DeLaney v. Perez

CLARENCE DELANEY, JR., Plaintiff, v. ADA PEREZ, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-cv-6084 (NSR)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 16, 2021

OPINION & ORDER

NELSON S. ROMÁN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Clarence DeLaney, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) brings this action against Ada Perez (“Perez”) Superintendent, Downstate Correctional Facility (“Downstate”); Melissa M. Pickett (“Pickett”), Inmate Grievance P.; Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) Shanikqua Harrison (“Harrison”), Supervising Offender Coordinator, Downstate; W. Stolfi (“Stolfi”), DMD, Downstate; and Dr. Quinones (“Quinones”), MD, Downstate; (together “Defendants”)^[1]. Before the Court is Defendants' motion to dismiss the Complaint, (ECF No. 33), which Plaintiff failed to oppose. For the following reasons Defendants' motion is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from the Complaint and are assumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. (Exhibit A, Dkt. No. 1)

On or about January 6, 2017, Plaintiff was sentenced by the County Court of Albany to two to four years' parole supervision pursuant to CPL § 410.19. (Id. at 4.) To execute the parole supervision sentence as an alternative to incarceration, the Albany County Court ordered that Plaintiff be transferred to the Willard Drug Program (“Willard”) to complete a ninety-day program. (Id.) This order appears in the “remarks” section of the Uniform Sentence & Commitment form. However, on the same form, the box that reads “execute as a sentence of parole supervision” is left unchecked. (Id. at 17.) Due to this inconsistency, Plaintiff's conditional release date was set as January 28, 2019, (Id. at 18), and on or about January 20, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred to Downstate. (Id.) While at Downstate, Plaintiff alleges he advised his counselor that he was sentenced to parole. The counselor stated that Plaintiff's records and computation sheet only stated Plaintiff was sentenced to two to four years. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a grievance which was denied. (Id.)

Plaintiff was then sent to Marcy Correctional Facility (“Marcy”) on or about February 23, 2017 and was ultimately sent to Willard on or about March 9, 2017. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges defendants Perez, Pickett, and Harrison denied him due process because his incarceration was extended by not facilitating his transfer to Willard within ten days. (Id. at 7, 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that while at Downstate, he requested medical accommodations of a CPAP machine for his sleep apnea as well as a tens machine for back pain related to scoliosis. (Id. at 5.) Plaintiff alleges Quinones was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs because although Plaintiff was advised that he would get these medical devices, he never received them before being transferred to Marcy. (Id. at 5, 14.) Plaintiff also alleges that Stolfi was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by refusing to pull two teeth which presented an infection. (Id. at 8, 14.)

Motion to Dismiss Standard

On a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), dismissal is proper unless the complaint “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When there are well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, “a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Id. at 679. “Although for the purpose of a motion to dismiss [a court] must take all of the factual allegations in the complaint as true, [it is] ‘not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). It is not necessary for the complaint to assert “detailed factual allegations, ” but must allege “more than labels and conclusions.” Twombly, 550 U.S at 555. The facts in the complaint “must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true.” Id.

“Pro se complaints are held to less stringent standards than those drafted by lawyers, even following Twombly and Iqbal.” Thomas v. Westchester, No. 12-CV-6718 (CS), 2013 WL 3357171, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2013). The court should read pro se complaints “‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest, '” Kevilly v. New York, 410 Fed.Appx. 371, 374 (2d Cir. 2010) (summary order) (quoting Brownell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d Cir. 2006)); see also Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (“even after Twombly, though, we remain obligated to construe a pro se complaint liberally”). “However, even pro se plaintiffs asserting civil rights claims cannot withstand a motion to dismiss unless their pleadings contain factual allegations sufficient to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Jackson v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Labor, 709 F.Supp.2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotations omitted). Dismissal is justified, therefore, where “the complaint lacks an allegation regarding an element necessary to obtain relief, ” and therefore, the “duty to liberally construe a plaintiff's complaint [is not] the equivalent of a duty to re-write it.” Geldzahler v. N.Y. Med. Coll., 663 F.Supp.2d 379, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (internal citations and alterations omitted).

Discussion

The court interprets the Complaint to allege six claims: (1) a due process violation pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendants Perez, Pickett, and Harrison, (2) a deliberate indifference claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendants Stolfi and Quinones, (3) an equal protection claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 against Defendants Stolfi and Quinones, (4) a medical malpractice claim against Defendants Stolfi and Quinones, (5) an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim against Defendants Perez, Pickett, and Harrison and (6) a wrongful confinement claim against Defendants Perez, Pickett, and Harrison.

I. Section 1983 Claims

Section 1983 provides, in relevant part, that: “[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State … subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States … to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 “is not itself a source of substantive rights, but a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred by those parts of the United States Constitution and federal statutes that it describes.” Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979); see Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 225 (2d Cir. 2004). To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege “(1) the challenged conduct was attributable to a person who was acting under color of state law and (2) the conduct deprived the plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution.” Castilla v. City of New York, 2013 WL 1803896, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. April 25, 2013); see Cornejo v. Bell, 592 F.3d 121, 127 (2d Cir. 2010). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and (2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of his federal statutory rights, or his constitutional rights or privileges. See Annis v. Westchester County, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 53 F.Supp.2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (noting that Section 1983 “furnishes a cause of action for the violation of federal rights created by the Constitution”) (citation omitted).

A. Personal Involvement

“[A] defendant in a § 1983 action may not be held liable for damages for constitutional violations merely because [he or she] held a high position of authority.” Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (affirming a district court's dismissal of claims against a prison warden where plaintiff did not allege the warden's personal involvement in, or awareness of, the health, safety, and communications issues raised by plaintiff); Walker v. Schriro, No. 11-CV-9299 (JPO), 2013 WL 1234930, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2013) (“A defendant's status as warden or commissioner of a prison, standing alone, is [ ] insufficient to support a finding of supervisory liability.”). Rather, “a plaintiff must establish a given defendant's personal involvement in the claimed violation in order to hold that defendant liable in his individual capacity.” Warren v. Pataki, 823 F.3d 125, 136 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, there must be specific factual allegations as to how each defendant is personally involved in the alleged illegal activities.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims against Perez Pickett, and Harrison should be dismissed due to a lack of personal involvement. (ECF No. 34 at 7.) Previously, courts within the Second Circuit had followed the standards set out in Colon v. Coughlin, which included five categories of evidence which, if factually presented, may have established a supervisory defendant's personal involvement. 58 F.3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995). But see Reynolds v. Barrett, 685 F.3d 193, 205 n.14 (2d Cir. 2012) (“Iqbal has ... engendered conflict within our Circuit about the continuing vitality of the supervisory liability test set forth in Colon.”). The Second Circuit has since stated that, “Iqbal holds that a plaintiff may not rely on a special test for supervisory liability. Rather, ‘a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official ...