Desantis v. N.J. Transit

103 F.Supp.3d 583

Anthony DeSANTIS, Plaintiff,

v.NEW JERSEY TRANSIT, et al., Defendants.

Civ. No. 14–3578 KMMAH.

United States District Court, D. New Jersey.

Signed April 29, 2015.

Luretha M. Stribling, Clark, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Lisa M. Koblin, Trenton, NJ, for Defendants.

OPINION

KEVIN McNULTY, District Judge.

The complaint in this case alleges that New Jersey Transit, a public employer, discriminated against one of its employees on the basis of age, disability, and race, and also violated that employee's First Amendment rights. The plaintiff, Anthony DeSantis, sues NJ Transit and two NJ Transit employees, Alan Wohl and Fred D'Ascoli. The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss various portions of the complaint. I will grant the motion in part in deny it in part. I will dismiss the individual defendants from all counts. I will likewise dismiss the First Amendment claim, as well as the harassment/hostile work environment claim. I will deny the motion, however, insofar as it seeks to dismiss the Title VII discrimination claim for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. I also deny defendants' request that I strike from the Complaint allegations regarding a failure to promote DeSantis in 1993, and that I strike DeSantis's demand for punitive damages.

Background¹

New Jersey Transit was the employer of the plaintiff, Anthony DeSantis. Defendant Fred D'Ascoli was NJ Transit's Deputy Chief Financial Officer. Defendant Alan Wohl was the Director of the Fixed Assets Department. (Compl.,²Background, ¶¶ 8–10).

DeSantis started his employment with NJ Transit in 1982 as a Senior Accountant. Id.at ¶ 13. He was promoted to Principal Accountant in 1994. Id.at ¶ 16. It appears that he left NJ Transit sometime after 2013. (Compl., Third Count, ¶ 44).

DeSantis suffers from epilepsy. (Compl., Background, ¶ 25) His condition caused him to experience seizures, some of which occurred while he was at work. Seizures were witnessed by his colleagues, including defendants D'Ascoli and Wohl. (Compl., Background, ¶ 27, Second Count, ¶ 26) DeSantis also suffers from “paralysis of his left arm” and “walks with a limp.” (Compl., Background, ¶ 25).

The Complaint alleges that DeSantis is over the age of forty years old. (Compl., First Count, ¶ 3) It does not, however, give his exact age, nor does it disclose when he turned forty. As a result, the Complaint does not reveal how old DeSantis was at the time the various incidents he alleges occurred.

DeSantis also states that he is married to an African American woman, a fact relevant to his discrimination claim. (Compl., Fourth Count, ¶ 49).

DeSantis alleges that on two occasions, he sought promotion to the position of Manager of Fixed Assets. He alleges that he was the “most qualified” for the position, but that on both occasions it was given to someone else. (Compl., First Count, ¶ 11).

In 1993, DeSantis alleges, he was already “quite proficient” in performing the work required of the Manager of Fixed Assets, and was “relied upon by other departments to provide the necessary information from his department that they required.” (Compl., First Count, ¶ 9) Nonetheless, DeSantis “was told by management that he could not apply for the position.” Id.at ¶ 14. DeSantis provided training to Rupak Biswas, the accountant ultimately chosen for the position in 1993. (Compl., Background, ¶ 8).

Some twenty years later, in 2013, the position of Manager of Fixed Assets became available again. DeSantis says that at this time, he remained qualified for the position. DeSantis interviewed for the position, but was not promoted. (Compl., Background, ¶ 23) NJ Transit instead filled the position with an accountant from its auditing department, Fabia Cattan. DeSantis alleges that Cattan was less qualified than he was: she had “no expertise to work in the Fixed Assets Department,” she “had been given the interview questions prior to the interview taking place,” and she ultimately required training from DeSantis to fill the position. Id.at ¶¶ 21–24.

Starting during Biswas's tenure, and continuing through Cattan's tenure, DeSantis regularly performed the work that should have been performed by the Manager of Fixed Assets. (Compl., Background, ¶¶ 18, 24).

DeSantis alleges that his employer subjected him to various forms of harassment: he was “expected” to complete both his own work and the work of the manager of fixed assets (Compl., Background, ¶ 24; Third Count, ¶ 45); he was unjustly disciplined for insubordination (Compl., Third Count, ¶ 40); he was “questioned about all aspects of his work” (Id.at ¶ 45); and he was subjected to “hostility from Defendants” (Id.).

