Dickson v. Abrams (In re Abrams)

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In re: MICHAEL ANTHONY ABRAMS, JR. Debtor.

ANNE MARIE DICKSON, Plaintiff, v. MICHAEL ANTHONY ABRAMS, JR., Defendant.

No. 20-61372-tmr13

Adv. Proc. No. 20-6043-tmr

United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Oregon

September 30, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION ^[1] ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THOMAS M. RENN U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.

Plaintiff Anne Marie Dickson filed this adversary proceeding asserting 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)^[2] as the basis for a determination that the debt in her favor represented by a state court supplemental judgment for attorney fees qualifies as an exception to the discharge of § 1328(a) in this chapter 13 bankruptcy case. Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment (Doc. #15), along with a statement of material facts (Doc. #16) and a memorandum in support (Doc. #17). Defendant Michael Anthony Abrams, Jr., filed an objection to the motion (Doc. #25), along with his own statement of material facts (Doc. #26) and a supporting memorandum (Doc. #27). The parties agree that this court has jurisdiction over this matter which is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(I). After oral argument on the motion and a review of all the submissions, I conclude that it is appropriate to grant the motion.

Facts:

The parties agree on many of the relevant facts and applicable documents as indicated by their positions in the complaint and answer, as well as by consistency in their statements of material facts. Beyond that agreement, Defendant asserts that, to get a clear picture of the judgment at issue, I must consider additional facts and rulings from the prior state court proceedings before rendering my decision. I disagree and will explain my reasoning below. For purposes of this summary judgment ruling, I lay out the necessary undisputed facts.

Plaintiff and Defendant are the parents of one minor child. They were never married to each other. On November 5, 2018, after a trial, the Lane County Circuit Court entered a General Judgment Re: Custody, Parenting Time, and Child Support in Case Number 18DR06019. The general judgment incorporated an attached parenting plan. Plaintiff included a portion of the general judgment as Exhibit 1 to her statement of material facts and a portion of the parenting plan as Exhibit 2.

In September 2019, Defendant filed a motion in Lane County Circuit Court to enforce and modify the parenting plan. See Exhibit 3 to Plaintiff's statement. After a hearing on the motion, the court entered a Supplemental Judgment Re: Enforcement of Parenting Time and Modification included as Exhibit 10 to Plaintiff's statement. That judgment ruled in favor of Plaintiff and included multiple findings related to the best interests of the child. It concluded by ordering that "Attorney fees will be awarded based on the ORCP 68 process." Exhibit 10 to Plaintiff's statement (emphasis in original).

Following a request by Plaintiff and pursuant to ORCP 68, the court entered a prevailing party judgment in her favor in the amount of $12, 916.24, including $12, 007.50 for attorney fees plus $908.74 for costs. The court entered the judgment as a Supplemental Judgment Re: Attorney Fees on March 18 2020. That Supplemental Judgment is Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff's complaint and Exhibit 1 to Defendant's statement. The court's opinion and order underlying the award of attorney fees is Exhibit 2 to Plaintiff's complaint and Exhibit 12 to Plaintiff's statement, identified as an "Opinion and Order" signed February 28, 2020, in both.

The court's opinion awarded "attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in an action to enforce a parenting plan" pursuant to ORS 107.434(2)(d). The court discussed the ORS 20.075(1) factors in deciding whether to make "a discretionary award of fees." See Baker and Baker, 173 Or.App. 33, 35 (2001) (court must identify criteria for award). In its analysis, the court used comments about Defendant including that he filed "arguably excessive court filings" and evidenced a "history of harassment, intimidation, and controlling behavior." The court also found that an award of fees here "would not deter another from asserting claims made in good faith," but that "an award here may create some amount of specific deterrence valuable in this case." Ultimately, the court ruled that it was because of "Petitioner's reckless, willful, and harassing conduct towards the Respondent" that "Petitioner chiefly created circumstances which the Court determined were not in the child's best interest."

