Dejesus v. Adkins

2020 NY Slip Op 34623(U)

JESSICA DEJESUS, Plaintiff, v. KAITLYN ADKINS, MICHAEL ADKINS, ANAHI MORAN, JILL CATLING & JON GROSSI, Defendants.

Index No. EF000178-2019

Supreme Court, Orange County

March 17, 2020

Unpublished Opinion

Motion Date: March 16, 2020

To commence the statutory time period for appeals as of right (CPLR5513 [a]), you are advised to serve a copy of this order, with notice of entry, upon all parties.

Present: HON. CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C.

HON CATHERINE M. BARTLETT, A.J.S.C.

The following papers numbered 1 to 10 were read on the motions of defendants Anahi Moran, Jill Catling and Jon Grossi for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them, and Plaintiffs motion for partial summary judgment on liability against all Defendants:

Notice of Motion (Moran) - Affirmation / Exhibits .................................1-2

Notice of Motion (Catling/Grossi) - Affirmation / Exhibits............................3-4

Notice of Cross Motion (Plaintiff) - Affirmation / Exhibits - Affidavit...................5-7

Affirmation in Opposition (Adkins) / Exhibits.......................................8

Reply Affirmation (Moran) 9

Reply Affirmation (Catling/Grossi) 10

Upon the foregoing papers it is ORDERED that the motions are disposed of as follows: This is a personal injury action arising out of a multiple-vehicle accident that occurred on October 27, 2017 at the intersection of Liberty Street and Third Street in the City of Newburgh New York. Defendant Anahi Moran was traveling northbound on Liberty Street, a through highway, at a speed of approximately 25 mph in a 30 mph zone. Defendant Kaitlyn Adkins was driving westbound on Third Street, and stopped at a stop sign at the intersection with Liberty Street. A third vehicle, owned by defendant Jill Catling, had been parked by defendant Jon Grossi on the east side of Liberty Street just short of the intersection with Third Street. Ms. Moran's vision to the right (i.e., east toward Third Street) and Ms Adkins' vision to the left (i.e., south along Liberty Street) was obstructed by the Catling/Grossi vehicle. Ms Adkins inched forward in an effort to see, and then entered the intersection, intending to make a right turn, whereupon the front left of her vehicle struck the rear passenger side of Ms. Moran's vehicle. Ms. Moran did not see or hear Ms. Adkins' vehicle before the collision, which caused her vehicle to spin out and to strike plaintiff Jessica DeJesus' vehicle, which was parked on the right side of Liberty Street past the intersection with Third Street.

Defendants Anahi Moran, Jill Catling and Jon Grossi move for summary judgment dismissing the claims against them. Plaintiff cross moves for partial summary judgment on liability against all Defendants.

Legal Analysis

A. Defendant Adkins Was Negligent As A Matter Of Law

Vehicle and Traffic Law ("VTL") § 1172(a) provides in pertinent part:

...every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop at a clearly marked stop line, but if none, then shall stop before entering the crosswalk on the near side of the intersection...and the right to proceed shall be subject to the provisions of section 1142.

VTL §1142(a) provides in pertinent part:

...every driver of a vehicle approaching a stop sign shall stop as required by section 1172 and after having stopped shall yield the right of way to any vehicle which has entered the intersection from another highway or which is approaching so closely on said highway as to constitute an immediate hazard during the time when such driver is moving across or within the intersection.

Both Plaintiff and defendant Moran established prima facie that defendant Kaitlyn Adkins was negligent as a matter of law in that she failed to yield the right of way to defendant Moran's vehicle in violation of VTL §§ 1172(a) and 1142(a).

"As a general matter, a driver who fails to yield the right-of-way after stopping at a stop sign in violation of Vehicle and Traffic Law §1142(a) is negligent as a matter of law." Belle-Fleur v. Desriviere, 178 A.D.3d 993 (2d Dept. 2019). See, Balladares v. City of New York, 177 A.D.3d 942, 943 (2d Dept. 2019); Fernandez v. American United Transportation, 111 A.D.3d 704, 705 (2d Dept. 2019); Shvydkaya v. Park Avenue BMWAcura Motor Corp., 172 A.D.3d 1130, 1131 (2d Dept. 2019); Enriquez v. Joseph, 169 A.D.3d 1008, 1009 (2d Dept. 2019).

The failure of a motorist to yield the right of way in violation of the statute is negligence as a matter of law and cannot be disregarded by the jury [cit.om.]. A driver is entitled to partial summary judgment on the issue of liability based on defendant's violation of VTL §1142(a) [citom.]. A driver is entitled to anticipate that a motorist facing a stop sign will yield the right of way [cit.om.]. The fact that the view of a motorist properly stopped is obscured does not exculpate the motorist; the motorist is under a common-law duty to see what is there to be seen [cit.om.]. Further, the fact that the motorist may have initially stopped at the stop sign does not negate her liability if she subsequently failed to yield the right of way [cit.om.].

