Dellay v. R.I. Parole Bd.

LANCE DELLAY, Petitioner v. RHODE ISLAND PAROLE BOARD, Respondent

C.A. No. PM-2015-0081

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

August 19, 2016

DECISION

VAN COUYGHEN, J. Before this Court is the Rhode Island Parole Board's (Respondent, Parole Board, or State) motion for summary judgment¹ on a petition for postconviction relief. Petitioner Lance Dellay (Petitioner or Mr. Dellay) opposes the State's motion for summary judgment and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The Parole Board denied Mr. Dellay's application for parole on October 21, 2013. Thereafter, Mr. Dellay filed a petition for postconviction relief on January 7, 2015, arguing that the Parole Board violated his procedural due process rights and is requesting that this Court remand the case to the Parole Board for a new hearing. The Court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to G.L. 1956 §§ 10-9.1-1, et seq. and Rule 56 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure.

IFacts

The parties entered into an agreed statement of facts, which are summarized as follows: On September 30, 1994, Mr. Dellay was sentenced after being convicted by a jury of second degree murder and larceny over $500 (P1-1992-3293A²). (Joint Stipulation of Undisputed Facts, ¶ 1.) The Court sentenced him to sixty years at the Adult Correctional Institution, with fifty years to serve, and ten years suspended with probation. Id. at ¶ 2. Mr. Dellay also received a sentence of ten years to serve for the larceny conviction to run concurrent with the murder sentence.

On October 21, 2013, the Parole Board unanimously denied Mr. Dellay's request for parole after a hearing. Id. at ¶¶ 3-4. The minutes of the Parole Board's meeting state, "The Board votes to deny parole. The reason for the denial is due to the violent nature of Mr. Dellay'soffense and the length of his sentence. We will see him again in October 2016." Department of Corrections, Inmate Parole Information (Parole Board's Minutes). Petitioner filed a petition for postconviction relief on January 7, 2015 challenging the sufficiency of the content of the Parole Board's written decision.

IIStandard of Review

Postconviction relief cases are civil proceedings; thus, Rule 56 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable to the present case. Doyle v. State, 122 R.I. 590, 593, 411 A.2d 907, 909 (1980). In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the trial judge must review the evidence "in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Long v. Dell, Inc., 93 A.3d 988, 995 (R.I. 2014). During this inquiry, the trial judge "must refrain from weighing the evidence or passing upon issues of credibility." DeMaio v. Ciccone, 59 A.3d 125, 130 (R.I. 2013) (citing Doe v. Gelineau, 732 A.2d 43, 48 (R.I. 1999)). Summary judgment is appropriate when there "'is no genuine issue of material fact to be decided . . .'" Id. at 129 (quoting Pereira v. Fitzgerald, 21 A.3d 369, 372 (R.I. 2011)).

In this case, Petitioner and Respondent have stipulated to the pertinent facts. Therefore, there are no genuine issues of material fact to be decided. See DeMaio, 59 A.3d at 130. Thus, the matter is ripe for summary judgment.

Postconviction remedies are set forth in §§ 10-9.1-1, et. seq., and provide that "'one who has been convicted of a crime may seek collateral review of that conviction based on alleged violations of his or her constitutional rights.'" Brown v. State, 32 A.3d 901, 907 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Lynch v. State, 13 A.3d 603, 605 (R.I. 2011)). "[P]ost-conviction relief is available to a defendant convicted of a crime who contends that his original conviction or sentence violated rights that the state or federal constitutions secured to him." State v. Laurence, 18 A.3d 512, 521(R.I. 2011) (quoting Otero v. State, 996 A.2d 667, 670 (R.I. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The applicant bears "'the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [postconviction] relief is warranted . . .'" Hazard v. State, 64 A.3d 749, 756 (R.I. 2013) (quoting Anderson v. State, 45 A.3d 594, 601 (R.I. 2012)). Our Supreme Court has held that postconviction relief is an appropriate vehicle for inmates who challenge decisions of the Parole Board. State v. Ouimette, 117 R.I. 361, 363, 367 A.2d 704, 706 (1976). However, the Superior Court's review of a Parole Board's decision is limited to whether or not the petitioner's due process rights were violated. Id.

