Dedjoe v. Esper

BENJAMIN DEDJOE, Plaintiff, v. DR. MARK T. ESPER, in his official capacity asthe Secretary of the Army,¹ Defendant.

1:15-CV-1170

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 19, 2019

THOMAS J. McAVOY, Senior United States District Judge

DECISION & ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

Following a jury verdict in favor of Defendant Department of the Army on Plaintiff Benjamin Dedjoe's sole remaining claim, Plaintiff moves for judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, a new trial. Dkt. Nos. 104 & 117. Also, Defendant moves to confirm its Bill of Costs (Dkt. No. 105), and to redact portions of the trial transcript (Dkt. No. 114). The Court addresses these motions seriatim.

II. BACKGROUND

The Court presumes familiarity with the procedural and factual background of thiscase, and recites portions of this background only where necessary to decide the pending motions.

III. DISCUSSION

a. Plaintiff's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial

1. Rule 50 Standard of Review

Plaintiff moves for a judgment as a matter of law pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). In reviewing the motion, "[t]he court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant and 'give that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence" bearing in mind that a jury is free to believe or disbelieve any part of a witness' testimony. Jones v. Town of E. Haven, 691 F.3d 72, 80 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 371 (2d Cir. 2007)). The Court may "disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required to believe," Zellner, 494 F.3d at 371 (quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 135 (2000)), and is required "to give [the non-moving] party the benefit of all reasonable inferences that the jury might have drawn in his favor from the evidence. The court cannot assess the weight of conflicting evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute its judgment for that of the jury." Tolbert v. Queens College, 242 F.3d 58, 70 (2d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).

The moving party thus bears a heavy burden, especially where, as here, "the jury has deliberated in the case and actually returned its verdict in favor of the non-movant." Cash v. Cty. of Erie, 654 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2011)(internal quotation marks omitted). "A judgment notwithstanding the verdict may only be granted if there exists such a completeabsence of evidence supporting the verdict that the jury's findings could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture, or the evidence in favor of the movant is so overwhelming that reasonable and fair minded persons could not arrive at a verdict against it." Wiercinski v. Mangia 57, Inc., 787 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2. Rule 59 Standard of Review

In the alternative, Plaintiff moves for a new trial pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59. The Court may "grant a new trial on all or some of the issues . . . for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court[.]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(a)(1)(A). "The general grounds for a new trial are that (1) the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence; (2) the trial court was not fair; (3) substantial errors occurred in the admission or rejection of evidence or the giving or refusal of instructions to the jury; or (4) damages are excessive." Lawson v. Cty. of Suffolk, 920 F. Supp. 2d 332, 339 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)(citing 12 Moore's Federal Practice, § 59.13[1] at 59-43 (3d Ed. 2005)).

"A district court should grant a new trial motion if it 'is convinced that the jury has reached a seriously erroneous result or that the verdict is a miscarriage of justice.'" United States v. Landau, 155 F.3d 93, 104 (2d Cir. 1998) (quoting Smith v. Lighting Bolt Productions, Inc., 835 F.2d 966, 970 (2d Cir. 1987)); see Raedle v. Credit Agricole Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 417-18 (2d Cir. 2012) ("'[A] decision is against the weight of the evidence . . . if and only if the verdict is (1) seriously erroneous or (2) a miscarriage of justice.'")(quoting Farrior v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 2002)). Such a motion may be granted "even if there is substantial evidence to support the jury'sverdict." Landau, 155 F.3d at 104. Though a trial judge "is free to weigh the evidence himself, and need not view it in the light most favorable to the verdict winner," DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998), a jury's verdict should "rarely be disturbed." Farrior v. Waterford Bd. of Educ., 277 F.3d 633, 635 (2d Cir. 2002) (per curiam); see also Carroll v. Cty. of Monroe, 712 F.3d 649, 653 (2d Cir. 2013); Raedle, 670 F.3d at 417-18. Evaluations of the evidence should be made with a "high degree of deference ... to the jury's evaluation of witness credibility...," ING Global v. United Parcel Serv. Oasis Supply Corp., 757 F.3d 92, 97-98 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), and "a trial judge's disagreement with the jury's verdict is not a sufficient reason to grant a new trial.'" Lawson, 920 F. Supp.2d at 344 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