1A NY PJI 3d 2:80, at 509-510 (2020). See, e.g., Balladares v. City of New York, supra; Fernandez v. American United Transportation, supra; Shvydkaya v. Park Avenue BMW Acura Motor Corp., supra; Enriquez v. Joseph, supra; Fuertes v. City of New York, 146 A.D.3d 936, 937 (2d Dept. 2017); Maliza v. Puerto-Rican Transp. Corp., 50 A.D.3d 650 (2d Dept. 2008).

Here, it is undisputed that (1) Ms. Adkins had embarked on a right turn into the northernmost segment of the intersection (i.e., furthest away from Ms. Moran's approaching vehicle) when the collision occurred, and (2) she impacted the rear passenger side of Ms. Moran's vehicle. The inference that Ms. Moran's vehicle had entered the intersection or was approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard when Ms. Adkins ventured past the stop sign into the intersection is compelling, and Ms. Adkins raised no triable issue of fact as to her failure to yield the right of way to Ms. Moran's approaching vehicle in violation of § 1142(a) of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.

Consequently, defendant Kaitlyn Adkins was negligent as a matter of law.

B. As A Matter Of Law, Defendant Moran Is Not Liable For The Accident

Since there may be more than one proximate cause of a motor vehicle accident, Ms. Adkins' failure to yield does not preclude as a matter of law a finding that negligence on Ms Moran's part also contributed to the accident See, Romano v. 202 Corp., 305 A.D.2d 576, 577 (2d Dept. 2003). See also, Gezelterv. Pecora, 129 A.D.3d 1021, 1023 (2d Dept. 2015); Arias v. Tiao, 123 A.D.3d 857, 859 (2d Dept. 2014); Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., 115 A.D.3d 787, 789 (2d Dept. 2014). Although a driver with the right of way is entitled to anticipate that the other vehicle will obey the traffic laws requiring it to yield, she may nevertheless be found to have contributed to the happening of the accident if she did not use reasonable care to avoid the accident. See, Belle-Fleur v. Desriviere, supra; Rabenstein v. Suffolk County Dept. of Public Works, 131 A.D.3d 1145 (2d Dept. 2015); Gezelter v. Pecora, supra; Arias v. Tiao, supra; Romano v. 202 Corp., supra.

Accordingly, Ms. Moran, to obtain summary judgment dismissing the claims against her, must establish her own freedom from fault. See, Stanford v. Smart Pick, Inc., 134 A.D.3d 1096 (2d Dept. 2015); Jones v. Pinto, 133 A.D.3d 634, 635 (2d Dept. 2015); Gezelter v. Pecora, supra; Arias v. Tiao, supra; Calderon-Scotti v. Rosenstein, 119 A.D.3d 722 (2d Dept. 2014); Espiritu v. Shuttle Express Coach, Inc., supra. In the Court's view, die evidence establishes as a matter of law that Ms. Moran bears no responsibility for this accident.

First, Ms. Moran's testimony, which is effectively uncontroverted, establishes that she was traveling at a rate of only about 25 mph in a 30 mph zone.

Second, although Ms. Moran's view of Third Street was obstructed by the Catling/Grossi vehicle parked on Liberty Street just short of the intersection, she was entitled to anticipate that vehicles entering Liberty Street from Third Street would obey the traffic laws which required them to yield the right-of-way and had "'no duty to watch for and avoid a driver who might fail to stop or to proceed with due caution at a stop sign' (Doxtader v. Janczuh, 29A A.D.2d 859, 859-860.[2002], /v. denied 99 N.Y.2d 505...[2003], quoting Perez v. Brux Cab Corp., 251 A.D.2d 157, 159...[1998]...)." Miglionico v. Leroy Holdings Company, Inc., 78 A.D.3d 1306, 1307 (3d Dept. 2010). See, Namisnakv. Martin, 244 A.D.2d 258, 260 (1st Dept. 1997); 1A NY PJI 3d 2:80A, at 511 (2020). The Second Department cases of Ballentine v. Perrone, 179 A.D.3d 993, 114 N.Y.S.2d 696 (2d Dept. 2020) and Canates v. Arichabala, 123 A.D.3d 869 (2d Dept. 2014) are distinguishable because their facts differ in highly material respects from those of the case at bar.

In Ballentine v. Perrone_t a driver with the right-of-way struck a bicyclist who entered the intersection from behind "a construction wall [that] blocked her view of traffic on Roebling Street in the direction that Perrone was traveling." Id., 114 N.Y.S.2d at 697. Like Ms. Moran, Mr. Perrone was traveling about 25 mph looking straight ahead when the collision occurred. Id. The Second Department held that Mr. Perrone "failed to eliminate triable issues of fact as to whether [he] kept a proper lookout or was traveling at a reasonable and prudent speed as he approached the intersection in light of the conditions then present" Id., at 698 (emphasis added).

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