Deka v. Countryside Ass'n for People With Disabilities, Inc.

140 F.Supp.3d 698

Kathryn Deka, Plaintiff,

v.Countryside Association for People With Disabilities, Inc., Defendant.

No. 15–cv–2611

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed October 14, 2015

Christina D. Hatzidakis, Hatzidakis Law, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Lawrence S. Gosewisch, Peter C. Kim, Adler Murphy & McQuillen LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

AMY J. ST. EVE, District Court Judge:

Defendant, Countryside Association for People with Disabilities, Inc. has moved to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint. The Court denies Defendant's motion.

STATEMENT

On July 10, 2015, Plaintiff Kathryn Deka ("Deka") filed a six-count First Amended Complaint¹ alleging six claims of illegal employment action against Defendant Countryside Association for People with Disabilities, Inc ("Countryside"). Specifically, Deka alleges that Countryside terminated her employment on March 30, 2012 in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. ; the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 ; the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. ; and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (R. 20 at 1, ¶ 1.)² For the following reasons, the Court denies Countryside's motion to dismiss.

BACKGROUND

The Court takes the following relevant facts from Deka's First Amended Complaint (the "Complaint"). (R. 20.) In evaluating the motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true the Complaint's well-pleaded factual allegations and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Deka. Stayart v. Yahoo!, Inc., 623 F.3d 436, 438 (7th Cir.2010).

Countryside "provides supported employment, job training, home-based assistance and other programs and services for people with disabilities." (R. 20 at 1, ¶ 3.) It operates in Palatine, Illinois and Waukegan, Illinois. (Id. at 2, ¶ 3.) During all times relevant to the Complaint, Wayne Kulick ("Kulick") was Countryside's Executive Director, Howard Reicheneker ("Reicheneker"), its Chief Financial Officer, and Elizabeth Black ("Black"), its Human Resources Administrator. (Id. ) Kathryn Deka "is a female who formerly worked for Defendant as the On–Site Director for its Palatine location." (Id. at 2, ¶ 4.) In this position, Deka's duties included, in part, "overseeing the programs at the Palatine location; determining the needs of Countryside's clients; supervising, evaluating, and training staff; ensuring compliance with accreditation standards and administrative regulations; developing budgets for Countryside's operations; and collaborating with outside agencies and organizations to address the needs of Countryside and its clients." (Id. at 2, ¶ 6.)

Deka "held [this position] for almost five years, from approximately July 9, 2007 through March 30, 2012." (Id. at 2, ¶ 4.) Countryside provided Deka with long-term disability coverage and a group health insurance plan as employment benefits throughout her tenure. (Id. at 6, ¶¶ 3839.)

Deka was also "recognized ... for her outstanding job performance." (Id. at 2, ¶ 7.) Specifically, she was commended for developing positive relationships with all of Countryside's referral sources, creating new bonds with other community members, significantly improving relationships with Countryside's major parent support groups, helping Countryside receive a three-year "Accreditation with Distinction," and operating Countryside at a surplus. (Id. at 2–3, ¶¶ 8–10.)

Over the course of various meetings and conversations, Deka witnessed Countryside's remarks regarding employee FMLA leave. On February 10, 2012, Deka observed a "visibly annoyed" Kulick refer to FMLA leave as a "get out of jail free card." (Id. at 3, ¶ 15.) Reicheneker and Black repeated the same statement, and Black added, "[y]eah, with a doctor's note, people can do whatever they want." (Id. at 3, ¶ 16.) Moreover, upon discussing an ill employee's termination, Kulick "dismissed" discrimination concerns, stating "[n]o one would ever think an agency like ours would discriminate.... Illinois is an employment at will state. We can do anything we want." (Id. at 3–4, ¶¶ 17–18.) The directors repeated statements such as this, and "[w]ho would suspect us?," at least five times between 2009 and March 30, 2012. (Id. at 4, ¶ 18.)

Eventually, Deka's multiple sclerosis caused her to seek FMLA medical leave from Countryside. Multiple sclerosis is "an inflammatory disease affecting the nervous system and causing a wide range of symptoms that may progress over time." (Id. at 4, ¶ 19.) Specifically, Deka's multiple sclerosis has caused her to experience extreme fatigue, difficulty concentrating, memory difficulties, and difficulty articulating thoughts and remembering information. (Id. at 4, ¶¶ 20, 23.) While working at Countryside, Deka used her employer-provided health insurance to pay for doctors' appointments, other health care provider visits, medications, exams, and other services required as a result of her multiple sclerosis. (Id. at 7, ¶ 49.) "By 2012, it was necessary for Deka to miss whole or half days of work due to fatigue and other symptoms associated with MS." (Id. at 4, ¶ 24.)

