Desir v. Austin

REMOND DESIR, Plaintiff, v. WENDELL I. AUSTIN,LOGAN LYNN WRAY and LYNN TRUCKING, Defendants.

WENDELL I. AUSTIN,LOGAN LYNN WRAY and LYNN TRUCKING, Third-party Plaintiffs, v. RAY'S RAPID TRANSPORTING LLCand REMUSAT CLAUDE THEBAUD, Third-party Defendants.

13 CV 912 (VMS)¹

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

December 21, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VERA M. SCANLON, United States Magistrate Judge:

This is a personal injury action arising out of a motor vehicle accident and is before this Court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Before the Court is Third-party Defendants Ray's Rapid Transporting, LLC ("Ray's Rapid") and Remusat Claude Thebaud's ("Thebaud") (collectively, "Third-party Defendants" or "TPDs") motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. For the reasons stated herein, Third-party Defendants' motion for summary judgment is denied; however, Florida's loss allocating law will apply.

I. BACKGROUND

a. Procedural History²

The instant action arises from a motor vehicle collision in Florida involving Plaintiff Remond Desir ("Plaintiff") and Defendant Wendell I. Austin ("Austin"), who at the time of the accident was operating a vehicle and trailer owned, respectively, by Defendants Logan Lynn Wray ("Wray") and Lynn Trucking. See Complaint, ECF No. 1. On August 22, 2013, Austin, Wray and Lynn Trucking (collectively, "Defendants," "Third-party Plaintiffs" or "TPPs") filed a Third-party Complaint against Rapid Ray's, Plaintiff's employer, and Thebaud, who was operating the vehicle in which plaintiff was a passenger when the accident occurred, alleging comparative negligence and seeking common law contribution and indemnification. See generally Third-party Complaint, ECF. No. 7.

Discovery between the parties subsequently commenced, and a discovery schedule was set. See November 21, 2013 Order, Un-numbered ECF Entry. Following several extensions of the discovery and dispositive motion-practice deadlines, I directed that any motions for summary judgment be initiated by May 1, 2015, in accordance with the Individual Rules of the Honorable Dora L. Irizarry, who - at the time - presided over all dispositive matters. See February 3, 2015 Order, un-numbered ECF entry. Due to subsequent extensions to the expert-discovery schedule, on April 24, 2015, I issued a revised scheduling order that set a deadline of June 8, 2015 for the parties to initiate any summary judgment motion practice. See April 24, 2015 Order, un-numbered ECF entry. This revised scheduling order granted the parties their "4^th or 5^th request for an extension" of the pretrial deadlines. See ECF No. 28.

After the June 8, 2015 deadline expired without any party initiating dispositive motion practice, Third-party Defendants sought to modify the scheduling order to extend the deadlines to move for summary judgment. See ECF No. 31. On June 29, 2015, District Judge Irizarry granted Third-party Defendants' motion insofar as the deadline to initiate dispositive motion practice was extended to July 6, 2015. See June 29, 2015 Order, un-numbered ECF entry. On July 6, 2015, rather than initiating dispositive motion practice, Third-party Defendants filed another extension request. See ECF No. 31. Finding that Third-party Defendants did not establish good cause for their failure to comply with the June 8, 2015 and July 6, 2015 deadlines, District Judge Irizarry denied their request to modify the original schedule order, thus foreclosing their opportunity to move for summary judgment. See generally ECF No. 33.

On August 26, 2015, the parties consented to my jurisdiction for all purposes. See ECF No. 38. On August 27, 2015, a conference was held, during which a trial date and briefing schedule for the parties' motions in limine were set. See ECF No. 39. The motions in limine schedule specifically included dates by which the parties would brief whether New York or Florida's loss allocating laws should apply at trial. Id. No party raised the prospect of moving for summary judgment. Id.

Pursuant to the briefing schedule set during the August 27, 2015 conference, Third-party Defendants served a motion for summary judgment, not a motion in limine, on October 2, 2015. See ECF No. 41. Plaintiff and Third-party Plaintiffs served their opposition papers on October 22, 2015, and October 23, 2015, respectively, see ECF Nos. 42-44, and Third-party Defendants served their reply papers on November 6, 2015. See ECF No. 45.