IIIParties' Arguments

Mr. Dellay essentially sets forth two arguments as to why the Parole Board's written decision violated his due process rights under both the Rhode Island and United States Constitutions: First, the decision did not address an individualized risk assessment, which he argues is mandatory pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 13-8-14.1. Second, the decision failed to sufficiently state the grounds and supporting factors in its written decision denying Mr. Dellay's application. Petitioner argues that the failure to provide sufficient grounds for the denial deprives him of a factual basis by which he is informed of his shortcomings. Petitioner also argues that failure to provide sufficient grounds prevents this Court from being able to competently review the Parole Board's decision.

The State contends that the Parole Board did not violate Mr. Dellay's due process rights because the Parole Board's decision fulfills statutory and due process requirements as articulated in Bernard v. Vose, 730 A.2d 30, 32 (R.I. 1999) ("due process only entitles the parole applicant an opportunity to be heard and to be informed in what respects the applicant falls short of qualifying for parole"). Further, the State contends § 13-8-14.1 does not require the ParoleBoard to reference an individualized risk assessment in its decision. The State also argues that the minutes of the meeting sufficiently set forth the Parole Board's reasons for denial, which provides a sufficient basis for judicial review. Thus, the State avers that Mr. Dellay's due process rights were not violated.

IVAnalysis

AStatutory Construction and Risk Assessment

Whether or not § 13-8-14.1 mandates that the Parole Board reference the risk assessment in its decision is essentially a matter of statutory construction. When statutes are clear on their face judicial review is at an end. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956, 960 (R.I. 2007). In cases where a statute is ambiguous, the Court must then utilize the canons of statutory construction to determine the General Assembly's intention. Id. One of the canons of statutory construction the Court utilizes is in pari materia, which stands for the proposition that "statutes on the same subject * * * are, when enacted by the same jurisdiction, to be read in relation to each other." Horn v. S. Union Co., 927 A.2d 292, 294 n.5 (R.I. 2007) (quoting Reed Dickerson, The Interpretation and Application of Statutes 233 (1975)). In pari materia is utilized in an attempt to harmonize inconsistencies or ambiguities within statutory provisions relating to the same subject matter. Narragansett Food Servs., Inc. v. R.I. Dep't of Labor, 420 A.2d 805, 807 (R.I. 1980) (citing Berthiaume v. Sch. Comm. of Woonsocket, R.I., 397 A.2d 889, 893 (1979)).

Petitioner urges the Court to interpret § 13-8-14.1 as mandating that the Parole Board include reference to consideration of his individual risk assessment in its written decision. However, when reading § 13-8-14.1 in conjunction with § 13-8-14, it is clear to this Court that Petitioner's argument is without merit.

Section 13-8-14 states as follows:

"(a) A permit shall not be issued to any prisoner under the authority of sections 13-8-9--13-8-13 unless it shall appear to the parole board:

"(1) That the prisoner has substantially observed the rules of the institution in which confined, as evidenced by reports submitted to the board by the director of the department of corrections, or his or her designated representatives, in a form to be prescribed by the director;

"(2) That release would not depreciate the seriousness of the prisoner's offense or promote disrespect for the law;

"(3) That there is a reasonable probability that the prisoner, if released, would live and remain at liberty without violating the law;

"(4) That the prisoner can properly assume a role in the city or town in which he or she is to reside. In assessing the prisoner's role in the community the board shall consider:

(i) Whether or not the prisoner has employment;

(ii) The location of his or her residence and place of employment; and

(iii) The needs of the prisoner for special services, including but not limited to, specialized medical care and rehabilitative services; and

"(5) That any and all restitution imposed pursuant to section 12-19-32 has been paid in full, or satisfactory arrangements have been made with the court if the person has the ability to pay. Any agreement shall be in writing and it is the burden of the person seeking parole to satisfy the parole board that this requirement has been met. Any person subject to the provisions of this section may request an ability to pay hearing, by filing the request with the court which imposed the original sentence." Sec. 13-8-14(a) (emphasis added).

Section 13-8-14.1 states as follows:

"(a) At least once each calendar year the parole board shall adopt standards to be utilized by the board in evaluating applications for parole of persons convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to the adult correctional institutions. These standards shall establish, with the range of parole eligibility set by statute, the portion of a sentence which should be served depending on the likelihood of recidivism as determined by a risk assessment, and shall serve as guidelines for the board in making individual parole determinations.

"(b) The board shall consider the applicable standard prior to rendering a decision on a parole application, and may make a determination at variance with that standard only upon a finding that the

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