Deal v. Perkins

347 So.3d 121

Francis DEAL

v.Adrian PERKINS and Caddo Parish Clerk of Court, Mike Spence, in His Official Capacity

No. 2022-C-01212

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

August 19, 2022

Scott R. Bickford, New Orleans, Leroy Havard Scott, III, Jeremy James Landry, Baton Rouge, Lawrence J. Centola, Spencer Ryan Doody, New Orleans, for Applicant.

Jerald R. Harper, Bennett Louis Politz, Shreveport, Anne Elizabeth Wilkes, Hugo A. Holland, Jr., for Respondent.

WEIMER, C.J.

Certiorari was granted in this election suit to consider the interplay between La. R.S. 18:492, which sets forth the grounds for objecting to candidacy, and La. R.S. 18:463, detailing the requirements of a notice of candidacy. Specifically, this court considers whether a candidate's incorrect certification on his notice of candidacy "that if he claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is located," required by La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(viii), serves as a ground for an objection to candidacy under La. R.S. 18:492. Resolving a split in the courts of appeal, this court holds that only those false certifications specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492(A)(5) through (7) constitute grounds for objecting to a candidate. Because the certification at issue in this case is not specifically listed in La. R.S. 18:492, it cannot serve as a basis to disqualify the candidate here. For the reasons that follow, the rulings of the lower courts are reversed.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Adrian Perkins, current mayor of Shreveport, Louisiana, seeks reelection to that office. On July 22, 2022, Perkins signed and filed a notice of candidacy form,¹ as required by La. R.S. 18:461 to become a candidate in a primary election. The requirements for the notice of candidacy are set forth in La. R.S. 18:463 and include a requirement that the candidate certify nine items.² Of particular relevance are the certifications:

(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying.

(viii) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress or a candidate who resides in a nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government, that if he claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is located.

La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2)(a)(ii) and (viii). It is undisputed that Perkins signed the form certifying all required statements and that his certification as to (viii), Item 8 on the notice of candidacy form, was incorrect. Perkins has two residences–Stratmore Circle and Marshall Street– both within the city of Shreveport. Although Perkins was registered to vote at the Stratmore Circle address at the time of his qualification, it is undisputed he maintained a homestead exemption at the Marshall Street residence. The two residences are in different voting precincts.

On July 29, 2022, Francis Deal, a qualified elector, filed a "Petition in Objection to Candidacy" asserting Perkins’ false certification on the notice of candidacy form disqualifies him from being a candidate for mayor pursuant to La. R.S. 18:492. Deal also asserted that pursuant to La. R.S. 18:101(B), Perkins was required to be registered to vote in the precinct where he claimed his homestead exemption, and his failure to do so caused him to be an unqualified elector and candidate.

On July 30, 2022, Perkins changed his voter registration to the precinct for the Marshall Street residence, where he claims a homestead exemption. On August 1, 2022, Perkins answered the petition with a general denial, and attached his affidavit with supporting documentation.³ Perkins attested to the following: he first registered to vote in the city of Shreveport in 2007 and has been registered to vote in the precinct of his Stratmore Circle residence since at least 2017; he currently resides on Marshall Street and has since 2019; he also has a residence on Stratmore Circle and resided there prior to residing on Marshall Street; his voter registration has never been cancelled. Perkins further responded that he mistakenly signed his notice of candidacy given that the residence of his homestead exemption was in a different precinct than where he was registered to vote. Perkins pointed out he corrected "his oversight." Additionally, Perkins responded that he remained a qualified elector pursuant to La. R.S. 18:191 because his voter registration had never been cancelled.

At trial, the parties stipulated to the following facts: (1) proper service on the defendants; (2) Deal is a registered voter in Precinct 113; (3) Perkins’ voter registration was at the Stratmore Circle address in Precinct 113 until July 30, 2022, at which time it was changed to the Marshall Street address in Precinct 5B; (4) the notice of candidacy attached to the petition is a true and correct copy of the one filed by Perkins; (5) the homestead exemption filing attached to the petition is a true and correct copy; and (6) Precincts 113 and 5B are different precincts and Precinct 5B contains the Marshall Street address, but not the Stratmore Circle address. Perkins’ voter registrations and his July 30, 2022 change thereof, homestead exemption documentation, and notice of candidacy were introduced into evidence pursuant to the stipulations.