In sum, Third-party Defendants seek a declaration from the Court that Florida's loss-allocating statute, Fla. Stat. § 768.31 (2015), applies to the contribution and indemnificationclaims made by Third-party Plaintiffs and that summary judgment be granted in their favor as a result.

b. The Parties' 56.1 Statements

Rule 56.1(a) of the Local Civil Rules of the Eastern District of New York requires a party moving for summary judgment to submit a "short and concise statement, in numbered paragraphs, of the material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." The non-moving party, in turn, must submit "a correspondingly numbered paragraph responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party, and if necessary, additional paragraphs containing a separate, short, and concise statement of additional material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue to be tried." Local Civ. R. 56.1(b). The responses by the non-moving party which attempt to "controvert any statement of material fact" asserted by the moving party must be supported by "citation to evidence which would be admissible" as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Local Rule 56.1(d). "If the opposing party [] fails to controvert a fact so set forth in the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement, that fact will be deemed admitted." Giannullo v. City of New York, 322 F.3d 139, 140 (2d Cir. 2003). Here, Third-party Defendants failed to properly file a statement in compliance with Local Rules 56.1(a) and (b), respectively.

Third-party Defendants submitted a 56.1 Statement containing fourteen paragraphs. See ECF No. 41, Attachment #4. The crucial "facts" which they use to support their argument that Florida law should apply (i.e., the domiciles of Plaintiff and Thebaud), though, are not found within their 56.1 Statement. Rather, Third-party Defendants describe the "facts" underlying these claims in their counsel's "Affirmation in Support," which, inter alia, describes this matter'sprocedural history and recounts the substance of several depositions. See TPDs' Affirmation in Support ("TPDs' Aff."), ECF No. 41, Attachment #1.³

Third-party Plaintiffs properly responded to Third-party Defendants' 56.1 Statement, and they also submitted their own statement of additional facts pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(b). See ECF No. 44, Attachment #4. Third-party Defendants, in turn, failed to respond to Third-party Plaintiffs' statement of additional facts. See generally TPDs' Reply Memorandum of Law, ECF No. 45.

"The purpose of Local Rule 56.1 is to streamline the consideration of summary judgment motions by freeing district courts from the need to hunt through voluminous records without guidance from the parties." Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 74 (2d Cir. 2001). Altogether, counsel filed more than one thousand pages of documents, including exhibits, in support of their respective arguments. It is not this Court's responsibility (although it undertook it as necessary), particularly when all parties are represented by counsel, to sift through the motion papers in an attempt to determine which material facts are undisputed and what evidence exists to support each parties' claim. See Baity v. Kralik, 51 F. Supp. 3d 414, 418 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) ("The purpose of [Local Rule 56.1], and counsel's compliance with the same, is to assist the Court by narrowing the scope of the issues to be adjudicated and identifying the facts relevant and admissible to that determination.").

Typically, "[f]ailure to provide a responsive 56.1 statement usually means that the material facts in the [opposing] party's 56.1(a) statement are deemed admitted as a matter oflaw." Booth v. Melville, 14 Civ. 7022 (CM), 15 WL 7730931, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2015) (citing Local Rule 56.1(c)); see T.Y. v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Educ., 584 F.3d 412, 418 (2d Cir. 2009) ("A nonmoving party's failure to respond to a Rule 56.1 statement permits the court to conclude that the facts asserted in the statement are uncontested and admissible."). In this case, this general rule is complicated by the inclusion of the third-party action, such that two parties, rather than one, opposed Third-party Defendants' motion, with only one party (Third-party Plaintiffs) filing a 56.1 counter-statement.

In Lopez v. Echebia, 693 F. Supp. 2d 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 2010), the Court found that because the mistakes made by one party in filing a Rule 56.1 statement did not "create[] a difficulty for the court," it would not hold the party to the strict requirements of the rule. Although Third-party Defendants' errors are formalistic in nature, they have certainly created difficulty for this Court, particularly because there are three parties and thus, three sets of motion papers. Nonetheless, "[a] district court has broad discretion to determine whether to overlook a party's failure to comply with local court rules." Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir. 2001). In my discretion, I will "look past such filing failures," Derienzo v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 404 F. Supp. 2d 555, 557 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), and review all of the parties' arguments, the facts on which they rely, and the evidence supporting same.

c. March 2, 2011 Motor Vehicle Accident

According to Plaintiff, at the time of the motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff owned Ray's Rapid, a company which transported vehicles to and from car dealerships. See TPPs' 56.1 ¶¶ 2-3. In line with his business, P...