Day v. Buckham

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Honorable Iain D. Johnston United States District Judge.

Plaintiff Ashley Day brings this action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Julia Buckham, the paternal grandmother of one of Day's children. She has properly invoked this Court's subject-matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332.^[1] Buckham now moves the Court to dismiss. For the reasons explained below, that motion [11] is denied.

I. Background

After improperly labeling her original complaint, the Court ordered Day to file an amended complaint and fix her errors. Dkt. 3. She complied. Along with her amended complaint, Day separately filed a document titled “Memorandum in Support of Complaint of Slander and Infliction of Extreme Emotion Distress.” Dkt. 5. Because Day brings this case pro se, the Court must construe her pleadings

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liberally. Beal v. Beller, 847 F.3d 897, 902 (7th Cir. 2017). So, the Court considers her separately filed memorandum to be an attachment to her complaint, and thus part of her complaint. Bradley v. Weber, No. 20-cv-48-jdp, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85305, at *2 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 25, 2020) (treating a separately filed document as a supplement to a pro se complaint).

Though Day includes more information in her response to the motion to dismiss, her allegations in the amended complaint-and its associated memorandum-are sparse. She alleges that Buckham repeatedly told the foster parents of Day's biological daughter that Day was a “child sexual predator and had inappropriately touched/sexually molested her children on numerous occasions.” Dkt. 4, ¶ 5(a). Day further alleges that Buckham told the foster parents that this was why Day lost custody of her oldest daughter. Day alleges that Buckham communicated this information to Day's daughter's foster parents between January 1, 2018, and October 1, 2020. Id. Day further alleges that Buckham repeatedly conveyed the same information to the Illinois Department of Child and Family Services (DCFS) between September 1, 2020, and October 1, 2020. Id. ¶ 5(b).

Day's memorandum, filed directly after her complaint, mostly contains legal conclusions and arguments, which the Court cannot accept at this point. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that federal courts accept factual allegations as true on a motion to dismiss but not legal conclusions). It does, however, add a few allegations, which this Court can accept in ruling on a motion to dismiss. See Highsmith v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 18 F.3d 434, 439 (7th Cir. 1994).

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Day alleges that Buckham conveyed this allegedly false information “to place Plaintiff in a bad light and with the hope of being able to gain custody of Plaintiff's minor children.” Dkt. 5, at 2. Day further alleges that Buckham knew the information she communicated was false. Id. at 5. She further explains that she has never been accused of sexually molesting her children by anyone else. Id. Day explains that, as a result of Buckham's actions, she suffers from a variety of mental and emotional distresses, including anxiety, depression, and PTSD. Id. at 6.

II. Statutory Good Faith Immunity under the Reporting Act Buckham contends that she is immune from suit. She cites the Illinois

Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act (“Reporting Act”). 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/1 et seq. The Reporting Act requires certain persons to report to the DCFS when they have “reasonable cause to believe that a child known to them in their professional capacities may be an abused or neglected child.” Id. § 5/4(a). The Reporting Act further provides that, regardless of mandate requirements, “any person may make a report if such person has reasonable cause to believe a child may be an abused child or a neglected child.” Id. § 5/4(f). In exchange, Section 5/9 of the Reporting Act provides those individuals with immunity for referrals and reports made in good faith. 325 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/9. The statute also presumes good faith. Id. (“good faith. . . shall be presumed”). If a person files a report that the person knows is false, however, then he or she commits the offense of disorderly conduct. Id. § 5/4(m).

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Buckham argues that she is entitled to immunity because her statements were made in good faith. Dkt. 11, at 3. Her argument, however, ignores Day's allegation that Buckham knew her communication to the DCFS and to the foster parents was false. Regardless of whether that allegation is proven true, the Court must accept it at this stage.^[2] Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr., Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2019).

Although a presumption of good faith exists, Day's allegations are sufficient to rebut the presumption at this stage. In Lipscomb v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Services, 799 N.E.2d 293 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003), the plaintiff brought her eight-year-old daughter to the emergency room because of a fever. The administered tests included a urinalysis, which showed trace amounts of spermatozoa and led defendant's employees to believe the girl may have been sexually abused. Id. at 295. After a second urinalysis and a physical examination, the defendant realized the initial result was a mistake, but it then transferred her to another facility that it also owned. Id. at 295-96. Notwithstanding the realization that the initial test was wrong, the employees at the new facility again questioned the possibility of abuse, contacted DCFS, subjected the child to additional and repeated examinations, and refused to release the child to her mother. Id. at 296. Among other things, the court determined that the defendant was not entitled to a presumption of good faith under the Reporting Act. Id. at 299. The court explained that “the allegations

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suggest defendant did not have ‘reasonable cause to believe' [the child] may have been an abused child and raised questions of fact regarding defendant's good faith.” Id. at 300.

The same is true here. Even if the Reporting Act's presumption of good faith applies to Buckham's communication with DCFS and the foster parents, Day's allegations are enough to rebut the presumption. Day's complaint alleges that Buckham knew her communication to DCFS and the foster parents was false. And a false report is not made in good faith, especially when the Reporting Act expressly provides that false reporting amounts to disorderly conduct. § 5/4(m). Furthermore, Day's allegations present more of a reason to question whether “reasonable cause” existed than the allegations presented in Lipscomb. There, the employees at the center of the allegations worked at a separate facility than the employees that expressly knew the accusation was wrong. In other words, those allegations at least left open the possibility that the employees at issue acted in good faith. Here, Day's allegations are explicit. She alleges that the communication was knowingly false. That is enough to rebut the presumption. See also Doe v. Winny, 764 N.E.2d 143, 154 (Ill.App.Ct. 2002) (“Rather, we believe that a plaintiff must show more than mere negligence to create a question of fact as to a reporter's good faith. To raise a question of fact, the plaintiff must show that the reporter has acted maliciously, dishonestly, or for some improper purpose.”).

Thus, at this stage, the Court denies Buckham's motion to dismiss based on statutory good faith immunity. She may raise the argument later if warranted by

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factual development of the record.

III. Failure to State a Claim

Buckham next moves to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) for failure to state a claim. In other words, she challenges the sufficiency of Day's allegations. McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d 873, 879 (7th Cir. 2012).

Under Rule 8, the plaintiff must have alleged facts sufficient to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. This means that a plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 622, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true all the plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations and views them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr., Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2019). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all of the complaint's allegations are true.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 545. “But the proper question to ask is still ‘could these things have happened, not did they happen.'” Carlson v. CSX Transp. Inc., 758 F.3d 819, 827 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404-05 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis in original)).

a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Day alleges that Buckham's actions in sharing allegedly false information amounts to an intentional infliction of emotional distress, in violation of Illinois law. Buckham argues that Day's allegations are not enough to put her on notice of the

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claims against her. She contends that a weighing of the relevant factors suggests that the allegations are not enough to state a claim. Dkt. 11, at 8-9 (arguing that she is not in a position of authority, had a legitimate purpose for the report, and that Day has not pleaded a unique susceptibility to emotional distress). Buckham also contends that her statements were not made publicly to a media outlet. In making this argument, Buckham seems to assume that the Court would not incorporate Day's separately filed memorandum as part of her complaint. But, as explained above, the Court incorporates the allegations in that memorandum.

Buckham's...