Dida v. Ascension Providence Hosp.

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DAWIT DIDA, Plaintiff, v. ASCENSION PROVIDENCE HOSPITAL, Defendant.

No. 4:22-CV-00508-AGF

United States District Court, E.D. Missouri, Eastern Division

April 19, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

AUDREY G. FLEISSIG UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Ascension Providence Hospital's motion to dismiss Plaintiff Dawit Dida's amended complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Doc. No 42. On June 21, 2022, Ascension filed a motion to dismiss Dida's original complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. No. 14. The Court granted the motion in part and denied the motion in part; dismissing Dida's breach of contract claim without prejudice and allowing Dida to amend his complaint with respect to his FMLA claim, ADA claim, and ERISA claim. Doc. No. 15. Dida filed an amended complaint on December 22, 2022, again alleging FMLA, ADA, and ERISA violations. Doc. No. 41. Dida did not re-allege any breach of contract claim. Ascension has again moved to dismiss Dida's amended complaint for failure to state a claim. Doc. No. 42.

For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be granted.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Dawit Dida is a resident of the District of Columbia. Defendant Ascension Providence Hospital is headquartered in Missouri and operates hospitals throughout the country including Providence Hospital in D.C., where Plaintiff was employed for over ten years. According to his amended complaint, Plaintiff fell ill in early 2016 and requested time off from work. At the beginning of February 2016 Providence notified Dida that it was eliminating his position and terminating his employment effective March 1, 2016. During the month of February, while still an employee of Ascension, Dida was hospitalized multiple times, and due to his diagnosis, was ultimately found to be disabled by the Social Security Administration, retroactive to February 1 2016. Dida, still covered by his employer's insurance, approached Ascension's employee Lorenzo Jones^[1] at least three times to obtain short-term and longterm disability coverage.^[2] Jones told Dida that he was not entitled to coverage. Dida asserts that following his hospitalization in February, he was still entitled to short-term and long-term disability benefits until March 1, 2016, and that he possesses a letter from Ascension Health to this effect.^[3] Shortly after his termination, Dida underwent two open-heart surgeries followed by several weeks of hospitalization and recovery, the cost of which Dida incurred personally, and which he claims should have been covered by his health insurance through Ascension.

According to Dida's brief on the prior motion to dismiss, Dida filed a charge of discrimination with the D.C. Office of Human Rights (OHR) on January 4, 2017, alleging violations of the D.C. Human Rights Act (DCHRA) and the D.C. Family and Medical Leave Act (DCFMLA). Doc. No. 8. Dida did not include his charge of discrimination in the Court record, but it has since been provided by Defendant.^[4] The parties participated in mediated settlement negotiations facilitated through OHR, but the process was unsuccessful, leading Dida to withdraw his OHR complaint on August 24, 2021. Doc. No. 8-1. The record does not indicate why the matter remained pending with the OHR for over four years. OHR granted withdrawal on September 24, 2021, and Dida filed the present action in D.C. Superior Court on November 5, 2021, asserting violations of the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA),^[5] the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) and a state law claim for breach of contract. Ascension removed the case to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia and filed a motion to transfer the case to this Court or dismiss the case for failure to state a claim. Pursuant to a forum selection clause, the matter was transferred to this Court on May 9, 2022. Doc. Nos. 10-12. The D.C. district court deferred consideration of Ascension's motion to dismiss, leaving the matter to this Court for resolution.

Prior Motion to Dismiss

In its first motion to dismiss, Ascension contended that (1) Dida's FMLA claim was time-barred; (2) Dida failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his ADA claim; (3) Dida failed to exhaust administrative remedies on his ERISA claim and the claim was time-barred; and (4) Dida failed to state a valid claim for breach of contract because he had no employment agreement with Ascension, and the statute on which Dida relied is inapplicable. In response, Dida asserted that applicable statutes of limitations were tolled while his charge was pending before the OHR, and D.C. law does not require the exhaustion of remedies.

On July 5, 2022, this Court denied Ascension's motion as to the FMLA, ADA, and ERISA claims (Counts I - III) and granted Ascension's motion as to the breach of contract claim (Count IV). Doc. No. 15. However, with respect to the FMLA, ADA, and ERISA claims, the Court noted that the facts contained in the present record precluded the Court from making a determination with respect to exhaustion, equitable tolling and equitable estoppel and permitted the Plaintiff to file an amended complaint with the expectation that these matters would be addressed.

Following numerous requests for extensions of time and improper filings, Dida filed the present amended complaint on December 19, 2022. See Doc. Nos. 17-39.

Present Motion to Dismiss

Ascension filed the present motion to dismiss on December 29, 2022. Doc. No. 42. Ascension argues that Dida's amended complaint should be dismissed because he again fails to state a claim for which relief can be granted under FRCP 12(b)(6). Specifically, Ascension argues that despite Dida's assertions in his opposition to the original motion to dismiss (Doc. No. 8) that he is entitled to equitable tolling on his untimely FMLA claim, his amended complaint contains no facts justifying this relief.

With respect to the ADA claim, Ascension argues that Dida failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not allege a disability discrimination claim in his charge filed with the OHR, and, in any event, his ADA accommodation claim should be dismissed because he fails to plausibly allege that Ascension failed to accommodate his alleged disability. Lastly, Ascension argues that Dida's ERISA claim should be dismissed because in addition to failing to identify the particular nature and basis of the claim as ordered by this Court, Dida fails to state a viable cause of action or plead adequate facts to establish a claim under ERISA.

Dida's opposition does not respond to any of the above arguments. Instead, he argues that Ascension's motion seems to turn on the argument that Dida was not an employee of Providence Hospital. Doc. No. 47. Dida then argues that the necessary elements of an employment contract are present in the instant matter, and then discusses the standard for implied employment contracts and relevance of at-will employee designations in employee handbooks. Plaintiff ultimately argues that the question of whether Dida was an employee of Ascension is a question of law for the Courts and requests that the Court deny Ascension's motion to dismiss and grant Dida's motion for summary judgment. There is no motion for summary judgment before this Court.

In reply, Ascension states that Dida's employment status is not at dispute in this this matter and notes that its arguments were not opposed nor rebutted by Dida. Doc. No. 48.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Choice of Law

As discussed in its previous order, the Court will look to the D.C. Circuit and district court precedent to the extent resolution of the motion depends on application of the DCOHR framework governing Dida's OHR complaint and initial pleadings. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S 516, 526 (1990) (applying transferor statute of limitations on a state law issue). In all other respects, however, where general principles of federal law apply, the Court relies on Eighth Circuit precedent. See e.g., In re Folgers Coffee, Mktg. Litig., 21-2984-MD-W-BP, 2022 WL 989727, at *3 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 9, 2022) (“When analyzing questions of federal law, the transferee court should apply the law of the circuit in which it is located.” (quoting In re Temporomandibular Joint (TMJ) Implants Prod. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 1996))). The Court also notes consistent D.C. authority as relevant and aligned in principle.

Rule 12(b)(6) Standard

The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. “To survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, ‘a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” McShane Constr. Co. v. Gotham Ins. Co., 867 F.3d 923, 927 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The reviewing court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Torti v. Hoag, 868 F.3d 666, 671 (8th Cir. 2017). But “[c]ourts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation, and factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. While a complaint does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Huang v. Gateway Hotel Holdings, 520 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1140 (E.D. Mo. 2007).

Untimeliness under a statute of limitations and failure to exhaust administrative remedies are...