3. Analysis - Sufficiency of the Trial Evidence

The only claim before the jury was whether Plaintiff was ordered to leave the U.S. Army Watervliet Arsenal on November 7, 2012 in retaliation for his prior informal complaints of race-based discrimination. The jury was instructed that to prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that: (1) he engaged in "protected activity" under Title VII by making prior informal complaints of race-based discrimination; (2) Defendant was aware of this protected activity; (3) Plaintiff was then subjected to a material adverse action, and (4) Plaintiff's protected activity was the determinative factor in the material adverse action. See Trial Trans. ("TT") at 714. The dispute on the instant motion concerns whether Plaintiff satisfied the fourth element. On this element, the Court instructed the jury:

Plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have been taken, or would have been substantially less adverse, were it not for Plaintiff's protected activity. This does not require proof that retaliation was the only cause of the adverse action, but Plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have occurred in the absence of a retaliatory motive. Put another way, Plaintiff must prove that but for his prior complaints, he would not have been subjected to the alleged adverse action on November 7, 2012.

Id. at 715.

The Court also instructed the jury that "[a]n employer may take adverse decisions against an employee for any reason, good or bad, as long as it is not retaliatory," id. at 716, and that whether Arsenal security officers' interactions with Plaintiff were motivated by racial animus was not an issue before the jury. Id. at 718. Rather, the Court instructed the jury: "The issues for you to decide are whether Arsenal security officers retaliated against Plaintiff for having made complaints of unlawful employment practices when they instructed him to leave the Arsenal property on November 7, 2012, and whether the Defendant is liable for such conduct." Id.

Here, when viewing the trial evidence in the light most favorable to Defendant, it cannot be said that there was such a complete absence of evidence that the jury's verdict could only have been the result of sheer surmise and conjecture. The jury heard testimony that at midday on November 7, 2012, Arsenal Security Officer Brad Frasco was dispatched to the Arsenal Visitor Center to provide assistance to other security officers dealing with a dispute with Plaintiff. Id. at 544-45, 636-38. Before entering, Frasco heard loud yelling coming from inside, id. at 546, 553, and once inside the Visitor Center saw that Plaintiff was very upset, was "pounding" on the counter, and yelling that the two security officers behind the counter were "messing" with him. Id. at 555, 559. Frasco learned that Plaintiff wasupset because he was told he had to provide his full Social Security number on an Arsenal parking form. Id. at 557. Frasco told Plaintiff to go about his business filling out the parking form, id. at 558, 559, but Plaintiff accused Frasco and members of the security force of being "gangsters" and singling Plaintiff out for harassment. Id. at 559. Plaintiff said he was "a hot commodity," that the federal government needed him more than he needed it, and that he could work anywhere. Id. Frasco told Plaintiff "that's fine," but if he planned on staying he needed to fill out the paperwork properly and then go about his day. Id. Plaintiff responded by asking Frasco if he wanted to assault him. Id. Plaintiff then stated that the security officers were harassing him because he is black. Id. Frasco believed Plaintiff was trying to incite an altercation and bait the officers into acting unprofessionally. Id. at 561. He responded by saying to Plaintiff: "[N]ow it's time for you to go, you're not gonna sit here and call us racists," telling Plaintiff that he would have to leave the Arsenal for the rest of the day. Id. at 560. Plaintiff said he was not going anywhere. Id. at 561. Frasco yelled at Plaintiff to "get the f - - k outta the Visitor Center," id. at 561, at which point Plaintiff walked into the parking lot followed by Frasco. Id. at 562.

Frasco called his supervisor, Captain Osgood, to effectuate removing Plaintiff from the Arsenal. Id. at 562-63. When Osgood arrived at the Visitor Center, Frasco and Dedjoe were standing in the parking lot. Id. at 638. Frasco informed Osgood that Dedjoe became belligerent and aggressive inside the Visitor Center, accused the officers of singling him out because of his race, called the officers racists and gangsters, and was yelling and banging on the counter. Id. at 565-66, 641. Frasco advised...