Dewitt v. Ritz

TONY DEWITT v. WILLIAM RITZ, et al.

Civil Action No. DKC 18-3202

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

March 10, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Presently pending and ready for resolution in this civil rights case is Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint as a litigation sanction based upon witness tampering and the fabrication of evidence. (ECF No. 48). The issues have been briefed, and the court now rules, no hearing being deemed necessary. Local Rule 105.6. For the following reasons, the motion to dismiss will be granted, but Defendants will be directed to supplement the record in order to make the evidentiary foundation for some of the exhibits clear.

I. Background

This civil rights action arises out of the arrest and prosecution of Plaintiff, Tony DeWitt, for murder and attempted murder in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. On July 5, 2002, Sherene Moore and Maurice Booker were shot in Baltimore City. Ms. Moore, only sixteen, was fatally wounded. Maurice Booker survived. (ECF No. 1, ¶ 18). In November 2003, a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City convicted Plaintiff of the first-degree murder of Ms. Moore, attempted first-degree murder of Mr. Booker, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence.¹ He was sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive term of twenty years.

On February 22, 2007, the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed Mr. DeWitt's conviction and, on June 8, 2007, the Court of Appeals of Maryland denied his petition for writ of certiorari. Having exhausted his options for direct appeal, Mr. DeWitt filed a petition for writ of actual innocence alleging newly discovered evidence on August 9, 2010.² Shortly thereafter the Circuit Court for Baltimore City denied this petition.

Then, in December 2013, Mr. DeWitt filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief alleging that he had unearthed another exculpatory document (the "Questioned Document"). (See ECF No. 48-12). The Questioned Document purported to be a police report containing a statement that a witness named Tyrell Curtis gave toBPD Detective, Mark Veney, on December 10, 2002, indicating that "he witnessed George Gaines come around the corner shooting at everybody . . . [and] that Tony DeWitt had nothing to do with the shooting." (Id.). The document appeared to be signed by both Detective Veney and a BPD Sergeant named Garnell Green. Mr. DeWitt claimed that he had never seen the document before and had learned of it only as a result of his May 2010 MPIA request.³ He attached the Questioned Document to his petition for post-conviction relief. (Id.).

A post-conviction hearing was held in July 2015. (ECF No. 48-10, at 2). At the hearing, he was allowed to add, orally, an ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the ground that his attorney had failed to develop Tyrell Curtis as a witness at his murder trial. (Id., at 73).⁴ Mr. Curtis testified at the hearing corroborating the "newly discovered" police report and stating that he did in fact give the statement attributed to him therein. (See ECF No. 48-13, at 19). Maurice Booker also testified at the hearing on Plaintiff's behalf. Trial counsel testified and said that, although he had access to the prosecutor's file, he did not recall seeing the report. Relying on the Questioned Document, itsassumed presence in the prosecutor's file, and Mr. Curtis's testimony bolstering it, the post-conviction court determined that Mr. DeWitt's attorney must have seen the report and should have interviewed Mr. Curtis given the exculpatory information in the report. Accordingly, the circuit court granted Plaintiff's petition for post-conviction relief and he was released from prison in October 2015.

In October 2018 Plaintiff filed the present action against seven BPD officers for malicious prosecution and conspiracy to violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants "manufactured inculpatory evidence" against him and ignored "numerous exculpatory statements that [Plaintiff] was not the shooter." (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 1-5). The claims against four of the named defendants and the claim for conspiracy to violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments were dismissed in January 2020. (ECF No. 39). In the months that followed, discovery commenced on the surviving allegation of malicious prosecution against the remaining Defendants: William Ritz, Gregory MacGillivary, and Kevin Turner.

On July 22, 2020, Defendants filed the currently pending motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint as a litigation sanction alleging that Plaintiff had tampered with witnesses and fabricated the Questioned Document in order to deceive the state court into granting his post-conviction petition and releasing him from prison. Defendants also contend that Mr. DeWitt intended to relyon the same fabricated evidence and false testimony to support his claims in the instant proceeding. (ECF Nos. 48, at 3; 67, at 8).

