DeFilippo v. Cnty. of Stanislaus

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GEORGIA DEFILIPPO, et al., Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF STANISLAUS, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:18-cv-00496-DJC-BAM

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 8, 2023

ORDER

DANIEL J. CALABRETTA, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This action concerns Plaintiffs' arrest and prosecution by Defendants in connection with the alleged murder of Korey Kauffman. Plaintiffs raise a number of claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California state law based on their arrest and the investigation that preceded it. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss some of the claims raised in the Third Amended Complaint. (Defs.' Mot. (ECF No. 115).) For the reasons stated below Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

Plaintiffs are the wife and daughter of criminal defense attorney Frank Carson. Carson was arrested in 2015 on suspicion that he was involved in a murder for hire scheme that resulted in the murder of Korey Kauffman. Plaintiffs were also arrested and charged in connection with the alleged murder but these charges were dismissed by the assigned judge after a lengthy preliminary hearing. Plaintiffs claim that the arrest of Carson and Plaintiffs was the result of a conspiracy to retaliate against Carson for his actions as a defense attorney. Plaintiffs have filed the present suit against both county and city Defendants based on the alleged violations of Plaintiffs' federal civil rights as well as violations of California state law.

The Court previously partially granted Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and dismissed Plaintiffs' complaint with leave to amend. After Plaintiffs submitted a Third Amended Complaint (“TAC”), Defendants filed the present Motion to Dismiss.^[1]

II. Legal Standard on Motion to Dismiss

A party may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted if the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or if there are insufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201, 1208 (9th Cir. 2019). The Court assumes all factual allegations are true and construes them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Steinle v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 919 F.3d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 2019). A complaint must plead “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). However, the Court must “draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014).

III. Allegations in the Complaint

In the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs include dozens of pages of detailed factual allegations which can be summarized as follows: Plaintiffs Georgia DeFilippo and Christina DeFilippo, along with attorney Frank Carson, were arrested on August 14, 2015, and accused of involvement with a murder for hire scheme that resulted in the death of Korey Kauffman, who had been reported missing in April 2012.^[2] (TAC at 7.) Carson was “reviled by many in law enforcement” as well as the Stanislaus County District Attorney's office (“SCDA”). (Id.) The murder for hire theory was based in part on the idea that Kauffman was suspected of a prior theft from Carson's property. (Id. at 8-9.) On April 4, 2012, shortly after Kauffman's disappearance, Defendant Kirk Bunch filed a report about a conversation with Michael Cooley, Carson's neighbor and purportedly the last person to see Kauffman alive. (Id. at 9.) In Defendant Bunch's report, Cooley “sought to implicate Carson, and by extension Plaintiffs” in Kauffman's death. (Id.) After prosecutors learned of the potential link between Carson and Kauffman's disappearance, the SCDA “[s]uddenly . . . became very interested in this missing person case.” (Id.)

Defendants Harris and Birgit Fladager created a task force to investigate Kauffman's disappearance. (Id.) Defendant Fladager supervised the investigation team which included Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, Cory Brown, and Jon Evers. (Id. at 10.) Defendant Harris was also originally responsible for supervising these Defendants but was later replaced by Defendant Marlissa Ferreira after Defendant Harris “was accused of jury tampering and contempt of court in a case he had with Carson as [opposing] counsel.” (Id. at 10-11.)

