, as the United States Supreme Court has explained, the prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); is an evidentiary standard rather than a pleading requirement. Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 508 (2002).

In Swierkiewicz, the Supreme Court held that the petitioner's complaint easily satisfied the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) because it gave the respondent fair notice of the bases for the claims. Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 514. In finding the complaint adequate, the Court observed that it included the statutory grounds for the claim, "events leading to [the complainant's] termination . . . , relevant dates, and . . . ages and nationalities of at least some of the relevant persons involved with [the] termination." Id.

The elements of a prima facie discrimination claim are nonetheless relevant to the determination of whether a complaint provides a defendant with fair notice and contains "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on itsface.' " Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).² See also Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) ("the elements of each alleged cause of action help to determine whether [a] plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim.") (citing Swierkiewicz, 534 U.S. at 515. To state a prima facie claim for age discrimination, the plaintiffs must allege that they: (1) are over 40 years old and, therefore, a member of the ADEA's protected class; ³ (2) suffered an adverse employment action; (3) were qualified for the position at issue; and (4) were treated less favorably than others not in the protected class. Jones, 617 F.3d at 1279 (citing Sanchez, 164 F.3d at 531). In addition, the plaintiff must show that "age was the 'but-for' cause of the challenged employer decision." Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 177 (2009).

There is no dispute that Plaintiffs are members of a protected class, nor is there any dispute that they were terminated from their employment. Rather, Defendants argue Plaintiffs do not plead facts showing they were qualified for the position at issue. (Mot. at 5.) "[A] plaintiff who cannot meet objective hiring or promotion criteria cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, and the employer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Cortez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 460 F.3d 1268, 1274 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing York v. AT & T, 95 F.3d 948, 954 (10th Cir.1996); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006...