Desimone v. Flagler Cnty.

682 F.Supp.3d 1085

Nicole DESIMONE, Plaintiff, v. FLAGLER COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 3:20-cv-1242-TJC-MCR

United States District Court, M.D. Florida, Jacksonville Division

Signed July 17, 2023

Carl Scott Schuler, Schuler & Lee, PA, Jacksonville, FL, Joseph J. Rinaldi, Jr., David W. Brill, Law Firm Brill & Rinaldi, Weston, FL, Zackary D. Slankard, Barthet Law, Miami, FL, Amanda Thoele, Thoele Drach, Jacksonville, FL, Eric Karl Neitzke, Eric K. Neitzke, P.A., Daytona Beach, FL, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Roper, Frank Mari, Roper, P.A., Orlando, FL, Derek J. Angell, O'Connor, Haftel & Angell, PLLC, Orlando, FL, for Defendants Flagler County, Rick Staly, Steve Cole, Becky Quintieri.

Bradley Gilyard, Palm Coast, FL, Pro Se.

Edward Infantolino, Jr., Vagovic & Abend, P.A., Daytona Beach, FL, for Defendant Julio Vazquez.

ORDER

Timothy J. Corrigan, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff, Nicole DeSimone, a former inmate at the Flagler County Jail, initiated this action, through counsel, by filing a Civil Rights Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. DeSimone is proceeding on a Corrected First Amended Complaint (Doc. 41; Amended Complaint) against the following Defendants: (1) Flagler County; (2) Rick Staly, Flagler County Sheriff; (3) Steve Cole, Chief of Court and Detention Services; (4) Becky Quintieri, former Director of the Flagler County Jail;¹ (5) Correctional Officer Bradley Gilyard; and (6) Correctional Officer Jonathan Vitale.² Id. at 2-4.

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Staly's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 94) with exhibits (Docs. 94-1 through 94-52); Defendant Cole's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 95) with exhibits (Docs. 95-1 through 95-52); Defendant Quintieri's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 96) with exhibits (Docs. 96-1 through 96-52); and Defendant Flagler County's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 97) with exhibit (Doc. 97-1).³ Plaintiff DeSimone filed a Response in opposition to each Motion (Docs. 102, 103, 104, 105) with exhibits (Docs. 102-1 through 102-13; 103-1 through 103-13; 104-1 through 104-13; 105-1 through 105-13). Staly, Cole, Quintieri, and Flagler County each filed a Reply. (Docs. 106, 107, 108, 111). The Motions are ripe for review.

I. BACKGROUND

DeSimone was an inmate at Flagler County Jail from November 2016 to January 2017. (Doc. 94-50 at 23:19-24:10, 27:17-28:1). Staly became Sheriff of Flagler County in January 2017. (Doc. 94-34 at 12:4-10). Quintieri was the Director of the Jail until December 2016. (Doc. 94-8 at 11:11-25). In January 2017, Cole replaced Quintieri and the position was given a new title: Chief of Court and Detention Services. (Docs. 94-34 at 12:4-10; 94-8 at 11:19-22).

DeSimone alleges that during her incarceration, multiple correctional officers including Gilyard, Vazquez, and Vitale engaged in sexual misconduct with DeSimone and other inmates. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 26-28, 32-37). On January 16, 2017, Gilyard sexually assaulted DeSimone. (Docs. 94-50 at 26:14-23; 102-2 at 6:6-7:1).⁴ The assault occurred in the Jail laundry room in a "blind spot" that was not visible through the Jail's cameras. (Docs. 94-7 at 10; 94-13 at 18:17-24, 25:25-26:18; 94-14; 102-2 at 13:19-14:14).

In the Amended Complaint, DeSimone raises eleven Counts for relief. (Doc. 41). The only Counts at issue for purposes of this Order are: (Count IV) Flagler County, Staly, Cole,⁵ and Quintieri, in their official capacities, violated DeSimone's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count V) Cole and Quintieri, in their individual capacities, violated DeSimone's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (Count VIII) Flagler County and Staly, in his official capacity, are vicariously liable for civil assault under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a); (Count IX) Flagler County and Staly, in his official capacity, are vicariously liable for civil battery under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a); and (Count X) Flagler County and Staly, in his official capacity, are vicariously liable for negligence under Florida Statutes section 768.28(9)(a). The pending Motions seek summary judgment on each of these counts.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Further, the Court will construe all evidence in a light most favorable to DeSimone. See Caldwell v. Warden, FCI Talladega, 748 F.3d 1090, 1098 (11th Cir. 2014).

