Devane v. Church & Dwight Co.

TAMMY DEVANE, MICHELLE BARBATO, PETER BARBATO, ANDSHARON MAROLDI Plaintiffs, v. CHURCH & DWIGHT CO., INC., Defendant.

Case No. 3:19-cv-09899-BRM-LHG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

February 28, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

MARTINOTTI, DISTRICT JUDGE

Before this Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Church & Dwight Co., Inc. ("Church & Dwight" or "Defendant") seeking to dismiss Plaintiffs Tammy Devane ("Devane"), Michelle Barbato, Peter Barbato, and Sharon Maroldi's ("Maroldi") (collectively, "Plaintiffs") Amended Class Action Complaint ("Amended Complaint") pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 16.) Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19) Having reviewed the submissions filed in connection with the motion and having declined to hold oral argument pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b), for the reasons set forth below and for good cause appearing, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

For the purposes of this Motion to Dismiss, the Court accepts the factual allegations in the Amended Complaint as true and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. See Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). Furthermore, the Court also considers any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." In re Burlington Coat Factory Secs. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (quoting Shaw v. Dig. Equip. Corp., 82 F.3d 1194, 1220 (1st Cir. 1996)).

This matter stems from Church & Dwight's purportedly false labelling of several of their multivitamins, including L'il Critters Multivitamins, Vitafusion Women's Complete Multivitamins, and Vitafusion Men's Complete Multivitamins ("the Products"). (ECF No. 10 ¶ 1.) Defendant is a large Delaware corporation in the business of manufacturing a variety of household items, including the Products. (Id.) Unbeknownst to Plaintiffs and consumers who purchased the Products, the Products lacked at least three essential vitamins identified by the FDA as being "necessary for human health." (Id. ¶¶ 2-3.)

Plaintiffs are a group of consumers from both New Jersey and Florida.¹ Each Plaintiff purchased the Products relying on marketing and labelling that described the Products as a "complete multivitamin" containing all "essential nutrients." (Id. ¶¶ 31, 39, 51.) While Plaintiffs do not rely solely upon the FDA to define or justify their understanding of what a "complete" multivitamin is or what is "essential," the FDA does provide an identifiable baseline of which vitamins should be included for a multivitamin to be "complete." (Id. ¶ 15.) However, despite these representations, the Products do not contain all essential vitamins identified by the FDA, "including any vitamin K, thiamin, riboflavin and—in the case of Vitafusion Men's Complete Multivitamin and L'il Critters Gummy Vites Complete Multivitamin—niacin." (Id. ¶ 21.)

On April 15, 2019, Devane filed a Complaint against Defendant. (ECF No. 1.) On June 7, 2019, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. (ECF No. 7.) In response,Plaintiffs filed a seven-count Amended Complaint against Defendant asserting claims for breach of express warranty under New Jersey law (Count One), breach of implied warranty under New Jersey law (Count Two), violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act ("NJCFA") (Count Three), violation of Florida's Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act ("FDUTPA") (Count Four), breach of express warranty under common law (Count Five), breach of implied warranty under common law (Count Six), and injunctive relief (Count Seven). (ECF No. 10.) Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Complaint on July 26, 2019. (ECF No. 16.) On August 19, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 19.) On September 10, 2019, Defendant filed a Reply to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 20.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

In deciding a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a district court is "required to accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and draw all inferences in the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff]." Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 228 (3d Cir. 2008). "[A] complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations omitted). However, the plaintiff's "obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action." Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A court is "not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286. Instead, assuming the factual allegations in the complaint are true, those "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for misconduct alleged." Id. This "plausibility standard" requires the complaint allege "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully," but it "is not akin to a probability requirement.'" Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "Detailed factual allegations" are not required, but "more than an unadorned, the defendant-harmed-me accusation" must be pled; it must include "factual enhancements" and not just conclusory statements or a recitation of the elements of a cause of action. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).

"Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Id. at 679 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). However, courts are "not compelled to accept 'unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences,'" Baraka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Schuylkill Energy Res. Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 417 (3d Cir. 1997)), nor "a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Papasan, 478 U.S. at 286.

While, as a general rule, the court may not consider anything beyond the four corners of the complaint on a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Third Circuit has held that "a court may consider certain narrowly defined types of material without converting the motion to dismiss [to one for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56]." In re Rockefeller Ctr. Props. Sec.Litig., 184 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 1999). Specifically, courts may consider any "document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint." Burlington, 114 F.3d at 1426 (quoting Shaw, 82 F.3d at 1220).

III. DECISION

A. Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

Defendant requests this Court dismiss or stay the Amended Complaint in its entirety based on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. (ECF No. 16-1 at 35.) The doctrine "requires judicial abstention in cases where protection of the integrity of a regulatory scheme dictates preliminary resort to the agency which administers the scheme." U.S. v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 353 (1963). In determining whether to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts in this District consider:

(1) whether the question at issue is within the conventional experience of judges or whether it involves technical or policy considerations within the agency's particular field of expertise; (2) whether the question at issue is particularly within the agency's discretion; (3) whether there exists a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings; and (4) whether a prior application to the agency has been made.

Clark v. Actavis Grp. hf, 567 F. Supp. 2d 711, 715 (D.N.J. 2008).

Because Plaintiffs bring claims under both New Jersey and Florida law, the Court will analyze Defendant's primary jurisdiction argument under both New Jersey and Florida law. See Garcia v. Kashi Co., 43 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1381 (S.D. Fla. 2014) (analyzing a primary jurisdiction challenge of Florida and California state law claims under both Florida and California law). Here,both New Jersey and Florida law dictate this Court should not invoke primary jurisdiction on any of Plaintiffs' claims.²

The primary issue with applying primary jurisdiction in this case is Defendant has not identified any relevant proceedings to which this Court should defer in resolving the case. Therefore, Defendant has not identified any FDA rulings which may give rise to a conflict with the current regulatory scheme. As such, Defendant has failed to satisfy the third prong of the analysis because it has not demonstrated a substantial danger of inconsistent rulings. See Mason v. Coca-Cola Co., No. 09-220, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65107, at *5 (D.N.J. June 30,2010) (finding no risk of inconsistent ruling where defendant had not "identified any pending hearing before the FDA, or imminent ruling"). Additionally, absent any relevant proceedings, Defendant has failed to satisfy the fourth prong of the analysis. Therefore, a stay of the case at this point would do nothing more than hold Plaintiffs' claim in limbo. See Chavez v. Church & Dwight Co., No. 17-1948, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82642, at *22 (N.D. Ill. May 16, 2018).

Furthermore, Defendant...