Dickerson v. Wallkill Valley Reg'l High Sch. Bd. of Educ.

NASIR DICKERSON, ASHON DICKERSON, PATRICIA DICKERSON,& STEFANIE DICKERSON, Plaintiffs, v. WALLKILL VALLEY REGIONAL HIGH SCHOOL BOARD OF EDUCATION& DAVID CARR, Defendants.

Civil No. 19-cv-08450(KSH)(CLW)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

June 1, 2020

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

OPINION

Katharine S. Hayden, U.S.D.J.

I. Introduction

Plaintiffs Nasir Dickerson ("Nasir"), a former student at Lenape Valley Regional High School, his father Ashon Dickerson ("Ashon"), his mother Stefanie Dickerson ("Stefanie"), and his grandmother Patricia Dickerson ("Patricia") (collectively, "plaintiffs") allege in their complaint that defendants Wallkill Valley Regional High School Board of Education ("the Board") and David Carr ("Carr"), the school's principal and superintendent, violated the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 et seq., the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 1983 et seq., and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et seq. Before the Court is the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint. For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies defendants' motion.

II. Background

On February 13, 2019, Wallkill Valley Regional High School hosted a basketball game against Lenape Valley Regional High School. (D.E. 1 ("Compl.) ¶ 3.) Nasir, a student at Lenape Valley, was the only black player and his family, including Ashon, Stefanie, and Patricia, were the only other African Americans present. (Id. ¶¶ 4, 6, 27.) Plaintiffs allege that spectators made monkey sounds and shouted the n-word and "monkey" at Nasir throughout the game and that neither referees nor school officials attempted to control the crowd. (Id. ¶¶ 5, 7.)

Plaintiffs claim that the spectators' insults grew louder and more aggressive near the end of the game. (Id. ¶ 8.) As Nasir walked to the bench with a minute remaining, Ashon stood up and cheered for his son, who had scored 20 points despite the purportedly hostile conditions. (Id. ¶ 11.) As Ashon applauded, several spectators gave him the finger. (Id. ¶ 12.) Ashon returned the gesture. (Id. ¶ 25.) At this point, "it was clear [to plaintiffs] that the slurs were being directed toward Ashon, Nasir, Stefanie, and Patricia." (Id. ¶ 12.)

Plaintiffs contend that, after Ashon sat back down, Carr and an armed security officer "aggressively approached" him and asked him to leave. (Id. ¶ 13.) Carr shouted at Ashon, "Get out!" to which Ashon replied, "Why, I'm a parent? Who do you think you're talking to like that? You don't hear them over there, you don't see them over there?" (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.) Carr directed Ashon to "Get up and [g]et out or [Ashon would] be arrested." (Id. ¶ 16.) The security guard escorted Ashon out of the gym, and Patricia followed. (Id. ¶ 17.) After Carr and the security officer ejected him from the game, Ashon was "considerabl[y] distress[ed]" and "fear[ed] for his life," especially given recent press coverage about black men being shot. (Id. ¶ 18.) Nasir, Stefanie, and Patricia feared for Ashon's life, as well as their own. (Id.) The racial slurs continued after Carr ejected Ashon. (Id. ¶ 19.)

After the game, Stefanie waited near the locker room because she was concerned for her son's safety. (Id. ¶ 20.) When the family left the school, students yelled at them in front of the security guard, "You don't belong here." (Id. ¶ 21.) Nasir and Stefanie asked for assistance controlling the crowd from the security officer, who replied, "They are under control why are you still here." (Id. ¶ 22.)

According to the complaint, Nasir has been the victim of numerous hate crimes. (Id. ¶ 10.) The cumulative effect of racial harassment has caused him psychological distress, post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, and depression. (Id.)

The pending motion is directed at both counts of the complaint: count one, alleging violation of the New Jersey Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-12 et seq., and count two, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C § 1983 et seq., and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act, N.J.S.A. 10:6-2, et seq. The Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' federal claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and may exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining New Jersey state law claims under U.S.C. § 1367.

III. Legal Standard

To survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true" to state a facially plausible claim for relief. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A plausible claim is one that permits the court to "draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).

