Delgado v. City of Chi.

547 F.Supp.3d 824

Benito FLORES DELGADO, individually and as Special Administrator of Plaintiff of Juan Flores, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.CITY OF CHICAGO, a Municipal Corporation; Clarence McCoy; Charles O'Connor; Richard Vitellaro; and Jesse Oeinck, Defendants.

No. 18-cv-06378

United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division.

Signed July 2, 2021

Daniel V. O'Connor, O'Connor & Nakos, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.

Bret Anthony Kabacinski, Jordan F. Yurchich, Andrea Lindsey Campbell, City of Chicago Department of Law, Jonathan Clark Green, Chicago Corporation Counsel, Chicago, IL, for Defendant City of Chicago.

Iris Y. Chavira, Scott A. Cohen, Maria Elizabeth Magginas, City of Chicago Department of Law, Chicago, IL, Laniya Moore, for Defendants Clarence McCoy, Charles O'Connor, Richard Vitellaro.

Iris Y. Chavira, Jordan F. Yurchich, Scott A. Cohen, Maria Elizabeth Magginas, City Of Chicago Department of Law, Chicago, IL, Laniya Moore, for Defendant Jesse Oeinck.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN F. KNESS, United States District Judge

This case arises from the death of Juan Flores, a minor who was shot and killed by a Chicago police officer after Flores backed his vehicle into the officer following a disturbance. Plaintiff Benito Flores Delgado, the father of Juan Flores and the Special Administrator of his estate, brings various state and federal law claims against the City of Chicago as well as the four officers who encountered Juan Flores on the night of his death. Plaintiff alleges that the officers are liable for allowing Flores to drive away from the scene of the disturbance despite knowing that he was both underage and intoxicated, and for using excessive force in violation of Flores's civil rights. Plaintiff further alleges that the City of Chicago is liable under the Monell doctrine for fostering a culture that tolerated the improper use of deadly force by police officers—a culture that, Plaintiff contends, led to Flores's death at the hand of a Chicago police officer.

For the following reasons, the Court finds that all claims against the individual officers who did not fire at Flores must be dismissed, while certain claims against the officer who fired the fatal shots and the City must be allowed to proceed.

I. BACKGROUND

The following recitation of facts is drawn from the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 55.) At this stage, the Court must accept Plaintiff's allegations as true and draw all inferences in Plaintiff's favor. Bell v. City of Chicago , 835 F.3d 736, 738 (7th Cir. 2016). On September 10, 2017, Juan Flores called the police to report that his girlfriend's father had assaulted him. (Dkt. 55 ¶ 7.) Defendants Clarence McCoy and Charles O'Connor, each Chicago Police Department officers, responded to the call. (Id. ¶ 8.)

When they arrived at the scene—a residence in the Humboldt Park neighborhood—Officers McCoy and O'Connor found Flores sitting in his car. (Id. ¶ 9.) Flores informed the officers that he did not have his keys, so the officers and Flores went looking for them. (Id. ¶¶ 10-12.) During that search, Flores’ girlfriend's father told McCoy that Flores was drunk and should not be allowed to drive. (Id. ¶ 13.) At some point, McCoy also spoke on the telephone with Flores's father, who informed McCoy that he was on his way to collect Flores. (Id. ¶ 14.) Eventually someone found the keys, and McCoy ordered Flores to pick them up. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 28.) McCoy then watched as Flores got in the car and drove away (it is unclear from the Second Amended Complaint whether Flores did so with McCoy's permission). (Id. ¶ 22.) Neither McCoy nor O'Connor pursued Flores or alerted other officers over the radio that Flores was driving while intoxicated. (Id. ¶ 34.)

As Flores drove home, Defendants Richard Vitellaro and Jesse Oeinck, also Chicago Police Department officers, spotted Flores driving without headlights. (Id. ¶ 33.) Without activating their cruiser's lights or sirens, they followed Flores, who was driving erratically in an apparent attempt to evade the officers. (Id. ¶¶ 36-37; Dkt. 61 at 12:58-12:59.) About one minute after the officers began to follow Flores, he pulled into to a dead-end lot near his house. (Id. ) Officers Vitellaro and Oeinck then exited their vehicle, just as Flores shifted his into reverse. (Dkt. 55 ¶¶ 39, 41.) According to Plaintiff, Officer Oeinck "saw the light indicators on [Flores's] car move from brake lights to reverse lights," yet Officer Oeinck "willfully proceeded to place himself in the path of" Flores's vehicle. (Id. ¶¶ 41-43.) Flores's vehicle then struck Officer Oeinck, pinning him against the squad car. (Id. ¶¶ 44, 46.) Officer Oeinck fired his service weapon into the vehicle, hitting Flores multiple times and killing him. (Id. ¶ 45.)

