Dejesus v. John Doe

DENNY DEJESUS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN DOE, MENTAL HEALTH UNIT CHIEF OF FIVE POINTS, MEDICAL DOCTOR AT FIVE POINTS,MS. BELGARD, C.O. JOHN DOE AT FIVE POINTS, Defendants.

16-CV-6470 EAW

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

FILED: December 11, 2018

December 10, 2018

DECISION AND ORDER

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiff Denny DeJesus ("Plaintiff"), an inmate currently confined at Auburn Correctional Facility, filed this pro se action seeking relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 1). Thereafter, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 8). Upon granting Plaintiff permission to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court screened the Complaint and the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and dismissed certain of Plaintiff's claims with leave to amend. (Dkt. 19). Plaintiff has now filed a Second Amended Complaint. (Dkt. 21). Plaintiff has also requested assignment of counsel. (Dkt. 24).

Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint asserts claims against three defendants: John Doe, the Mental Health Unit Chief at Five Points Correctional Facility ("MHU Chief Doe"); Ms. Belgard, a medical doctor at Five Points Correctional Facility ("Dr. Belgard"); and C.O. John Doe ("C.O. Doe"), a corrections officer at Five Points Correctional Facility. The Court has screened the Second Amended Complaint pursuant to Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A and, for the reasons set forth below, finds that Plaintiff's Fourth and Eighth Amendment claims against C.O. Doe may proceed to service, while the remainder of his claims must be dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. The Court further requests additional identifying information regarding C.O. Doe's identity, as discussed below.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of Review

Sections 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code require the Court to conduct an initial screening of this Second Amended Complaint. In evaluating the Second Amended Complaint, the Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations and must draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. See Larkin v. Savage, 318 F.3d 138, 139 (2d Cir. 2003). While "a court is obliged to construe [pro se] pleadings liberally, particularly when they allege civil rights violations," McEachin v. McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 200 (2d Cir. 2004), even pleadings submitted pro se must meet the notice requirements of Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2004). "Specific facts are not necessary," and the plaintiff "need only 'give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'" Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atl Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)); see also Boykin v. Keycorp, 521 F.3d 202, 213 (2d Cir. 2008).

Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. "To state a valid claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the plaintiff must allege that the challenged conduct (1) was attributable to a person acting under color of state law, and (2) deprived the plaintiff of a right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States." Whalen v. County of Fulton, 126 F.3d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1997).

II. Plaintiff's Allegations

The following facts are taken from the Second Amended Complaint. As required as this stage of the proceedings, the Court treats Plaintiff's allegations as true.

On June 12, 2015, C.O. Doe sexually assaulted Plaintiff during a pat frisk while Plaintiff was on his way to the law library. (Dkt. 21 at 3). In particular, C.O. Doe placed his hand inside Plaintiff's pants and boxer shorts and squeezed his penis and testicles, causing Plaintiff "excruciating pain." (Id.). C.O. Doe then said to Plaintiff, "you like that freak." (Id.). After the sexual assault, Plaintiff noticed that his penis and testicles had swollen and there was blood in his urine and a stinging sensation when he urinated. (Id.).

That same day, Plaintiff "wrote to sick call informing them that [he] wanted to speak to mental health and see a doctor regarding [an] incident that happened to [him] that [he] got injured and feared talking about it at sick call because the officers [were] right at the door." (Id. at 5). Plaintiff was interviewed by non-defendant Sergeant Atwood on June 14, 2015, and again indicated a desire to speak to a mental health specialist. (Id.). Plaintiff was taken to speak to a nurse, who took a urine sample which revealed blood in Plaintiff's urine. (Id.). Plaintiff was kept in the infirmary overnight. (Id.).