To determine whether a plaintiff has met the facial plausibility standard mandated, courts engage in a three-step process. Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010). First, the court must "outline the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim for relief." Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012). Next, the Court "peel[s] away those allegations that are no more than conclusions and thus not entitled to the assumption of trust." Id. Finally, where "there are well-pleaded factual allegations, the court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

IV. Preliminary Issues

A. Video evidence

When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court may only consider the facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached thereto as exhibits, and matters of judicial notice. S. Cross Overseas Agencies, Inc. v. Kwong Shipping Grp. Ltd., 181 F.3d 410, 426 (3d Cir. 1999); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Industries, Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). If additional materials outside the pleadings are presented and the Court incorporates those materials into its analysis, the Rule 12(b)(6) motion will be converted, upon notice to the parties, into a summary judgment motion pursuant to Rule 56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d), 56; see also Slippi-Mensah v. Mills, 2016 WL 4820617, at *2 (D.N.J. Sept. 14, 2016) (Hillman, J.). However, as an exception to the general rule, the Court may also consider a document "integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint...without converting the motion to dismiss into one for summary judgment." Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d. Cir. 2014) (quoting In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litg., 114 F.3d 1410 (3d. Cir. 2017)).

In their complaint, plaintiffs reference "video footage lasting over an hour" which they claim makes it "clear" that the spectators' behavior occurred as they described. (Compl. ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs did not attach this video to their complaint, nor did they further describe its contents. However, in their opposition brief, they cite to the URL link of a third-party video available on YouTube and published by "Mugs Media." Plaintiffs then direct the Court's attention to various timestamps where the racially harassing language can purportedly be heard on camera. (D.E. 9 ("Opposition Brief") at 9-10.) Plaintiffs make reference to this video numerous times throughout their brief.

Defendants argue that the Court must disregard the video footage because its use is improper, unsupported by law, and offered in bad faith, but "welcome a review of the video...as it will support their position that the allegations in the Complaint, and in Plaintiffs' opposition brief, are largely false." (D.E. 10 ("Reply Brief"), at 3-4.) Although a video may be considered at the motion to dismiss stage to "establish, for example, that a particular identifiable statement was made," the identities of the speakers in this video and the specific comments made may present issues of factual interpretation.

In Liebler v. City of Hoboken, 2016 WL 3965198, *2-3 (D.N.J. July 21, 2016), Judge McNulty had occasion to distinguish video footage from a written document. Although a video might be useful to establish that a particular statement was made, the "context of the statements, the identities and tone of voice of the speakers, the discussions that may have preceded or surrounded the meeting, and so on, all present issues of factual interpretation" that could "distort the analysis" when viewed in isolation. Id. at *3. Unlike a written document, the proffered video does not amount to "the sort of uncontroversial document that may itself settle the claims one way or the other." Id. The Court declines to consider the video evidence at this stage of litigation.

V. Discussion

A. Violations of § 1983 and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act (NJCRA)

Plaintiffs failed to include a statement of jurisdiction in their complaint or moving brief. In their second count, they allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("§ 1983"). It is this federal claim that provides the Court with jurisdiction over the case, which is not challenged. 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

In this second count, plaintiffs also allege violations of the New Jersey Civil Rights Act ("NJCRA"). The "NJCRA is interpreted as analogous to § 1983." Szemple v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 493 Fed. App'x. 238, 241 (3d Cir. 2012). Therefore, the Court will "analyze...NJCRA claims through the lens of § 1983." Trafton v. City of Woddbury, 7999 F.Supp.2d 417, 444 (D.N.J. 2011) (Hillman, J.); see also Estate of Martin v. U.S. Marshals Serv. Agents, 649 Fed. Appx. 239, 245 n.4 (3d Cir. 2016) (holding that "it appears undisputed that Plaintiffs' claims under the New Jersey Constitution and the New Jersey Civil Rights Act trigger the same legal elements and principles as...[the] federal causes of action [under § 1983]"); Pettit v. New Jersey, 2011 WL 1325614, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 30, 2011) (Hillman, J.) ("This district has repeatedly interpreted [the] NJCRA analogously to § 1983.") As a result, the Court's analysis of plaintiffs' § 1983 claims will also apply to the plaintiffs'...