III. SUMMARY OF MOTIONS

Staly argues he is entitled to summary judgment on the official capacity claims against him because: (1) DeSimone fails to establish an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment violation; (2) failure to follow federal PREA standards does not amount to a constitutional violation; and (3) DeSimone has failed to establish the requisite liability for her state law claims against Staly. See generally Doc. 94.

Cole argues he is entitled to summary judgment as to the claims against him because: (1) he is entitled to qualified immunity as to the individual capacity claim against him; (2) any official capacity claim against him should be treated as a claim against the municipality; (3) he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in his official capacity as an arm of the state; (4) DeSimone fails to establish an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against him; and (5) failure to follow federal PREA standards does not amount to a constitutional violation. See generally Doc. 95.

Quintieri argues she is entitled to summary judgment as to the claims against her because: (1) she is entitled to qualified immunity as to the individual capacity claim against her; (2) any official capacity claim against her should be treated as a claim against the municipality; (3) she is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity in her official capacity as an arm of the state; (4) DeSimone fails to establish an Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment claim against her; and (5) failure to follow federal PREA standards does not amount to a constitutional violation. See generally Doc. 96.

Flagler County argues it is entitled to summary judgment on the claims against it because: (1) the Sheriff and his employees are not agents of the County; (2) DeSimone fails to establish municipal liability under § 1983 against Flagler County; (3) the assault and battery counts fail because Defendant Vazquez was employed by the Sheriff, not Flagler County; (4) Defendant Vazquez was not acting within the scope of his employment; (5) Flagler County owed no legal duty in negligence to DeSimone; and (6) even if it did owe DeSimone a duty, it is entitled to sovereign immunity. See generally Doc. 97.

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Count IV: Flagler County and Staly, Cole, and Quintieri, in their official capacities, violated DeSimone's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

DeSimone alleges in Count IV that Flagler County and Staly, Cole and Quintieri, in their official capacities, had a series of "established practices, customs, policies, and protocols" that violated her Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 84-86). Specifically, these practices, customs, policies, and protocols consisted of: (1) violating Defendants' own policies regarding the prevention of sexual misconduct by correctional officers; (2) placing male correctional officers "in a position to exercise total sexual domination over female inmates"; (3) "creating and operating a system of surveillance security cameras with known blind spots and deficiencies that created opportunities for sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse of inmates by correctional officers"; (4) ignoring, disregarding, or turning a blind eye to ongoing sexual harassment of female inmates and failing to watch for harassment on the Jail's surveillance system; (5) failing to train and/or supervise Jail staff to recognize and report sexual misconduct; and (6) failing to train and/or supervise Jail supervisors to recognize and report sexual misconduct. Id. ¶ 86. DeSimone alleges that these practices, customs, policies, and protocols "encouraged and failed to prevent the continued unlawful sexual harassment, sexual misconduct, and sexual abuse of Ms. DeSimone by Defendants Gilyard, Vitale, and Vazquez." Id. ¶ 87.

1. Cole and Quintieri in their Official Capacities

Cole and Quintieri, current and former Jail leadership, are entitled to summary judgment on DeSimone's official capacity claims against them in Count IV because they are redundant Defendants. Suits against municipal officers sued in their official capacities are "functionally equivalent" to suits against municipalities. Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 776 (11th Cir. 1991). Since DeSimone sues Cole and Quintieri in their official capacities as well as the municipality that employs them, it would be "redundant and possibly confusing to the jury" to allow DeSimone's official capacity claims against Cole and Quintieri to proceed. Id.; see also Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cnty. Bd. Of Cnty. Comm'rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1302 n.3 (11th Cir. 2005) (noting that when employees are sued in their official capacity along with the municipality that employs them, the employer is the proper party to the action). Thus, Cole and Quintieri are entitled to summary judgment on the official capacity claims against them in Count IV.

2. Staly and Flagler County as Co-Defendants

Before getting to the merits of Sheriff Staly's and Flagler County's Motions, the Court must address Staly and Flagler County's status as co-defendants. Staly is sued only in his official capacity. Typically, an official-capacity suit is to be treated as a suit against the government entity of which the officer is an agent. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). However, the law appears unsettled on which entity a Florida sheriff represents. See Brown v....