Dawn v. The Press Enter.

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KEITH DAWN, Plaintiff v. THE PRESS ENTERPRISE, INC.; PAUL EYERLY; and BRANDON EYERLY, Defendants

No. 4:23cv499

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

July 29, 2024

MEMORANDUM

JULIA K. MUNLEY, JUDGE.

Before the court for disposition is the motion to dismiss Plaintiff Keith Dawn's complaint filed by Defendant Press Enterprise, Inc., Defendant Paul Eyerly, and Defendant Brandon Eyerly (collectively “defendants”). The parties have briefed their respective positions, and the matter is ripe for disposition.

Background^[1]

Defendant Press Enterprise is a commercial printer and newspaper publisher which publishes a daily print newspaper and a news website. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 1). Defendant Paul Eyerly serves as president of Defendant Press Enterprise, and Defendant Brandon Eyerly serves as the vice president and secretary of Defendant Press Enterprise. (Id. ¶¶ 11 -12).

Defendant Press Enterprise employed Plaintiff Keith Dawn from October 25, 2017 through March 25, 2022. (Id. ¶ 7). Defendant Paul and Brandon Eyerly were plaintiff's immediate supervisors during his employment. (Id. ¶ 13).

Defendant's place of business is in Bloomsburg, Pennsylvania. (Id. ¶ 9). During his employment, plaintiff resided in New Jersey with his wife. (jd. ¶ 17). Plaintiff stayed in Bloomsburg on Monday through Friday and returned home to New Jersey on the weekends, (h± ¶ 18).

Plaintiff's wife is an individual with an addiction related disability. (Id. ¶¶ 2122). Several times during his employment, plaintiff expressed a desire to work from home to better assist his wife. (Id. ¶¶ 24, 28). His requests to work from home were rejected by Defendants Paul and Brandon Eyerly. (Id. ¶¶ 25, 37).

On January 20, 2022, several months after his last request to work from home to some degree, Defendant Paul and Brandon Eyerly informed him that they considered his request to work from home as a resignation, and they had found a replacement for him. (Id. ¶¶ 41-42). They thus terminated plaintiff's employment as of March 25, 2022. (Id. ¶ 51). Defendants published an article in its newspaper on April 17, 2022 which stated that plaintiff had retired. (Id. 56).

On May 4, 2022, plaintiff's attorney notified defendants that plaintiff intended to pursue a discrimination claim against them regarding his termination. (Id., ¶ 54). Per plaintiff, in retaliation, defendants opposed plaintiff's application for Unemployment Compensation benefits (Id. ¶ 55). They informed the Pennsylvania Unemployment Compensation Bureau that plaintiff had resigned. (Id. ¶ 56).

The instant employment discrimination case followed. Plaintiff's complaint raises the following causes of action: Count One - Disability Discrimination in Violation of the Americans With Disabilities Act, (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.; Count Two - Defamation regarding the article which indicated that plaintiff had “retired”; Count Three - Tortious Interference With Prospective Business Relations, regarding the article which indicated plaintiff had “retired”; and Count Four Invasion of Privacy False Light, regarding defendants' claim that plaintiff had retired.

Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.

Jurisdiction

As plaintiff brings suit pursuant to a federal statute, the ADA the court has federal question jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”). The court has supplemental jurisdiction over the plaintiff's state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

Legal Standard

Defendants filed their motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court tests the sufficiency of the complaint's allegations when considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. All well-pleaded allegations of the complaint must be viewed as true and in the light most favorable to the non-movant to determine whether, ‘“under any reasonable reading of the pleadings, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.'” Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988) (quoting Estate of Bailey by Qare v. Cnty. of York, 768 F.2d 503, 506 (3d Cir. 1985)). The plaintiff must describe “‘enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' [each] necessary element” of the claims alleged in the complaint. Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp, v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007)). Moreover, the plaintiff must allege facts that “justify moving the case beyond the pleadings to the next stage of litigation.” Id. at 234-35. In evaluating the sufficiency of a complaint the court may also consider “matters of public record, orders, exhibits attached to the complaint and items appearing in the record of the case.” Qshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.2 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). The court does not have to accept legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. See Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad, of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 133 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist, 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997)).

The federal rules require only that plaintiff provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,” a standard which “does not require detailed factual allegations,” but a plaintiff must make “a showing, rather than a blanket assertion, of entitlement to relief that rises above the speculative level.” McTernan v, N.Y.C., 564 F.3d 636, 646 (3d Cir. 2009) (citations and internal quotations and quotation marks omitted). The “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Such “facial plausibility” exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “[T]he factual detail in a complaint [cannot be] so undeveloped that it does not provide a defendant the type of notice of claim which is contemplated by Rule 8.” Phillips, 515 F.3d at 232 (citation omitted). “Though a complaint ‘does not need detailed factual allegations, ... a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” DelRio-Mocci v. Connolly Props., Inc., 672 F.3d 241, 245 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).

The Supreme Court has counseled that a court examining a motion to dismiss should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Next, the court should make a context-specific inquiry into the “factual allegations in [the] complaint to determine if they plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief.” Id., at 681.

Discussion

Defendants move to dismiss each count of the plaintiff's complaint and the court will address each count in turn.

I. ADA Claim

Count One of plaintiff's complaint asserts a cause of action for association discrimination. That is, plaintiff claims that defendants terminated him because of his association with his wife who suffered a disability. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 59-64).

The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The term “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability” includes “excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is known to have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4). Claims based on this provision are referred to as ADA association or ADA association discrimination claims. See Erdman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 582 F.3d 500, 504 (3d Cir. 2009); Barthalow v. David H, Martin Excavating, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-2593, 2007 WL 2207897, at *3 (M.D. Pa. July 30, 2007)(Rambo, J).

The ADA association provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4), however, “does not obligate employers to accommodate the schedule of an employee with a disabled relative[,]” like the reasonable accommodations provisions set forth at 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)-(B). See Erdman, 582 F.3d at 510 (“Although refusal to ‘mak[e] reasonable accommodations' may constitute illegal discrimination against a disabled employee, 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5), the plain language of the ADA indicates that the accommodation requirement does not extend to relatives of the disabled.”)(emphasis in original)(further citations omitted).

To establish a prima facie case of association discrimination, a plaintiff must prove the following:

(1) the plaintiff was “qualified” for the job at the time of the adverse employment action; (2) the plaintiff was subjected to adverse employment action;

(3) the plaintiff was known by her employer at the time to have a relative or associate with a disability; [and]

(4) the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances raising a reasonable inference that the disability of the relative or associate was a determining factor in the employer's decision.

Dodson v. Coatesville Hosp. Corp., 773 Fed.Appx. 78 83, n. 8 (3d Cir. 2019)(citing Den Hartog v. Wasatch Acad., 129 F.3d 1076, 1085 (10th Cir. 1997)(further citation omitted); see also ...