Deanda v. Becerra

645 F.Supp.3d 600

Alexander R. DEANDA, Plaintiff, v. Xavier BECERRA, et al., Defendants.

2:20-CV-092-Z

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Amarillo Division

Signed December 8, 2022

Jonathan F. Mitchell, Austin, TX, Alex Lee Yarbrough, Riney & Mayfield LLP, Amarillo, TX, W. Heath Hendricks, Underwood Law, Amarillo, TX, Charles W. Fillmore, H. Dustin Fillmore, III, The Fillmore Law Firm LLP, Fort Worth, TX, Douglas Bryan Hughes, Pro Hac Vice, Law Office of D. Bryan Hughes, Tyler, TX, for Plaintiff.

Amber Justine Richer, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

MATTHEW J. KACSMARYK, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court are parties' competing motions for summary judgment. Plaintiff Alexander R. Deanda filed his Motion for Summary Judgment ("Motion") (ECF No. 50) on July 25, 2022. Defendants filed their Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Cross-Motion") (ECF No. 52) on August 19, 2022. Having considered the motions, pleadings, and relevant law, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion and renders summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor on all claims. The Court DENIES Defendants' Cross-Motion.

BACKGROUND

Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service ("PHS") Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 et seq., to "mak[e] comprehensive voluntary family planning services readily available to all persons desiring such services." Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-572, § 2(1), 84 Stat. 1504 (1970). The PHS authorizes the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services ("HHS") to "make grants to and enter into contracts with public or nonprofit private entities to assist in the establishment and operation of voluntary family planning projects which shall offer a broad range of acceptable and effective family planning methods and services (including natural family planning methods, infertility services, and services for adolescents)." 42 U.S.C. § 300(a). In 1981, Congress amended the statute to include the current requirement that, "[t]o the extent practical," participating entities "shall encourage family participation in projects assisted under this subsection." Id.; see also Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 931(b)(1), 95 Stat. 357 (1981). HHS regulations now provide that "Title X projects may not require consent of parents or guardians for the provision of services to minors[.]" 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(b); see also 86 Fed. Reg. 56,144, 56,166 (Oct. 7, 2021).

Plaintiff is a Christian who is "raising each of [his] daughters in accordance with Christian teaching on matters of sexuality, which requires unmarried children to practice abstinence and refrain from sexual intercourse until marriage." ECF No. 51-1 at 1. Texas Family Code § 151.001(a)(6) protects Plaintiff's free exercise of religion in this regard because it protects "the right to consent to the child's ... medical and dental care, and psychiatric, psychological, and surgical treatment." Texas law also provides Plaintiff standing to sue for a violation of Section 151.001(a)(6). See TEX. FAM. CODE § 102.003(a)(1).

Plaintiff alleges Defendants' administration of Title X impedes this statutory right and his parental rights under the U.S. Constitution because Defendants: (1) fail to monitor grantees to ensure compliance; and (2) continue to fund grantees that violate Section 151.001(a)(6). ECF No. 1 at 5-7. Arguing Title X does not preempt "parental consent" laws, Plaintiff alleges his injures include, but are not limited to: (1) loss of his statutory rights under Section 151.001(a)(6); (2) the subversion of his authority as a parent; (3) loss of assurance that his children will be unable to access prescription contraception or other family planning services that facilitate sexual promiscuity and pre-marital sex; and (4) weakening of his ability to raise his children under the teachings of his Christian faith. ECF No. 51-1 at 2. Plaintiff asks this Court to declare that Section 151.001(a)(6) applies to all Title X grantees in Texas. See ECF No. 1 at 3-5. Plaintiff further asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from funding any Texas-based Title X grantee that violates Section 151.001(a)(6). Id. at 7.

LEGAL STANDARD

A court "shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is "material" if its existence or non-existence "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "[T]he substantive law will identify which facts are material." Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A genuine issue of material fact exists "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. "On cross-motions for summary judgment, [the Court] review[s] each party's motion independently, viewing the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Texas v. Rettig, 987 F.3d 518, 526 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Amerisure Ins. Co. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 611 F.3d 299, 304 (5th Cir. 2010)).