On one occasion, while training Cattan for her position, DeSantis asked Cattan to explain how she was more qualified for the position than he was. (Compl., Fifth Count, ¶ 60) Cattan “wrote [DeSantis] up” for insubordination. Id.at ¶ 61.

This harassment, DeSantis explains, had a negative effect on him. He experienced stress and depression (Compl., Third Count ¶¶ 35, 43), and his seizures grew more frequent. Id.at ¶ 36. His “health worsened which resulted in Plaintiff being taken out of work by his physician to address his worsening Epilepsy.” Id.at ¶ 44.

DeSantis has brought suit in this Court alleging discrimination and violation of the First Amendment. The complaint consists of five counts: the First Count alleges that the defendants violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”). The Second Count alleges that the defendants violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“NJLAD”). The Third Count alleges harassment and hostile work environment claims under the NJLAD. The Fourth Count alleges race discrimination (stemming from DeSantis's marriage to an African American) in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and the NJLAD. Finally, the Fifth Count alleges First Amendment violations stemming from Cattan's disciplining of DeSantis for insubordination.

The defendants have filed a motion to dismiss several portions of the complaint.

First, they argue that the individual defendants should be dismissed from all counts. With respect to the federal law claims in counts one, two, and four, defendants contend that ADEA, ADA, and Title VII do not provide for individual liability. (Mot., 48, 17–20) With respect to counts three and four (harassment/hostile work environment and race discrimination under the NJLAD) they contend that DeSantis's allegations do not state a claim against the individual defendants. Id.at 8, 17–20.

Second, defendants argue that the Third Count (alleging harassment/hostile work environment under the NJLAD) should be dismissed in its entirety for failure to state a claim. (Mot., 8–14).

Third, defendants contend that the Fourth Count (alleging Title VII claims of race discrimination) should be dismissed because plaintiff failed to file an EEOC administrative claim of racial discrimination. (Mot., 14–17).

Fourth, defendants contend that the Fifth Count (First Amendment Violations) should be dismissed because DeSantis's speech did not involve a matter of public concern, and therefore was not protected by the First Amendment. (Mot., 20–24).

Fifth, the defendants request that any mention of alleged failure to promote DeSantis in 1993 be struck from the complaint. (Mot., 24–27).

Sixth, they ask that the Court hold that punitive damages will not be available in this case. (Mot., 27–33).

I will grant the Defendants' motion in part in deny it in part. I will dismiss the individual defendants from all counts. I will likewise dismiss the harassment claim (Third Count) and the First Amendment claim (Fifth Count).

I will not, however, dismiss the Title VII claim (Fourth Count) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. I will not strike the allegations of the Complaint that describe the 1993 failure to promote. Nor will I rule, at this juncture, that punitive damages will not be available. All dismissals will be without prejudice to the filing of an amended complaint within 21 days of the date of the accompanying Order.

Discussion

I. Grounds for Dismissal Applicable Only to Individual Defendants

Wohl and D'Ascoli argue that they should be dismissed from First, Second, Third, and Fourth Counts because individual liability is ruled out as a matter of law or has not been pled sufficiently.

a. Individual liability under the ADA, the ADEA, and Title VII

I deal first with the federal-law claims asserted in the First, Second, and Fourth Counts. Wohl and D'Ascoli correctly contend that Title VII, ADA, and ADEA do not impose liability on individuals who are not themselves employers.

With respect to violations of Title VII, the Third Circuit has long held that individuals cannot be personally liable. For example, in Emerson v. Thiel College,296 F.3d 184 (3d Cir.2002), a former student brought suit under Title VII against a college, its president, its vice president of academic affairs, and members of the faculty and staff. The Third Circuit upheld dismissal of the claim against the individual defendants because “individual employees are not liable under Title VII.” Id.at 190. See also Dici v. Com. of Pa.,91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir.1996)(“individual employees cannot be held liable under Title VII”); Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,100 F.3d 1061, 1078 (3d Cir.1996)(“we are persuaded that Congress did not intend to hold individual employees liable under Title VII”). As to Title VII, then, the law is clear. Count Four, the Title VII claim, must be dismissed as against Wohl and D'Ascoli, because they are not employers but individuals.

Does the same reasoning apply to ADEA and ADA? I briefly examine the state of Third Circuit precedent and discuss the statutes' parallel construction, from which I conclude that it does.

With respect to the ADEA, the Third Circuit has held in non-precedential opinions that individual defendants are not liable. Hill v. Borough of Kutztown,455 F.3d 225, 246 (3d Cir.2006)(“Hill did not...