During the investigation, Plaintiffs were never accused by any witness of involvement in a crime. (Id. at 11.) Multiple other suspects were disregarded and exculpatory evidence was not disclosed to the judge who signed Plaintiffs' arrest warrants. (Id. at 11-15.) As part of the investigation, Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers conducted a seven-hour interrogation of Robert Woody after he was recorded saying he had killed Kauffman. (Id. at 15-16.) Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers informed Woody of the theory involving Carson and Plaintiffs and pressured Woody despite him repeatedly denying “any involvement in, or knowledge of, the Kauffman murder . . . .” (Id. at 16.) Woody was threatened with the death penalty and life in prison, and told he had an opportunity to implicate others in the murder. (Id.) During the interrogation, Woody took a 20-minute bathroom break, accompanied by Defendants Bunch and Jacobson. (Id. at 17.) This period was not recorded and when Woody returned, he repeated back part of the theory that Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers had told him previously: “that [Woody's] employers, Baljit Athwal and Daljit Athwal had murdered Kauffman and that they did it because they were asked by Carson to watch over his property for thieves.” (Id.) Defendants Bunch, Jacobson, and Evers conducted several additional interviews with Woody over the next two years during which they reinforced what Woody had told them. (Id. at 1822.) Woody eventually recanted his confession on April 24, 2014, and passed a polygraph stating that he had nothing to do with Kauffman's murder. (Id. at 22-23.)

On August 13, 2015, Defendant Brown submitted a Ramey Warrant for Plaintiffs' arrest. (Id. at 23.) The preparation of this warrant request was “a ‘group consensus' between [Defendant Brown] and Defendants Fladager, Ferreira, Bunch, Evers, and Jacobson on what charges to seek and what facts to include (and exclude) in the warrant.” (Id. at 23.) The ultimate warrant was a 325-page “unorganized, rambling document” that failed to establish probable cause. (Id. at 23-25.) The arrest warrant also contained a number of “fabrications, material omissions[,] and misleading statements.” (Id. at 26-29.)

After Plaintiffs' arrest, Georgia DeFilippo remained in jail for fifty days and was eventually released on $4.5 million bail. (Id. at 29.) Christina DeFilippo was released after booking. (Id.) “A preliminary hearing began on October 13, 2015, and continued for 18 months, one of the longest in California history.” (Id.) The charges against Plaintiffs were eventually dismissed on April 10, 2017, by Superior Court Judge Barbara Zuniga who found that probable cause did not exist. (Id. at 30.)

IV. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss

A. Claims That Plaintiffs Concede Should be Dismissed

As an initial matter, in response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs concede two categories of claims should be dismissed.

First, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs improperly brought suit against Defendants in their official capacity as the Court previously dismissed these claims as redundant to Plaintiffs' claims against Stanislaus County. (Defs.' Mot. at 3.) In their opposition, Plaintiffs concede that these official claims are improper and state they were included due to a “drafting error.” (Pls.' Opp'n (ECF No. 121) at 3.) Plaintiffs state these claims are no longer being asserted by the Plaintiffs. (Id.) Accordingly, claims against Fladager, Harris, Ferreira, Bunch, Jacobson, and Brown in their official capacities are dismissed.

Second, Defendants argue in their motion that Defendants Fladager and Harris are not proper parties to a Monell municipal liability claim. (Defs.' Mot. at 9.) In the opposition, Plaintiffs also concede this point and voluntarily dismiss the claims against Fladager and Harris based on municipal liability. (Pls.' Opp'n at 3.) Accordingly, these claims are also dismissed.

B. Timeliness of Plaintiffs' Judicial Deception and False Imprisonment and False Arrest Claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira

In their motion, Defendants argue that two sets of claims are not timely under the requisite statute of limitations: Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment judicial deception claims against Defendants Fladager, Harris, and Ferreira; and Plaintiffs' false arrest and false imprisonment claims against these same Defendants. Plaintiffs initially contend that their claims are timely under the Heck rule for accrual. To the extent that these claims are not timely or the Heck rule does not apply, Plaintiffs argue that statutory and equitable tolling apply. The Court will first determine the date each set of claims was accrued and then determine whether are subject to tolling.

1. Accrual of Claims

a. Fourth Amendment Judicial Deception Claims

Turning first to Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment judicial deception claims, as these claims are brought pursuant to section 1983 the Court must apply the statute of limitations for personal injury of the state in which the claim arose. Alameda Books, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 631 F.3d 1031, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) In California, there is a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 335.1. Plaintiffs do not...