When reviewing summary-judgment evidence, the court must resolve all reasonable doubts and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-movant. Walker v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 853 F.2d 355, 358 (5th Cir. 1988). A court cannot make a credibility determination when considering conflicting evidence or competing inferences. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. If some evidence supports a disputed allegation, so that "reasonable minds could differ as to the import of the evidence," the court must deny the motion. Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

ANALYSIS

The Court will address parties' standing and statute-of-limitations arguments before moving to their merits arguments.

A. Plaintiff Has Standing

The judicial power of federal courts is limited to certain "Cases" and "Controversies." U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The case-or-controversy requirement requires a plaintiff to establish he has standing to sue. See Gill v. Whitford, — U.S. —, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1923, 201 L.Ed.2d 313 (2018); Cibolo Waste, Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 718 F.3d 469, 473 (5th Cir. 2013) ("Every party that comes before a federal court must establish that it has standing to pursue its claims."). Standing is "an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III." Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992).

To have standing, the party invoking federal jurisdiction must establish he suffered: (1) an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent"; (2) an injury that is "fairly ... trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant"; and (3) an injury that is "likely" rather than "speculative[ly]" to be "redressed by a favorable decision." Id. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130. "[S]tanding is not dispensed in gross; rather, plaintiffs must demonstrate standing for each claim that they press and for each form of relief that they seek (for example, injunctive relief and damages)." TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, — U.S. —, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2208, 210 L.Ed.2d 568 (2021).

1. Plaintiff satisfies the first Lujan factor.

The first Lujan factor considers whether a plaintiff has sustained an "injury in fact" that is "concrete and particularized" and "actual or imminent." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. A "concrete" injury must be "de facto." Spoken, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 340, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016). That is, it must "actually exist" and be "real" rather than "abstract." Id. A "particularized" injury "must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

One who seeks injunctive or declaratory relief must show an injury with "continuing, present adverse effects" or a "substantial likelihood that he will suffer injury in the future." Bauer v. Texas, 341 F.3d 352, 358 (5th Cir. 2003); see also TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2210 ("[A] person exposed to a risk of future harm may pursue forward-looking, injunctive relief to prevent the harm from occurring, at least so long as the risk of harm is sufficiently imminent and substantial."). "[E]ven a small probability of injury is sufficient to create a case or controversy — to take a suit out of the category of the hypothetical — provided of course that the relief sought would, if granted, reduce the probability." Village of Elk Grove Village v. Evans, 997 F.2d 328, 329 (7th Cir. 1993); see also, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 525 n.23, 127 S.Ct. 1438, 167 L.Ed.2d 248 (2007); Mo. Coal. for Env't v. FERC, 544 F.3d 955, 957 (8th Cir. 2008); Stewart v. Blackwell, 444 F.3d 843, 855 (6th Cir. 2006), vacated and superseded on other grounds, 473 F.3d 692 (6th Cir. 2007); Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 464 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Ocean Advocs. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 402 F.3d 846, 860 (9th Cir. 2005); Friends of Marolt Park v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., 382 F.3d 1088, 1095 (10th Cir. 2004).

A court should assess whether the alleged injury to the plaintiff has a "close relationship" to a harm "traditionally" recognized as providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts. TransUnion, 141 S. Ct. at 2204. "[A] plaintiff doesn't need to demonstrate that the level of harm he has suffered would be actionable under a similar, common-law cause of action. But he does need to show that the type of harm he's suffered is similar in kind to a type of harm that the common law has recognized as actionable." Perez v. McCreary, Veselka, Bragg & Allen, P.C., 45 F.4th 816, 822 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, 49 F.4th 931, 940-41 (5th Cir. 2022) (Ho., J, concurring) (stating evidence of injury required by TransUnion is not burdensome).

a. Plaintiff suffers from an injury in fact.

"[T]he actual or threatened injury required by Art. III may exist solely by...