Summary Judgment:

On a motion for summary judgment, the moving party has the burden to establish the absence of a material issue of fact for trial and that movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FRCP 56(c), applicable in bankruptcy adversary proceedings through FRBP 7056. The substantive law governing a claim or defense determines whether a fact is material. T.W. Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pacific Elec. Contractors Ass'n, 809 F.2d 626, 630 (9th Cir. 1987). Material facts are such facts as may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). /// Summary judgment is properly granted when no genuine issues of disputed material fact remain, and, when viewing the evidence most favorably to the non-moving party, the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). "[I]ssues are genuine only if the trier of fact reasonably could find in favor of the nonmoving party on the evidence presented." Bank of New York Mellon v. Lane (In re Lane), 589 B.R. 399, 406 (9th Cir. BAP 2018); Far Out Prods., Inc. v. Oskar, 247 F.3d 986, 992 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49).

Domestic Support Obligation:

In a chapter 13 case, debtors may obtain a discharge of all debts except for those listed in § 1328(a), including debts of a kind described in § 523(a)(5) "for a domestic support obligation." Congress defined domestic support obligation in § 101(14A) to include a debt "in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support" and such definition is "without regard to whether such debt is expressly so designated." In this case, the parties do not dispute that (1) the supplemental judgment has not been assigned to a nongovernmental entity and (2) is owed to the parent of a child of the debtor (3) by reason of an order of a court of record. The debt, thus, meets parts (A), (C), and (D) of the definition for domestic support obligation. The only remaining question involves part (B)-whether the debt qualifies as "in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support."

As a general matter, it should be noted that courts should favor the bankruptcy discharge and that the party attempting to limit a discharge has the burden of proof to meet the appropriate standard. See Gard v. Gibson (In re Gibson), 103 B.R. 218, 221 (9th Cir. BAP 1989). The exception to discharge for support obligations, however, "enforces an overriding public policy favoring the enforcement of familial obligations." Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984). The bankruptcy court must strike a balance between these competing policies. See Beaupied v. Chang (In re Chang), 163 F.3d 1138, 1140 (9th Cir. 1998).

A bankruptcy court must determine whether a debt is "in the nature of support" as a question of federal law and without regard to how the debt is designated. See Friedkin v. Sternberg (In re Sternberg), 85 F.3d 1400, 1405 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd on other grounds, Murray v. Bammer (In re Bammer), 131 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc). As part of that determination, the court may look to cases discussing domestic support obligations in former § 523(a)(5). See Chang, 163 F.3d at 1142; In re Nelson, 451 B.R. 918, 921 (Bankr. D. Or. 2011). The court must look beyond the language of the decree "to the substance of the obligation." Shaver v Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316 (9th Cir. 1984) (intent of parties for settlement agreement). See also Kritt v. Kritt (In re Kritt), 190 B.R. 382, 388 (9th Cir. BAP 1995) (must examine substance and not form); and Jodoin v. Samayoa (In re Jodoin), 209 B.R. 132, 138 (9th Cir. BAP 1997) (intent of court important after contested trial).

The Ninth Circuit has identified several non-exclusive factors to apply in determining whether an obligation qualifies as spousal support. See Sternberg, 85 F.3d at 1405. Those factors include whether the recipient needed support, the imbalance in relative income of the parties, whether the obligation terminates on death or remarriage, the presence of minor children, and whether the payments are made directly to the recipient and paid in installments over a substantial period. Id. For spousal support, the bankruptcy court must review and apply the factors on a case-by-case basis. See Gionis v. Wayne (In re Gionis), 170 B.R. 675, 682 (9th Cir. BAP 1994), aff'd 92 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 1996) (unpublished).

These spousal-support factors do not inform the analysis much when making determinations about child support. See Seixas v. Booth (In re Seixas), 239 B.R. 398, 404 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) ("factors do not fit neatly"). The BAP instructs courts, therefore, to look "at the surrounding circumstances and all other relevant incidents" to determine whether the obligation qualifies as child support. Seixas, 239 B.R. at 404, quoting Kritt, 190 B.R. at 387. As cited and argued by the parties, another judge of this court discussed this limitation at length when holding that an attorney fee award arising from custody litigation was support. In re Moser, 530 B.R. 872, 875 (Bankr. D. Or. 2015) (unpublished letter opinion) (factors "are not particularly helpful").

Plaintiff points to Moser and another unpublished Oregon opinion from the same judge, Luetkenhaus, to assert that attorney fees incurred in...