Dehkordi v. Bitter

1

NARGES LOTFIZADEH DEHKORDI, Plaintiff, v. RENA BITTER, et al., Defendants.

CIVIL No. 22-2470 (RJL)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

August 30, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

[DKT. #8]

RICHARD J. LEON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Narges Lotfizadeh Dehkordi (“plaintiff' or “Dehkordi”), brings this action against officials of the U.S. State Department, seeking to compel the Government to adjudicate her mother's IR-5 visa application. Plaintiff alleges that the State Department which received her mother's case from U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services in April 2022, has unreasonably delayed in processing the application. Defendants have moved to dismiss on several grounds, first under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of standing and alternatively under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act or Mandamus Act. While plaintiff, in my judgment, has met the minimum requirements of constitutional standing, the delay in her mother's case attributable to the State Department is not unreasonable as a matter of law. As such, defendants' motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, a U.S. citizen, first began the immigration process on her mother's behalf in December 2019. Mandamus Pet. & Compl. [Dkt. #1] (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 1, 5. Consistent with applicable regulations, she filed a Form 1-130, Petition for Alien Relative, for each of her parents, seeking to have them join her in the United States; mother Zinat Kianidehkordi and father Mohammadhasan Lotfizadehdehkordi are both Iranian nationals. See Dehkordi Deci. [Dkt. #10-1] ¶ 4; Repede Deci. [Dkt. #8-1] ¶ 4. Filing a Form 1-130 “is the first step in helping an eligible relative apply to immigrate to the United States.”^[1] See also 8 C.F.R. §§ 204.1(a)(1), 204.2(f). This first step is managed exclusively by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), an agency within the Department of Homeland Security. USCIS “will generally approve [a] Form 1-130” if the U.S. petitioner satisfactorily establishes the existence of a qualifying relationship between herself and the alien beneficiary. USCIS Information Page.

Once USCIS approves a Form 1-130, its role in the process ends and the beneficiary's case is transferred to a separate Government entity, the State Department. “In this second stage of the process,” the National Visa Center (“NVC”), an arm of the State Department, “receives the file from USCIS and imposes a waiting period until an application becomes ‘current,' permitting review.” Manzoor v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs., 2022 WL 1316427, at *1 (D.D.C. May 3, 2022). “At that time, the applicant must then submit additional information on a new Form DS-260.” Id. (citing 22 C.F.R. § 42.67(a)). Once that information is submitted and accepted, the file becomes “[d]ocumentarily [c]omplete,” and NVC can proceed to the last step of the process: an interview between the beneficiary and a U.S. consular officer.^[2] See also 22 C.F.R. § 42.67(a)(1), (a)(3). “NVC cannot predict when [a] case will be scheduled for an interview” but “fills these appointments in a first-in, first-out manner.” State Department Information Page. After the interview, “the consular officer must [either] issue the visa [or] refuse the visa.” 22 C.F.R. §42.81(a).

In plaintiffs case, both of her parents' Forms 1-130 were approved by USCIS at the first step of the process, albeit at different times. Her father's Form 1-130 was granted in September 2020 and his case progressed to NVC; the State Department issued his visa 22 months later. Dehkordi Deci. ¶¶ 5, 8. For plaintiffs mother, however, USCIS did not approve the Form 1-130 until April 25, 2022, and NVC did not receive the approved petition until April 29. Repede Deci. ¶ 5. The following month, plaintiff and her mother were cleared to “begin the application process” with NVC, which required them to submit additional paperwork; they reportedly did so by June 28. Dehkordi Deci. ¶ 7. Less than eight weeks later, on August 18, 2022, plaintiff sued the three defendants in this case-all State Department officials-alleging unreasonable delay in adjudicating the visa. The combined complaint and mandamus petition seeks an order “[m]andating that Defendants process Plaintiffs mother's immigration case within fifteen (15) calendar days.” Compl.

¶31.

