Depree v. Jungwirth

1

SCOTT DEPREE, Plaintiff v. JERRY JUNGWIRTH II, et al., Defendants

No. 2:22-cv-01462-TLN-DMC

United States District Court, E.D. California

September 20, 2024

ORDER

Troy L. Nunley, United States District Judge

This matter is before the Court on Defendants Jerry A. Jungwirth II (“Jungwirth”), Richard Knox (“Knox”), Eric Patterson (“Patterson”),^[1] and County of Tehama's (“County”) (collectively “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss.^[2] (ECF No. 18.) Plaintiff Scott Depree (“Plaintiff”) filed an opposition. (ECF No. 22.) Defendants filed a reply. (ECF No 23.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion.

I. Factual and Procedural Background^[3]

This case arises from Defendants' allegedly unlawful search of Plaintiff's property and use of excessive force during Plaintiff's arrest. On June 4, 2018, Jungwirth, a Deputy Sheriff for County, applied for an Inspection and Abatement Warrant after observing what he believed to be illegal marijuana cultivation on Plaintiff's property. (ECF No. 17 at 4-5.) A magistrate judge signed the warrant the same day. (Id. at 7.) The scope of the warrant was limited to “the land proper and all non-residential buildings on the premises.” (Id. at 7-8.) The warrant also authorized a safety sweep of residential structures as necessary for officer safety. (Id. at 8.) The warrant did not authorize a search of the residence or a seizure of lawfully possessed, processed marijuana. (Id.)

Defendants executed the warrant on June 7, 2018. (Id. at 14.) When Defendants arrived on the property, Sergeant Knox shot Plaintiff with a bean bag rifle and arrested him. (Id. at 12.) Defendants proceeded to search Plaintiff's residence (including an “attempt” to open a safe within the residence) and trailers located on the premises. (Id. at 14-15.) Plaintiff further alleges Defendants unlawfully seized 60 pounds of processed marijuana, which had been kept in large, sealed, opaque containers within a locked trailer. (Id. at 15.)

Plaintiff initiated this action on August 18, 2022. (ECF No. 1.) Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint, and the Court dismissed the Complaint in its entirety except for Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Knox. (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiff filed the FAC on October 8, 2023, alleging: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for unlawful search and seizure and excessive force against the individual Defendants; and (2) a Monell claim against the County. (ECF No. 17.) Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss on October 27, 2023. (ECF No. 18.)

II. Standard of Law

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Under notice pleading in federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal citation and quotations omitted). “This simplified notice pleading standard relies on liberal discovery rules and summary judgment motions to define disputed facts and issues and to dispose of unmeritorious claims.” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512 (2002).

On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail Clerks Int'lAss 'n v. Schermei'horii, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege “‘specific facts' beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted).

Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).

Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted).

If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.'” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)).

III. Analysis

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claim for unlawful search and seizure against the individual Defendants (Claim One) and Plaintiff's Monell claim against the County (Claim Two).^[4] (ECF No. 18-1.) The Court will address Defendants' arguments in turn.

A. Unlawful Search and Seizure Claim

In moving to dismiss the unlawful search and seizure claim, Defendants raise four main arguments: (1) Plaintiff fails to allege the warrant was obtained through judicial deception or was otherwise invalid; (2) Plaintiff fails to allege Defendants exceeded the scope of the warrant; (3) Plaintiff fails to allege he has standing to challenge the search; and (4) Plaintiff does not have a legally protected property interest in the marijuana seized.^[5] (ECF No. 18-1 at 13-17.)

In opposition, Plaintiff clarifies that his claim is not based on a theory of judicial deception. (ECF No. 22 at 8.) Rather, Plaintiff argues the claim is premised on the theory that Jungwirth exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching Plaintiff's residence and by searching drawers, cabinets, and containers in residential trailers on Plaintiff's property. (Id. at 8-9, 1516.) Plaintiff also argues he has standing to challenge the search. (Id.) Lastly, Plaintiff argues Defendants unlawfully seized his processed marijuana and it is irrelevant whether Plaintiff has a legally protected property interest for the purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim. (Id. at 18-19.)

The threshold issue is whether the allegations in the FAC are sufficient to establish that Jungwirth exceeded the scope of the warrant. The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure ... against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “[A] search or seizure pursuant to an otherwise valid warrant is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment to the extent it exceeds the scope of that warrant.” United States v. Ramirez, 976 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2020).

The Court agrees with Defendants that the allegations in the FAC are insufficient to establish Jungwirth exceeded the scope of the warrant. As to the scope of the warrant, the FAC alleges the search was limited to “the land proper, and all non-residential buildings on the Premises in order to inspect and abate the unlawfully cultivated marijuana.” (ECF No. 17 at 8.) The FAC further alleges the warrant permitted “forcible entry of such non-residential buildings in order to inspect and abate the unlawfully cultivated marijuana, and a safety sweep of residential structures as necessary for Officer safety.” (Id.)

As to the execution of the warrant, the FAC lacks sufficient allegations regarding Jungwirth specifically. The allegations about Jungwirth primarily relate to events that took place prior to execution of the warrant. (ECF No. 17 at 4-12.) There are no allegations that Jungwirth personally exceeded the scope of the warrant during the search, and the FAC instead refers to “Defendants” collectively. See Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[A] plaintiff [cannot] hold an officer liable because of his membership in a group without a showing of individual participation in the unlawful conduct.”). /// Moreover, while the FAC vaguely alleges Defendants searched Plaintiff's residence,...