Deaton v. Town of Barrington

100 F.4th 348

John DEATON, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. TOWN OF BARRINGTON; James Cunha, Town Manager, Town of Barrington;David Wyrostek, individually, and in his official capacity as police officer for theTown of Barrington; Anthony DeCristoforo, individually,and in his official capacity as police officer for the Town of Barrington;Timothy Harrington, individually, and in his official capacityas police officer for the Town of Barrington; John Lacross, individually,and in his official capacity as police officer for theTown of Barrington, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 23-1794

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit

May 3, 2024

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF RHODE ISLAND [Hon. William E. Smith, U.S. District Judge]

John E. Deaton, with whom Deaton Law Firm LLC, was on brief, for appellant.

Marc DeSisto, with whom Sarah D. Boucher, Kathleen A. Hilton, and DeSisto Law LLC, were on brief, for appellees.

Before Gelpí, Howard, and Rikelman, Circuit Judges.

GELPÍ, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellant John Deaton ("Deaton") was arrested and charged with assault, battery, and disorderly conduct. Although the charges were later dismissed, he brought state and federal claims against the Town of Barrington and other individuals in their capacities as police officers and town manager (the "Defendants"). The Defendants removed the case from Providence County Superior Court to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island, Deaton's motion for remand was unsuccessful, and then he added federal claims via an amended complaint. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on most counts, and remanded three counts, one in full and two in part, for the state court to resolve. Deaton now appeals, arguing that the district court improperly found that probable cause to arrest him existed, that it improperly denied his post-judgment motion, and that it should have abstained and remanded to state court to allow the state claims to be resolved. We disagree and affirm.

I. Background

When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the relevant facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, in this case, Deaton. See Mancini v. City of Providence ex rel. Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 2018). The facts below are undisputed unless noted otherwise.

A. Facts

In September 2017, Deaton and his partner attended a Pop Warner football game in Barrington, Rhode Island.¹ Deaton's partner's ex-husband, Ronald Warner ("Warner"), and his new partner were also in attendance. A verbal and physical altercation occurred between Deaton and Warner, and while the details of the encounter are disputed, it is undisputed that Deaton said something to the effect of not wanting to "whip [Warner's] ass." Warner called 911 and claimed he was assaulted by Deaton. While Warner claimed that Deaton "put his hands on [Warner's] throat," Deaton claimed that he pushed Warner away and likely touched his throat or "neck area." A football coach told the men to "knock it off and get out of there."

The Barrington Police Department dispatched Officers David Wyrostek ("Officer Wyrostek") and Anthony DeCristoforo ("Officer DeCristoforo") to Barrington High School where Officer Wyrostek arrived first and spoke with Warner. Warner claimed Deaton placed his hands on his throat and choked him. Officer Wyrostek did not notice any apparent injuries on Warner. As Deaton drove by, Warner pointed him out to Officer Wyrostek who immediately pulled Deaton over. Officer Wyrostek allowed Deaton to exit the car and told Deaton that Warner claimed Deaton choked him, which Deaton denied. Shortly after this exchange, Officer Wyrostek placed Deaton in handcuffs and told him he was being arrested for simple assault and battery and disorderly conduct.

Officer DeCristoforo arrived at the field shortly after Officer Wyrostek pulled over Deaton. Officer DeCristoforo spoke with Warner and his partner, confirming the account Warner gave to Officer Wyrostek. Officer DeCristoforo obtained a witness statement from the football coach who stated that he witnessed Deaton "put his right hand on [Warner's] throat."² Officer DeCristoforo noted that Warner's throat was not red, swollen, or had any indication of finger marks. After Deaton had been handcuffed, Officer DeCristoforo told Officer Wyrostek that he had a witness who confirmed Warner's story. Later that day, Officer DeCristoforo became aware of an active arrest warrant for Warner who was then arrested pursuant to that warrant.³ After approximately two hours at the police station, Deaton was released on his own recognizance.