On August 5, 2020, Plaintiff simultaneously moved to strike Defendants' motion and requested more time to respond so that he could conduct discovery into the allegations. (ECF No. 51). On August 18, 2020, Plaintiff's attorney, Robert E. Joyce of the Law Office of Barry R. Glazer, LLC moved to withdraw himself as attorney for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 53). The court granted the motion on October 16, 2020, leaving Mr. Charles Edwards, IV as the sole counsel of record for Plaintiff. (ECF No. 54). Following a recorded telephonic conference on December 8, 2020, the court granted Plaintiff an additional 14 days to file a substantive response to the allegations. (ECF No. 57). After receiving yet another extension in late December, Plaintiff filed his response on January 6, 2021. (ECF No. 64). Defendants replied on February 3, 2021. (ECF No. 67).

II. Motion to Dismiss

A. Inherent Power of the Court to Dismiss as a Sanction for Misconduct

"Federal courts have the inherent power to dismiss an action with prejudice as a sanction." In re Jemsek Clinic, P.A., 850 F.3d 150, 158 (4^th Cir. 2017). "This power is organic, without need of a statute or rule for its definition, and it is necessary to the exercise of all other powers." United States v. Shaffer Equipment Co., 11 F.3d 450, 461 (4^th Cir. 1993). "The courts'inherent powers exist to preserve the integrity of the judicial process and the resources needed to resolve disputes in an orderly and expeditious manner—two indispensable assets in any nation dedicated to the rule of law." In re Jemsek, 850 F.3d at 157 (citing Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991)). "The courts must protect the integrity of the judicial process because, '[a]s soon as the process falters . . . the people are then justified in abandoning support for the system.'" Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d 583, 590 (4^th Cir. 2001) (citing Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 457).

"Mindful of the strong policy that cases be decided on the merits, and that dismissal without deciding the merits is the most extreme sanction," a court must exercise its dismissal power with restraint and "may do so only after considering several factors[.]" Shaffer, 11 F.3d at 462. In evaluating whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction, the court considers:

(1) the degree of the wrongdoer's culpability; (2) the extent of the client's blameworthiness if the wrongful conduct is committed by its attorney, recognizing that [courts] seldom dismiss claims against blameless clients; (3) the prejudice to the judicial process and the administration of justice; (4) the prejudice to the victim; (5) the availability of other sanctions to rectify the wrong by punishing culpable persons, compensating harmed persons, and deterring similar conduct in the future; and (6) the public interest.

Id., at 462-63. Dismissal is justified where "a party deceives a court or abuses the process at a level that is utterly inconsistent with the orderly administration of justice or undermines theintegrity of the process[.]" Id., at 462; see also Projects Mgmt. Co. v. Dyncorp Int'l LLC, 734 F.3d 366, 373 (4^th Cir. 2013). A district court's use of its inherent power to dismiss is subject to an abuse of discretion standard on review. See Hartford Ins. Co. v. Am. Automatic Sprinkler Sys., Inc., 201 F.3d 538, 543-44 (4^th Cir. 2000).

Moreover, courts have considered, and imposed, sanctions when the misconduct occurred primarily before other tribunals. For example, in Chambers, the Court observed:

Fourth, Chambers challenges the District Court's imposition of sanctions for conduct before other tribunals, including the FCC, the Court of Appeals, and this Court, asserting that a court may sanction only conduct occurring in its presence. Our cases are to the contrary, however. As long as a party receives an appropriate hearing, as did Chambers, see 124 F.R.D., at 141, n.11, the party may be sanctioned for abuses of process occurring beyond the courtroom, such as disobeying the court's orders. See Young [v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A.,], 481 U.S. [787 (1987)] at 798, 107 S.Ct., at 2132; Toledo Scale [v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U.S. 399 (1923)] at 426-428, 43 S.Ct., at 465-466. Here, for example, Chambers' attempt to gain the FCC's permission to build a new transmission tower was in direct contravention of the District Court's orders to maintain the status quo pending the outcome of the litigation and was therefore within the scope of the District Court's sanctioning power.

Chambers, 501 U.S. at 57. See also Roche Diagnostics Corp. v. Priority Healthcare Corp., No. 2:18-CV-01479-KOB, 2020 WL 2308319, at *6 (N.D. Ala. May 8, 2020) (discussing cases in which the sanctioning court considered behavior in other cases that sharedobvious linkages to its own case, e.g., the cases were consolidated or involved the same parties and issues.).

B. Procedure

There is no rule or required procedure for assessing a litigant's alleged misconduct, and a request for sanctions can arise in a variety of circumstances. The bedrock...