Perkins was the only witness to testify. Regarding the notice of candidacy, Perkins testified that he understood he was under oath when he signed the document. He further testified that members of his campaign team helped him review the document and he conferred with his personal attorney before signing the form. Perkins understood and agreed that he had to pay certain fines in order to comply with Items 10, 11, and 12 of the form,⁴ but also conceded that he did not personally read the form the day he signed it, although he had read it before.

Regarding Item 8 of the form, concerning voter registration and homestead exemption, Perkins testified that he had conflated Items 7 and 8, both of which begin with the same phraseology.⁵ Perkins explained he thought he had already read Item 8 and continued to go down the list. Perkins also testified that both the Stratmore Circle and Marshall Street residences are within the city of Shreveport and that he has been domiciled in Shreveport since he was of voting age.

After considering the evidence, the district court disqualified Perkins as a candidate in the primary election for the office of the Mayor of the city of Shreveport. Referencing the conflicting courts of appeal opinions relied on by both parties and finding some merit to both sides of the issue, the district court ultimately found it was bound to follow Sellar v. Nance , 54,617 (La.App. 2 Cir. 3/1/22), 336 So.3d 103, which held:

Considering the integrity necessary to the process of qualifying for public office, we agree with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning and analysis in Percle v. Taylor [20-244 (La.App. 5 Cir. 8/5/20), 301 So.3d 1219 ]. The manner of qualifying in La. R.S. 18:461 is by filing an accurate notice of candidacy, under oath. We agree with our colleagues of the Fifth Circuit that any information on the notice of candidacy required to be given by oath is substantive and/or material information and that "any inaccuracies, mistakes, or false statements" made under oath regarding this information are grounds for disqualification under La. R.S. 18:492(A), as a failure to qualify in the manner prescribed by law.

Sellar , 54,617 at 18, 336 So.3d at 112-13. The district court here explained it could not agree that Perkins’ error was insignificant "because of the high standard of integrity the public requires of our elected officials and the clear language on the qualifying form." However, the district court also recognized that nothing adduced at trial "suggested that the mayor had any nefarious purpose in making the error, nor that he sought any personal or political advantage from the inaccuracy. His testimony established, rather, that it was simply an oversight attendant upon changing residence while serving in public office."

The court of appeal affirmed, with two of the three judges concurring with reasons. Deal v. Perkins , 54,892 (La.App. 2 Cir. 8/8/22), 346 So.3d 380. The appellate court essentially found Perkins failed to qualify in the manner prescribed by law. The court explained that La. R.S. 18:463(A)(2) sets forth the requirements for a notice of candidacy, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) The notice of candidacy also shall include a certificate, signed by the candidate, certifying all of the following:

....

(i) That he has read the notice of his candidacy.

(ii) That he meets the qualifications of the office for which he is qualifying.

....

(viii) Except for a candidate for United States senator or representative in congress or a candidate who resides in a nursing home as defined in R.S. 40:2009.2 or in a veterans’ home operated by the state or federal government, that if he claims a homestead exemption on a residence pursuant to Article VII, Section 20 of the Constitution of Louisiana, he is registered and votes in the precinct in which that residence is located.

(ix) That all of the statements contained in it are true and correct.

Deal , 54,892, 346 So.3d at 385. Further, La. R.S. 18:101(B) provides for the homestead exemption and voter registration, in relevant part, as follows:

For purposes of the laws governing voter registration and voting, "resident" means a citizen who resides in this state and in the parish, municipality, if any, and precinct in which he offers to register and vote, with an intention to reside there indefinitely. If a citizen resides at more than one place in the state with an intention to reside there indefinitely, he may register and vote only at one of the places at which

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