Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Chakrin

304 So.3d 822

DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAY SAFETY AND MOTOR VEHICLES, Petitioner,

v.Richard Alan CHAKRIN, Respondent.

Case No. 2D20-192

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed October 14, 2020

Christie S. Utt, General Counsel, and Mark L. Mason, Assistant General Counsel, Tallahassee, for Petitioner.

Christopher E. Cosden, Fort Myers, for Respondent.

CASE, JAMES R., Associate Senior Judge.

The Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) challenges the circuit court's order granting the petition for writ of certiorari brought by Richard Chakrin pursuant to section 322.31, Florida Statutes (2019), after a hearing officer denied his request to have his driver license reinstated after it was permanently revoked following a conviction for DUI manslaughter.¹ See § 322.271(4), Fla. Stat. (2018). Our review of "a circuit court order entered in its review capacity over a final administrative order" by DHSMV pursuant to section 322.31 is by second-tier certiorari under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.030(b)(3). Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Alliston, 813 So. 2d 141, 144 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; see also Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 530 (Fla. 1995). For the reasons that follow, we grant the petition and quash the order of the circuit court.

Procedural Facts and Relevant Law Underlying Petition for Reinstatement:

Upon his plea and resulting judgment, Mr. Chakrin's driver license was suspended permanently under sections 322.26, .27(1)(b), .28, Florida Statutes (1999). Following his release from prison in February 2014, he petitioned to have his license reinstated under section 322.271(4), Florida Statutes (2018), which provides:

Notwithstanding the provisions of s. 322.28(2)(d), a person whose driving privilege has been permanently revoked because he or she has been convicted of DUI manslaughter in violation of s. 316.193 and has no prior convictions for DUI-related offenses may, upon ... the expiration of 5 years after the termination of any term of incarceration under s. 316.193 ..., petition the department for reinstatement of his or her driving privilege.

A hearing on his request was held on February 19, 2019.² In order to be considered for a license reinstatement, it was Mr. Chakrin's burden to prove that he had "not been arrested for a drug-related offense during the 5 years preceding the filing of the petition," had "not driven a motor vehicle without a license for at least 5 years prior to the hearing," had "been drug-free for at least 5 years prior to the hearing," and had "completed a DUI program licensed by the department." See § 322.271(4)(a) (emphasis added). The department's role was then to "determine the petitioner's qualification, fitness, and need to drive" and then exercise its discretion to reinstate the license. See § 322.271(4)(b) ("Upon such determination, the department may, in its discretion, reinstate the driver license of the petitioner." (emphasis added)).

At the hearing, Mr. Chakrin stated that he had consumed a beer one week before the hearing—when he accidently grabbed it instead of a Coke from the refrigerator—but thought it would not matter as he was not driving anywhere at the time. The hearing officer took the matter under advisement and indicated he would rule once he had checked the statutes. The order of the hearing officer denying the petition for reinstatement made only one factual finding—that a beer was consumed by the petitioner a week before the hearing—followed by the legal statement "Florida Statutes require 5 years of complete abstinence prior to consideration for early reinstatement (see below)." Below that, in a separate section, the order then cited two statutes, sections 322.28(2)(d) and .27(4), and indicated six bulleted requirements under those statutes. The order does not specify whether those requirements were met, with the exception of the alcohol-consumption finding.

Circuit-court review:

Following the denial, Mr. Chakrin filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court seeking review of the denial, arguing that the denial of the petition for reinstatement based on alcohol consumption was a departure from the essential requirements of law and a failure to provide him due process because section 322.271(4)(a) requires only that he remain free of drugs and not alcohol. The circuit court granted the petition for writ of certiorari and quashed the order denying the petition for reinstatement—which DHSMV challenges by way of a second-tier review of the circuit court's order through this petition for writ of certiorari—because it concluded that section 322.271(4)(a)'s requirement that Mr. Chakrin prove he had remained drug-free could not be interpreted by DHSMV as including alcohol. For the reasons explained below, the circuit court did not observe the essential requirements of the law when it disregarded the application of binding case law holding otherwise and, in its stead, failed to adequately conduct a review of the plain statutory language or the discretion it affords the hearing officer. This deviated from the first-tier certiorari standard it should have applied and resulted in a miscarriage of justice, and even under this court's limited second-tier review, we must grant the petition and quash the circuit court's order.

