Diaz v. Amerijet Int'l, Inc.

872 F.Supp.2d 1365

Mario DIAZ, et al., Plaintiffs,

v.AMERIJET INTERNATIONAL, INC., Defendant.

Case No. 11–61812–CIV.

United States District Court,

S.D. Florida,

Miami Division.

May 24, 2012.

David L. Markel, K. David Kelly, J.H. Zidell, P.A., Jamie H. Zidell, Miami Beach, FL, for Plaintiffs.

Joan Marie Canny, Amerijet International, Inc., Fort Lauderdale, FL, Patrick F. Martin, Linda Noel, Littler Mendelson, Miami, FL, Peter J. Petesch, Kevin Michael Kraham, Littler Mendelson PC, Washington, DC, for Defendant.

ORDER

CECILIA M. ALTONAGA, District Judge.

THIS CAUSE came before the Court upon Defendant, Amerijet International, Inc.'s (“Amerijet['s]”) Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h), Or, In the Alternative, Fully–Dispositive Motion for Summary Judgment (“Motion”) [ECF No. 101], filed March 19, 2012. Plaintiffs filed a Complaint [ECF No. 1] on August 12, 2011, alleging one count for violations of Sections 2, Third and Fourth of 45 U.S.C. §§ 151, et seq. (“Railway Labor Act” or “RLA”), or “infringement on Plaintiffs' rights to engage in and to organize union activities and representation.” (Compl. 2). The Court has previously denied Amerijet's motions to dismiss the Complaint on the basis of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rule”) 12(b)(6) ( see Nov. 9, 2011 Order [ECF No. 32] ) and Federal Rule 12(b)(1) ( see Nov. 28, 2011 Order [ECF No. 37] ). Amerijet now moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule 12(h), or, in the alternative, for summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims. Plaintiffs filed a Response [ECF No. 119] on April 2, 2012. Amerijet filed its Reply [ECF No. 127] on April 12, 2012. The Court has carefully considered the parties' submissions and the applicable law.

I. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Defendant Amerijet moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule 12(h)(3), which provides that “[i]f the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). A defendant may attack subject matter jurisdiction in two ways—a facial attack or a factual attack. Amerijet asserts the portion of the Motion concerning subject-matter jurisdiction is a factual attack, “not duplicative of the grounds” addressed in the Court's November 28, 2011 Order, and “based upon the facts as now known after discovery.” (Mot. 13 n. 13). For the purpose of Federal Rule 12(h), Amerijet seeks to use the undisputed facts that also serve as the basis for the portion of the Motion seeking summary judgment. ( See id.). A factual attack “challenges the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact, irrespective of the pleadings, and matters outside the pleadings such as testimony and affidavits, are considered.” Menchaca v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 613 F.2d 507, 511 (5th Cir.1980). In a factual attack, courts are free to weigh the evidence to satisfy themselves they have the power to hear the case. See Lawrence v. Dunbar, 919 F.2d 1525, 1529 (11th Cir.1990). No presumption of truth attaches to the plaintiff's allegations, and the existence of disputed material facts does not prevent the trial court from evaluating for itself the merits of the jurisdictional claim. See id. Moreover, “[i]n the face of a factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove that jurisdiction exists.” OSI, Inc. v. United States, 285 F.3d 947, 951 (11th Cir.2002) (citations omitted).

B. Motion for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment shall be rendered “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In making its assessment of summary judgment, the Court “must view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997), and “must resolve all reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” United of Omaha Life Ins. Co. v. Sun Life Ins. Co. of America, 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir.1990).

“By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). “As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material. Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Likewise, a dispute about a material fact is a “genuine” issue “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id.

The moving party “always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,’ which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is proper “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Id. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. In those cases, there is no genuine issue of material fact “since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

II. BACKGROUND¹

Amerijet is a small cargo airline serving the Caribbean and Latin America, with its domestic flights originating from and terminating at Miami International Airport (“MIA”). ( See Amerijet's Concise Statement of Undisputed Material Facts ... (“SMF”) [ECF No. 102] ¶ 1). In addition to aircraft flight operations, Amerijet's operations at MIA include the “provision of warehousing, warehouse services, and/or transportation of cargo and loading/unloading of cargo at the airport,” collectively referred to as “cargo handling services” pursuant to the Airline Use Agreement and related policies and leases in place between Miami–Dade County (“County”), which owns and manages MIA, and the airlines such as Amerijet that use MIA. ( Id. ¶¶ 2–3). Amerijet has cargo handling employees at locations other than MIA in Miami and at locations throughout the country. ( See id. ¶ 4). As a small airline, Amerijet's pay rates have not matched the rates of large air carriers in the industry. ( See id. ¶ 5). Amerijet employees performing cargo handling services (“Cargo Handlers”) were at the low end of Amerijet's wage scale, due to the skill and experience required for that position. ( See id. ¶ 6).

Beginning in February 2010, in addition to handling its own cargo, Amerijet began providing cargo handling services to another air carrier, British Airways (“BA”), at MIA. ( See id. ¶ 7). Cargo handling services performed by one airline lessee for another airline at MIA are permitted under the Airline Use Agreement and under Amerijet's lease with MIA, with approval from the Miami–Dade County Aviation Department (“MDAD”). ( See id. ¶ 8). Amerijet obtained approval from the MDAD to handle BA's cargo. ( See id. ¶ 9).

When Amerijet began handling BA's cargo, the Miami–Dade County Code contained a Living Wage Ordinance (“Wage Ordinance”). ( See id. ¶ 10). Since 2002, the Wage Ordinance has required any service contractor providing “covered services” at MIA to pay an employee performing a covered service a minimum hourly wage set by the County and higher than the state and federal minimum wage. ( Id. ¶ 11). Since 2006, the Wage Ordinance has included “in-warehouse cargo handling” among covered services. ( Id. ¶ 12). The Wage Ordinance requires covered employers to post “Living Wage Notices” in work areas throughout MIA stating the current minimum wage for covered employees and the process for making a complaint to the County of a violation of the Wage Ordinance. ( Id. ¶ 13).

In June 2010, Amerijet's Senior Director of Airport Operations, Rasheme Richardson (“Richardson”), received a letter from the Miami–Dade County Department of Small Business Development (“SBD”), which enforces the Wage Ordinance. ( See id. ¶ 14). The letter (“SBD Letter”) notified Amerijet that the SBD was initiating an investigation into Amerijet's compliance with the Wage Ordinance, specifically as to Amerijet's employees performing cargo handling services for BA (“Cargo Handlers for BA”). ( See id. ¶¶ 14–15). The SBD Letter stated that the County “has received a complaint from an Amerijet employee who indicated that Amerijet had started providing cargo services for British Airways and other airlines and [employees] are not being paid a living wage.” ( Id. ¶ 15). The SBD Letter further stated that Amerijet's failure to pay the Cargo Handlers for BA the minimum wage pursuant to the Wage Ordinance would violate that Ordinance. ( See id.). The SBD requested certain information from Amerijet as part of its investigation. ( See id. ¶ 16).

Amerijet engaged outside counsel for assistance regarding the SBD Letter. ( See id. ¶ 17). During discussions between Amerijet's outside counsel and the County Attorney's Office, the SBD informed Amerijet in July 2010 that in response to Amerijet's request, no response to the County's information...