Dillard v. Richmond

549 F.Supp.3d 753

Gayle Nicole DILLARD, individually and as a parent, guardian, and next friend to K.D., a minor, and Q.D., a minor, Plaintiff,

v.Debbie RICHMOND, in her individual capacity, Stephen Dillard, and Michelle Dillard, Defendants.

No. 2:20-CV-00246-JRG-CRW

United States District Court, E.D. Tennessee, at Greeneville.

Filed July 14, 2021

James W. Friauf, Law Office of James W. Friauf, PLLC, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiff.

K. Erickson Herrin, Herrin, Booze & McPeak, Johnson City, TN, for Defendant Debbie Richmond.

Joseph W. McMurray, R. Wayne Culbertson, P.C., Kingsport, TN, for Defendants Stephen Dillard, Michelle Dillard.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

J. RONNIE GREER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Stephen Dillard's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Hearing [Doc. 28], Mr. Dillard's Memorandum of Law [Doc. 30], Plaintiff Gayle Nicole Dillard's Response [Doc. 35], and Mr. Dillard's Reply [Doc. 40]. For the reasons herein, the Court will deny Mr. Dillard's motion.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Gayle Dillard alleges that, in August 2015, her former husband, Defendant Stephen Dillard, falsely reported to the Bristol Police Department that she had physically abused their biological child, Q.D. [Compl, Doc. 1, ¶ 12]. Ms. Dillard claims that the Bristol Police Department opened an investigation into Mr. Dillard's report and assigned Defendant Detective Debbie Richmond to it. [Id. ¶ 13]. According to Ms. Dillard, Detective Richmond engaged in a "highly-inappropriate personal relationship" with Mr. Dillard, [id. ¶ 61], and together, along with Mr. Dillard's mother, Michelle Dillard, they conspired to bring false allegations against Ms. Dillard in Sullivan County Criminal Court in April 2017, [id. ¶¶ 46, 65, 74]—allegations that rested in part on Mr. Dillard's coercion of K.D. and Q.D., whom he allegedly coached so they would blame Ms. Dillard for bruises on their bodies, when, in fact, he was responsible for them, [id. ¶¶ 39, 41–45]. These false allegations, Ms. Dillard claims, resulted in her eventual indictment on charges of child abuse and child endangerment. [Id. ¶ 46]. According to Ms. Dillard, however, she was found not guilty of these charges. [Id. ¶ 65]. The Sullivan County Criminal Court, she alleges, lifted all the restrictions on her visitation rights to Q.D. in May 2018 and entered an expungement order in December 2019. [Id. ¶¶ 50, 53, 55]. Ms. Dillard claims that she then filed an emergency petition to suspend Mr. Dillard's visitation rights to their minor children, K.D. and Q.D., over whom she now has sole custody, and her motion was granted. [Id. ¶¶ 52–53].

In November 2020, Ms. Dillard, K.D., and Q.D. brought suit in this Court against Mr. Dillard, alleging assault and battery, defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, fraud, and conspiracy to commit malicious prosecution. [Id. ¶¶ 68–75]. Ms. Dillard also sues Mr. Dillard's mother, Defendant Michelle Dillard, alleging the same claims except assault and battery. [Id. ¶¶ 76–81]. Lastly, Ms. Dillard sues Detective Richmond, alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and several violations of state law. [Id. ¶¶ 58–67].¹ Mr. Dillard now moves for the dismissal of the claims against him, maintaining that the applicable statutes of limitation bar them² and raising several other arguments for their dismissal. [Def.’s Mem. at 2–9]. Having carefully considered the parties’ arguments, the Court is now prepared to rule on Mr. Dillard's motion to dismiss.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), "[a] pleading that states a claim for relief must contain ... a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the plaintiff's complaint must contain "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff pleads facts that create a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct in the complaint. Id.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court accepts the allegations in the complaint as true and construes them in a light most favorable to the plaintiff. Mixon v. Ohio , 193 F.3d 389, 400 (6th Cir. 1999). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions," however. Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. A plaintiff's allegations must consist of more than "labels," "conclusions," and "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of action." Twombly , 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (citation omitted); see Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ("Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." (citation omitted)).