B. Procedural History

The Town of Barrington prosecuted the charges against Deaton. The criminal case was scheduled for trial in state court, but the town dismissed the charges without prejudice, with Warner's consent, in exchange for Deaton's completion of thirty hours of community service. Deaton then filed suit in Providence County Superior Court. Deaton alleged civil rights violations pursuant to 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) for unlawful arrest (Count I), civil rights violations for false imprisonment under 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-1 (1956) (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), conspiracy to violate his civil rights under 9 R.I. Gen. Laws § 9-31-1 (1956) (Count IV), invasion of privacy (Count V), assault and battery (Count VI), failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count VIII). Deaton also alleged violations of the United States Constitution, including the "right to be secure in his person [and] to equal protection of the laws of Due Process in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."

The Defendants removed the matter to the United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island on federal question grounds. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441, 1446. Deaton moved to remand, which the district court denied because the complaint "clearly alleged violations of state and federal law." Deaton then amended his complaint, adding claims of unreasonable search and seizure pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count IX), conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count X),⁴ and failure to intervene pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count XI).

The Defendants moved for summary judgment on all counts arguing that Deaton's arrest was justified and that the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, entering judgment on false imprisonment in violation of 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-1 (1956) (Count II), malicious prosecution (Count III), invasion of privacy (Count V), assault and battery (Count VI), unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment (Count IX), conspiracy to violate Plaintiff's constitutional rights (Counts IV and X) and failure to intervene (Count XI), and partially granted summary judgment for failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count VIII) in relation to those counts. The district court remanded to the Rhode Island state court claims for unlawful arrest in violation of 12 R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-7-3 (1956) (Count I) and failure to supervise (Count VII), and municipal liability (Count VIII) in relation to Count I. Deaton filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. Deaton now timely appeals both decisions.

II. Discussion

Deaton argues that summary judgment was not proper because (1) probable cause to arrest Deaton did not exist at the time of his arrest, (2) several facts materially undermined the determination of probable cause, and (3) the district court improperly made credibility determinations and weighed the evidence. In addition, Deaton argues that (4) denial of Deaton's post-judgment motion was plain error, and (5) the district court should have abstained and remanded to allow full resolution of the state court claims by the state court. His arguments are unpersuasive. Therefore, we affirm the district court's judgment.

A. Summary Judgment

1. Standard of Review

We review a district court's determination of a summary judgment motion de novo. See López-Hernández v. Terumo P.R. LLC, 64 F.4th 22, 28 (1st Cir. 2023) (citing Murray v. Kindred Nursing Ctrs. W. LLC, 789 F.3d 20, 25 (1st Cir. 2015)). We examine the record in "the light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw[ ] all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Id. Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A 'genuine' issue is one on which the evidence would enable a reasonable jury to find the fact in favor of either party," and "[a] 'material' fact is one that is relevant in the sense that it has the capacity to change the outcome of the jury's determination." Perez v. Lorraine Enters., Inc., 769 F.3d 23, 29 (1st Cir. 2014) (first citing Vasapolli v. Rostoff, 39 F.3d 27, 32 (1st Cir. 1994); and then citing Borges ex rel. S.M.B.W. v. Serrano-Isern, 605 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2010)). When the material facts, "what the police knew at the moment of the arrest, the source of their knowledge, and the leads that they pursued or eschewed," are undisputed, as they are here, "the existence vel non of probable cause ordinarily is amenable to summary judgment." Acosta v. Ames Dep't Stores, Inc., 386 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2004).

2. Probable Cause⁵

Deaton asks us to find that probable cause did not exist at the time of his arrest and therefore the district court's grant of summary judgment should be vacated. We disagree. Because the facts, when viewed in the light most favorable to Deaton, support a finding of probable cause at the time of his arrest, we affirm the district court.⁶

Counts II, III, IV, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, and XI hinge on Deaton's claim of lack of probable cause to arrest.⁷ Deaton was arrested for misdemeanor assault, battery, and disorderly conduct. Assault is "a...