After she filed suit, on October 26, 2022, NVC advised plaintiff that her mother's case had become “documentarily qualified,” rendering her eligible for a consular interview. Dehkordi Deci. ¶ 9; Repede Deci. ¶ 6. Shortly thereafter, defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. See generally Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. #8]. The motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for decision. See generally Opp'n Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. #10] (“Opp'n”); Reply Supp. Mot. Dismiss [Dkt. #11] (“Reply”).

LEGAL STANDARD

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff “bears the burden of invoking the court's subject matter jurisdiction, including establishing the elements of standing.” Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11,19 (D.C. Cir. 2015). A plaintiff may do so with “material factual allegations in the complaint,” which the court must treat as true, “granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be derived.” Am. Int'l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court may also “properly consider ... evidentiary material in the record,” in addition to factual allegations, again affording plaintiff “the benefit of all reasonable inferences” to support subject-matter jurisdiction. Feldman v. FDIC, 879 F.3d 347, 351 (D.C. Cir. 2018).

The Federal Rules also require the pl aintiff to adequately “state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In resolving a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), as under 12(b)(1), the court must accept “all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draw all reasonable inferences ... in plaintiffs favor.” Arpaio, 797 F.3d at 19. The court will not, however, “assume the truth of legal conclusions” or “accept inferences that are unsupported by the facts.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Dismissal is warranted if a plaintiff cannot “demonstrate that it is at least plausible” that defendants are liable for the misconduct alleged. Dean v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 2022 WL 2785967, at *6 (D.D.C. July 15, 2022).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff alleges that defendants in this case have unreasonably delayed in adjudicating her mother's visa application, in violation of both the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), and Mandamus Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1361. Defendants have moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), on two alternative grounds. First, they contend that plaintiff cannot establish Article III standing because the delay in her mother's case is not traceable to the State Department, as opposed to other actors. Second, defendants assert that even if this Court had subject-matter jurisdiction, the purported delay in this case is not unreasonable as a matter of law. Each of these theories is addressed in turn.

Defendants first move to dismiss on jurisdictional grounds, arguing that this Court lacks authority to hear plaintiffs claims because she has no standing to bring them. Defendants surmise that plaintiffs real grievance is with the time the Government has taken collectively to process her mother's visa, see Reply at 3-which is about 45 months as of the date of this decision. But as defendants point out, roughly 29 of those 45 months are not attributable to delay by the State Department or its officials, who are the only named defendants in this case. Accordingly, defendants argue, plaintiff cannot satisfy the second or third elements of Article III standing, since plaintiffs injury-in-fact relating to her mother's visa is not causally connected to the State Department's conduct and will not be redressed by a favorable decision. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992).

Defendants' jurisdictional theory hits wide of the mark. While true that other actors, including USCIS, must shoulder some of the blame for the delay up to this point, the complaint adequately-and correctly-identifies the State Department as the party responsible for plaintiffs injury-in-fact now. See Compl. ¶¶ 1, 15^[3]Indeed, however limited the State Department's involvement in Zinat Kianidehkordi's case prior to suit- at the earliest, it had no obligation to act on her application until USCIS approved her Form 1-130 in April 2022, see Abbas, 2021 WL 3856625, at *2-adjudication of the visa, and any further delay in that process, is now squarely with the State Department. And because an order by this Court directing the State Department to finish processing the visa would redress plaintiffs injury, she plainly satisfies the third element of constitutional standing as well. See Carpenters Indus. Council v. Zinke, 854 F.3d 1, 6 n.l (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Causation and redressability typically overlap[.] ... [I]f a government action causes an injury, enjoining the action usually will redress that injury.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

At bottom, defendants' standing argument is just a merits argument dressed up in a jurisdictional costume! What they really dispute is not the fact that the State Department- rather than USCIS or plaintiff-is currently the cause of plaintiffs legally cognizable injury. Rather, they quarrel with what they view as plaintiffs attempt to hold the State Department responsible for a 45-month delay when it has had her mother's case for about 16 months. Fair enough (see infra), but that argument does not raise...