On June 15, 2015, Plaintiff was again seen by a nurse, who verified that there was still blood in Plaintiff's urine. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff was then seen by Doctor Belgard, whom he asked for "some good medication for [his] pain." (Id.). Doctor Belgard responded, "we will see." (Id.). Thereafter, Plaintiff "was discharged from medical and only given ibuprofen." (Id.). At sick call on June 16, 2015, Plaintiff requested prescription medication, and a nurse explained that only the doctor can prescribe medications. (Id. at 9). When Plaintiff complained that ibuprofen "only helps a little bit," the same nurse gave him additional ibuprofen. (Id.).

On June 26, 2015, Plaintiff spoke to someone from the mental health unit. (Id. at 7, 9). Plaintiff alleges that MHU Chief Doe "did not follow policy and procedure, rules and regulation[s] pertaining to a . . . victim that was sexually assaulted." (Id. at 9). In particular, Plaintiff asserts that it should not have taken two weeks before he was seen by the mental health unit. (Id.).

III. Eighth and Fourth Amendments Claim Against C.O. Doe

Based on C.O. Doe's sexual assault, Plaintiff asserts a violation of his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. To succeed on an Eighth Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment, a plaintiff must show "(1) a deprivation that is objectively, sufficiently serious" and "(2) a sufficiently culpable state of mind on the part of the defendant official." Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[A] corrections officer's intentional contact with an inmate's genitalia or other intimate area, which serves no penological purpose and is undertaken with the intent to gratify the officer's sexual desire or humiliate the inmate,violates the Eighth Amendment." Crawford v. Cuomo, 796 F.3d 252, 257 (2d Cir. 2015). Here, Plaintiff's allegations against C.O. Doe state an Eighth Amendment claim and are sufficient for this claim to proceed to service.

Plaintiff further asserts that his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures was violated by the assault. "[T]he Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell[.]" Harris v. Miller, 818 F.3d 49, 57 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984)). As such, "although inmates do possess a limited right to bodily privacy, some aspects of that right must yield to searches for contraband, even random visual body-cavity searches, so that prison administrators may maintain security and discipline in their institutions." Covino v. Patrissi, 967 F.2d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 1992). However, searches of an inmate's body "performed with no legitimate penological purpose but merely to intimidate, harass, or punish are impermissible." George v. City of New York, 12-CV-6365 PKC/JLC, 2013 WL 5943206, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2013). Here, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that C.O. Doe's search of Plaintiff's person was performed maliciously, and so his Fourth Amendment claim against C.O. Doe may also proceed to service. See Love v. Town of Granby, No. CIV.3:03 CV 1960 EBB, 2004 WL 1683159, at *5 (D. Conn. July 12, 2004) (finding potentially viable Fourth Amendment claim where, during a pat down, the defendant allegedly grabbed the plaintiff's scrotum and said "you haven't felt like this in a long time, you faggot"); see also Colman v. Vasquez, 142 F. Supp. 2d 226, 232 (D. Conn. 2001) (inmates' retained right to bodily privacy prohibits patsearches that are abusive, taking into account "the nature of the search, the circumstances of the inmates, [and] the penological justifications").

IV. Deliberate Indifference Claims Against Dr. Belgard and MHU Chief Doe

Plaintiff attempts to assert a claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical condition against Doctor Belgard. Specifically, he complains that he was given only ibuprofen for his pain following the sexual assault and not a stronger medication.

A claim for denial of medical care rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where the facts alleged show that a defendant was deliberately indifferent to a plaintiff's serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976); see also Ross v. Kelly, 784 F. Supp. 35, 43-44 (W.D.N.Y. 1992). This standard has both an objective and subjective component. First, Plaintiff's medical needs must be objectively serious. "A serious medical condition exists where 'the failure to treat a prisoner's condition could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'" Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136-137 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998)).

Second, Plaintiff must adequately allege that the doctor had actual knowledge of Plaintiff's serious medical needs but was deliberately indifferent. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994); Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2003); Hathaway v. Coughlin, 37 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 1994). "[N]ot every lapse in prison medical care will rise to the level of a constitutional violation." Smith v. Carpenter, 316 F.2d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 2003). Moreover, mere disagreement over the proper treatment does not create a constitutional claim because prison officials have broad discretion in determining the typeand extent...