On September 6, 2018, Plaintiff initiated this action in state court, but Defendants properly removed it to this Court on September 19, 2018. (Dkt. 1.) The Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. 55), which is currently operative complaint, includes eight counts: (1) Officers McCoy and O'Connor illegally seized Flores in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count I); (2) Officers Vitellaro and Oeinck willfully and wantonly harmed Flores in violation of Illinois law (Count II); (3) Officers Vitellaro and Oeinck illegally seized Flores in violation of the Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Count III); (4) all Defendants failed to protect and serve Flores under Illinois state law (Count IV); (5) all Defendants are liable for Flores’ wrongful death under Illinois law (Count V); (6) the City of Chicago willfully and wantonly harmed Flores in violation of Illinois law (Count VI); (7) the City of Chicago must indemnify the defendant officers for their tort liability (Count VII); (8) the City of Chicago is liable for the officers’ constitutional violations under Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York , 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (Count VIII). Defendants jointly moved to dismiss all counts (Dkt. 63.) That motion is now fully briefed. (Dkts. 64, 65.)¹

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint generally need only include "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement must "give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal punctuation omitted). The Seventh Circuit has explained that this rule "reflects a liberal notice pleading regime, which is intended to ‘focus litigation on the merits of a claim’ rather than on technicalities that might keep plaintiffs out of court." Brooks v. Ross , 578 F.3d 574, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A. , 534 U.S. 506, 514, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) ).

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) "challenges the sufficiency of the complaint to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." Hallinan v. Fraternal Order of Police of Chicago Lodge No. 7 , 570 F.3d 811, 820 (7th Cir. 2009). Each complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ). These allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Although legal conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth, Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678-79, 129 S.Ct. 1937, the Court, in evaluating a motion to dismiss, must accept as true the complaint's factual allegations and draw reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Ashcroft v. al-Kidd , 563 U.S. 731, 742, 131 S.Ct. 2074, 179 L.Ed.2d 1149 (2011).

In addition to the complaint, the Court reviews any exhibits attached to it. Bogie v. Rosenberg , 705 F.3d 603, 609 (7th Cir. 2013) And "[w]hen an exhibit contradicts the allegations in the complaint, ruling against the non-moving party on a motion to dismiss is consistent with [the Court's] obligation to review all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Id.

III. DISCUSSION

Defendants contend the Second Amended Complaint should be dismissed because: (1) Officers McCoy, O'Connor, and Vitellaro did not seize Flores (Dkt 63 at 6); (2) Officer Oeinck's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable (id. ); (3) Plaintiff's Monell claim against the City is "too vague and lacking in sufficient details" (id. at 13); and (4) Plaintiff's state-law claims against all Defendants are barred by the Illinois Tort Immunity Act, 745 ILCS 10/2-202, et seq. (id. at 14). The Court will address each argument in turn.

A. Section 1983 Claims Against Officers McCoy, O'Connor, and Vitellaro

Section 1983 provides a civil cause of action for "deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution...." 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In their motion to dismiss, Defendants point out that the Second Amended Complaint refers to "constitutional rights" Defendants supposedly violated, but it does not specify which constitutional rights they violated. (See Dkt. 63 n.2.) Plaintiff's response brief does not address Defendants’ argument or otherwise clarify Plaintiff's theory. It is clear from the factual allegations, however, that Plaintiff's Section 1983 claims could only arise under the Fourth Amendment. See Kernats v. O'Sullivan , 35 F.3d 1171, 1177 (7th Cir. 1994) ( Section 1983 claim regarding police use of force during arrest arise under Fourth Amendment). Accordingly, the Court will assess whether Plaintiff has alleged a Fourth Amendment violation. Cf. R3 Composites Corp. v. G&S Sales Corp. , 960 F.3d 935, 941 (7th Cir. 2020) ("Plaintiffs need only plead facts, not legal theories, in their complaints").

The Fourth Amendment guar...