Dees v. Zurlo

1

JENNIFER LYNN DEES and ETHAN DAVIS SMITH, Plaintiffs, v. MICHAEL ZURLO, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:24-CV-1 (MAD/DJS)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

May 21, 2024

JENNIFER LYNN DEES and ETHAN DAVIS SMITH Plaintiffs, pro se

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

Mae A D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

On January 2, 2024, Plaintiffs Jennifer Lynn Dees and Ethan Davis Smith commenced this action, pro se, against fifty-three Defendants. See Dkt. No. 1. In their 170-page complaint, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have deprived them of various constitutional rights because of Defendants' roles and involvement in state-court custody, support, and/or criminal disputes. See id. Plaintiffs submitted applications to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP") and for leave to file electronically. See Dkt. Nos. 2, 3, 4, 5.

On March 11, 2024, Magistrate Judge Daniel J. Stewart issued an Order granting Plaintiffs' IFP motions. See Dkt. No. 11. Magistrate Judge Stewart also issued a Report- Recommendation and Order reviewing Plaintiffs' complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and recommending that the complaint be dismissed. See Dkt. No. 12. He also ordered that Plaintiffs be denied leave to file electronically. See id.

Plaintiffs objected to every single aspect of the Report-Recommendation and Order. See Dkt. No. 13.^[1] "Generally, when a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo review." Boice v. M+W U.S., Inc., 130 F.Supp.3d 677, 683 (N.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C)). "To be 'specific,' the objection must, with particularity, 'identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations, or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.'" Id. (quoting N.D.N.Y. L.R. 72.1(c)) (footnote omitted). "When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review." Id. at 684 (citations omitted). "Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error review." Id. (footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

As Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the Court must review their complaint under a more lenient standard. See Govan v. Campbell, 289 F.Supp.2d 289, 295 (N.D.N.Y. 2003). The Court must "make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights because of their lack of legal training." Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983). Thus, "a document filed pro se is 'to be liberally construed,' and 'a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). "Although the court has the duty to show liberality towards pro se litigants, . . . there is a responsibility on the court to determine that a claim has some arguable basis in law before permitting a plaintiff to proceed with an action in forma pauperis." Moreman v. Douglas, 848 F.Supp. 332, 333-34 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (internal citations omitted).

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs summarize their claims at the beginning of their complaint as allegations against "a broad spectrum of governmental entities and private defendants" including judges, attorneys, family members, the Saratoga County Sheriff's Office, district attorneys' offices, departments of social service, Warren County, Saratoga County, and the City of Mechanicville. Dkt. No. 1 at ¶ 2. The complaint concerns New York State Family Court and County Court proceedings and events related to custody and supervision of Plaintiff Smith's children. The proceedings are primarily between Plaintiff Smith and Defendant Veronica Smith-the mother of his children. Plaintiff Dees is Plaintiff Smith's partner. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate their constitutional rights as well as Plaintiff Smith's rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq., and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794.

For a fuller recitation of the relevant background information, the Court refers to Plaintiffs' complaint and Magistrate Judge Stewart's Report-Recommendation and Order. See generally Dkt. No. 1; see also Dkt. No. 12 at 4-5.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine

In his Report-Recommendation and Order, Magistrate Judge Stewart first addressed the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, under which federal courts are divested of jurisdiction over claims that seek to overrule state court determinations. See Dkt. No. 12 at 8-9; see also Green v. Mattingly, 585 F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 2009). Magistrate Judge Stewart concluded that because Plaintiffs' complaint seeks to overturn state-court custody and support decisions, the Court's review of Plaintiffs' claims is barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Dkt. No. 12 at 8. Plaintiffs object, arguing that because they have appealed the state court decisions, and those appeals have not been decided, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Dkt. No. 13 at 1-3.

"The Supreme Court has explained that Rooker-Feldman bars 'a party losing in state court . . . from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court.'" Hunter v. McMahon, 75 F.4th 62, 67 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). "Rooker-Feldman 'is confined to cases of the kind from which the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.'" Id. at 67-68 (quotation omitted). "The doctrine 'does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doctrine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court actions.'" Id. at 68 (quotation omitted).

The doctrine "'applies only in limited circumstances where a party in effect seeks to take an appeal of an unfavorable state-court decision to a lower federal court.'" Id. (quoting Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459, 466 (2006)). In adopting "the unanimous position of every other circuit court to address it[,]" the Second Circuit in Hunter held that "[i]f a federal-court plaintiff's state-court appeal remains pending when she files her federal suit, the state-court proceedings have not ended and Rooker-Feldman does not apply." Id. at 70 (quoting Butcher v. Wendt, 975 F.3d 236, 246 (2d Cir. 2020) (Menashi, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).

In their objections, Plaintiffs list eight "currently pending" appeals. Dkt. No. 13 at 1-2. The relevant inquiry is whether those appeals were pending when they filed their complaint with this Court on January 2, 2024. See Dkt. No. 1; see also Hunter, 75 F.4th at 71 (quoting E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc. v. Lloyd's & Cos., 241 F.3d 154, 163 (2d Cir. 2001)) ("[F]ederal courts 'assess[ ] jurisdiction . . . as of the moment the complaint was filed'"). Upon the Court's review of the state court dockets, seven of the eight appeals that Plaintiffs list were pending at the time they filed their complaint in this Court. See Smith v. Smith, CV-23-1726 (3d Dep't 2023); Smith v. Smith, CV-23-1805 (3d Dep't 2023); Veronica LL. v. Ethan LL., CV-23-1874 (3d Dep't 2023); Smith v. Smith, CV-23-1265 (3d Dep't 2023); Smith v. Smith, CV-23-1642 (3d Dep't 2023); Matter of Smith v. Smith, CV-23-2087 (3d Dep't 2023); Matter of Smith v. Smith, CV-23-2195 (3d Dep't 2023); Matter of Ethan LL v. Veronica LL, CV-24-0306 (3d Dep't 2024). Plaintiffs also contend that their "Article 78 action CV-23-1727, against multiple defendants still remains open." Dkt. No. 13 at 2. Upon the Court's search of that case number in the New York State Unified Court System Electronic Filing System, it appears that the final entry is an "order" dated November 21, 2023. See Ethan Smith et. al. v. Karen Heggen et. al., CV-23-1727 (3d Dep't 2023), Dkt. No. 36. The Court is unable to view the document as it is sealed. See id. Plaintiffs do not contend that they appealed this "order" from the Appellate Division.

To the extent Plaintiffs have not appealed Supreme Court, Family Court, or Appellate Division decisions, and such decisions are final, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes the Court's consideration of the decisions in which Plaintiffs lost. Insofar as appeals are pending in the Appellate Division from Supreme Court or Family Court decisions, Plaintiffs are correct that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply. See Hunter, 75 F.4th at 67-71. However, even where the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply, as thoroughly set forth in Magistrate Judge Stewart's Report-Recommendation and Order, Plaintiffs' complaint must be dismissed on numerous other grounds.

B. Younger Abstention

Magistrate Judge Stewart next addressed the Younger abstention doctrine which mandates that federal courts abstain from interfering in claims seeking declaratory or injunctive relief over ongoing state proceedings. See Dkt. No 12 at 10 (citing Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-44 (1971))....