Standards of review:

"[A] circuit court conducting first-tier certiorari review of an administrative decision is limited to determining (1) whether due process was accorded, (2) whether the essential requirements of the law were observed, and (3) whether the administrative findings and judgment were supported by competent[ ] substantial evidence." Wiggins v. Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 209 So. 3d 1165, 1170 (Fla. 2017). Mr. Chakrin, in his petition for writ of certiorari in the circuit court, made two arguments. He primarily argued that the hearing officer failed to observe the essential requirements of law by concluding that the use of alcohol acted as a bar to the reinstatement of his license under the language of the statute. He further argued that the statute's use of the term "drug-free" was sufficiently vague to deprive him of due process. The circuit court granted the petition based only on the first argument—specifically finding that the statutory language was not vague.

This court's "second-tier certiorari review is more narrowly limited to (1) whether the lower tribunal afforded procedural due process and (2) whether the lower tribunal applied the correct law." Id. There is no argument raised by DHSMV or Mr. Chakrin here that asserts the circuit court did not afford procedural due process, nor is the circuit court's finding regarding the statutory vagueness as a due process argument raised as an issue, and our review is therefore limited to whether the circuit court applied the correct law in granting the petition for writ of certiorari and quashing the DHSMV order on the basis of its finding that the hearing officer failed to observe the essential requirements of law. See State v. Jones, 283 So. 3d 1259, 1264 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019). "A circuit court departs from the essential requirements of law when it violates a ‘clearly established principle of law,’ which can come from the circuit court's ‘interpretation or application of controlling case law, statutes, procedural rules, or constitutional provisions.’ " Id. (quoting Daniels v. Sorriso Dental Studio, LLC, 164 So. 3d 778, 781 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015) ). It is this type of departure that we are tasked with examining in this case.

"A decision made according to the form of law and the rules prescribed for rendering it, although it may be erroneous in its conclusion as to what the law is as applied to facts, is not an illegal or irregular act or proceeding remediable by certiorari ." Haines City Cmty. Dev. v. Heggs, 658 So. 2d 523, 525 (Fla. 1995) (quoting Basnet v. City of Jacksonville, 18 Fla. 523, 526-27 (1882) ). However, the "failure to apply a controlling legal decision is a classic departure from the essential requirements of the law." Jones, 283 So. 3d at 1266 (citing Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Hofer, 5 So. 3d 766, 772 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Walsh, 204 So. 3d 169, 171 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016) ; Dep't of Hwy. Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Clay, 152 So. 3d 1259, 1260 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) ). "It [likewise] is well-established that a circuit court's failure to apply the unambiguous language of a statute is a departure from the essential requirements of the law." Id. at 1268. Once either basis for such a departure is found, then a district court will grant relief only where the departure constituted a manifest injustice. Id. at 1269 ("Having established that the circuit court's decision ... departs from the essential requirements of law, we must still consider whether it results in a miscarriage of justice.").

"[T]his court cannot grant certiorari absent a showing that the failure to apply the correct law resulted in a ‘miscarriage of justice.’ An important factor to consider when determining whether the circuit court's error amounts to a ‘miscarriage of justice’ is the adverse precedential effect the error might have on subsequent cases." Hofer, 5 So. 3d at 772 ("A circuit court's decision will generally not merit certiorari review if it is issued without a written opinion or is particularly fact-dependent or fact-specific because it lacks precedential value."). "Appellate courts, however, have found a miscarriage of justice and exercised their certiorari jurisdiction when a decision applies incorrect law and establishes principles of general application binding in subsequent cases." Id. With these standards in mind, we turn to an analysis specific to the facts and argument presented in this petition.

Analysis:

In this case, our analysis of whether the circuit court departed from the essential requirements of law must begin with identifying the legal basis on which ...