On February 17, 2012, Deka emailed Black and requested an FMLA leave application. (Id. at 4, ¶ 25.) Before receiving a response from Countryside, Deka attended a Directors' Meeting on February 23, 2012 and heard Black refer to FMLA leave as getting "a get out of jail free card." (Id. at 5, ¶ 27.) Deka subsequently received an application from Countryside. Her doctor completed the application and submitted it to Countryside on February 27, 2012. (Id. at 5, ¶ 29.) Specifically, Deka requested a "job accommodation in the form of intermittent FMLA leave on an as-needed basis." (Id. at 5, ¶ 30.) The application notified Countryside that Deka was an "MS patient [who] experiences severe fatigue with flares or high stress situations ... that is under treatment (Rx) to prevent flares." (Id. at 5, ¶ 31.) Specifically, Deka's doctor "estimated that the flare-ups would occur one time per six months, and last one to three days per episode." (Id. at 5, ¶ 32.) On March 1, 2012, Countryside notified Deka that it approved her FMLA application for leave as-needed. (Id. at 5, ¶ 34.) At that time, Deka notified Countryside that she completed the application to provide them with "notice of future FMLA-approved absences," stating, "I just need it in case I get sick. I'm not asking for time off right now." (Id. at 5–6, ¶ 34.)

Countryside continued to make remarks about FMLA leave until Deka's termination. On March 7, 2012, for example, Deka heard Black again refer to FMLA leave as "a get out of jail free card" at a Directors' Meeting. (Id. at 6, ¶ 35.) On March 30, 2012, at a managers' meeting, Deka witnessed Reicheneker make the same FMLA leave comment while looking at her and laughing. (Id. at 6, ¶ 36.)

Later the same day, on March 30, 2012, Countryside terminated Deka's employment before Deka utilized any FMLA intermittent leave. (Id. at 6, ¶ 37.) Subsequently, Countryside replaced Deka with a male employee after previously stating a desire to hire more males. (Id. at 8, ¶ 57.) Earlier in the year, Countryside considered firing the last hired employee to alleviate financial difficulties but, ultimately, declined to do so. Another employee inquired whether Countryside made that decision because the employee was a male, and Kulick replied, "yes, that's right." (Id. at 8, ¶¶ 59–60.)

On a few occasions, Countryside directors discussed the cost-effectiveness of only covering three to five "expensive illnesses" with the company's health insurance policy. (Id. at 6, ¶ 42.) Specifically, Kulick, Reicheneker, and Black would often comment about the costs of health insurance, "bitterly stat [ing] that, ‘we have several people with expensive illnesses.’ " (Id. at 6, ¶ 40.) On April 5, 2012, Deka attempted to pick up two multiple sclerosis medications from her pharmacy. The pharmacy informed her that Countryside had discontinued her health insurance on February 28, 2012, and Deka was unable to receive the medicine. (Id. at 7, ¶ 52.)

In her First Amended Complaint, Deka alleges six counts: 1) interference in violation of the FMLA; 2) retaliation in violation of the FMLA; 3) interference in violation of ERISA; 4) discrimination in violation of the ADA; 5) retaliation and interference in violation of the ADA; and 6) discrimination in violation of Title VII. (R. 20.) Countryside moves to dismiss Counts One and Two, predicated on the FMLA, as time-barred by the relevant statute of limitations. (R. 22 at 2.) Countryside additionally moves to dismiss all six counts for failing to "plausibly plead facts to support all of the elements" of each claim. (Id. at 1–2.)

ANALYSIS

I. Timeliness of FMLA claims

Countryside argues that the relevant statute of limitations time-bars Counts One and Two. Thus, Countryside argues, the Court should dismiss Counts One and Two with prejudice.

A. Legal Standard

"The period of limitations is an affirmative defense." Richards v. Mitcheff, 696 F.3d 635, 637 (7th Cir.2012), citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1). "[A]lthough a plaintiff need not anticipate or overcome affirmative defenses such as those based on the statute of limitations, if a plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to establish a statute of limitations defense, the district court may dismiss the complaint on that ground." O'Gorman v. City of Chicago, 777 F.3d 885, 889 (7th Cir.2015). Specifically, "on the subject of the statute of limitations[,] ... a complaint must plead ... enough to show that the claim for relief is plausible." Mitcheff, 696 F.3d at 637.

Under FMLA Section 2617(c)(1), a complainant must normally bring an action based on retaliation or interference within a two year statute of limitations period. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(c)(1). Section 2617(c)(2), however, "extends that limitations period to 3 years ‘[i]n the case of such action brought for a...