III. ANALYSIS

Mr. Dillard raises manifold arguments for the dismissal of Ms. Dillard's claims, ranging from the statute of limitations to immunity from civil liability. The Court will now proceed with these arguments on a claim-by-claim basis, as Mr. Dillard has done in his legal memorandum. [Def.’s Mem. at 2–9].

A. Statute of Limitations

" ‘Under the Erie doctrine,’ it is long settled, ‘federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and federal procedural law,’ " Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co. , 559 U.S. 393, 437, 130 S.Ct. 1431, 176 L.Ed.2d 311 (2010), and the same is true for federal courts with supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims, Super Sulky, Inc. v. U.S. Trotting Ass'n , 174 F.3d 733, 744 (6th Cir. 1999). "Statutes of limitation are classified as substantive for Erie purposes," Phelps v. McClellan , 30 F.3d 658, 661 (6th Cir. 1994) (footnote omitted) (citing Guaranty Tr. Co. v. York , 326 U.S. 99, 110–11, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945) ), but even though "state law sets the length of the statute of limitations, ‘federal law’ establishes when the ‘statute of limitations begins to run,’ " Winnett v. Caterpillar, Inc. , 609 F.3d 404, 408 (6th Cir. 2010) (quotation omitted). "Under federal law, as under most laws," the discovery rule—an equitable common-law rule—generally governs the question of when a statute of limitations begins to run, meaning that "the limitations clock starts ticking ‘when the claimant discovers, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the acts constituting the alleged violation.’ " Id. (quotation omitted).³

1. Defamation

Mr. Dillard argues that Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-103 applies to Ms. Dillard's defamation claim. [Def.’s Mem. at 3]. Section 28-3-103 states that "[a]ctions for slanderous words spoken shall be commenced within six (6) months after the words are uttered." Relying on § 28-3-103, Mr. Dillard maintains that Ms. Dillard's claim is untimely because she "alleges that communication made by ... [him] were made on or about 2015" but did not file suit until 2020, well beyond the six-month timeframe. [Def.’s Mem. at 3]. In addition, Mr. Dillard rightly points out that the discovery rule does not apply to slander. [Id. ]; Hajiani v. ESHA USA, Inc. , No. 3:14-CV-594-TAV-HBG, 2017 WL 5163354, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 7, 2017).

In response, Ms. Dillard contends that Tennessee Code Annotated § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) governs her defamation claim. [Pls.’ Resp. at 5–7]. Subsection 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) provides that "[a]ctions for libel, injuries to the person, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, or breach of marriage promise" must "commence[ ] within one (1) year after the cause of action accrued." Ms. Dillard views her claim as timely because her prosecution in Sullivan County, which arose from the Mr. Dillard's alleged defamatory statements, "continued until on or about December 4, 2019," when the case against her concluded with an expungement order. [Pls.’ Resp. at 6]; see [Compl. ¶ 55]. She brought suit for defamation in this Court within one year of that date, in November 2020. So, Ms. Dillard appears to be asserting that her defamation claim is timely because the harm that she suffered from Mr. Dillard's alleged defamatory statements continued through December 2019.

Ms. Dillard does not expressly plead whether the alleged defamatory statements were written or spoken, stating only that Mr. Dillard "made a false report" to police and "knowingly false allegations" before the Sullivan County Criminal Court. [Compl. ¶¶ 12, 46]. But because she argues in good faith that § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A) rather than § 28-3-103 applies to her claim, the Court presumes she is bringing a claim for libel and not slander. See generally Energy Conversion Devices Liquidation Tr. v. Trina Solar Ltd. , 833 F.3d 680, 688 (6th Cir. 2016) ("As the master of the complaint, the plaintiff may decide what claims to bring[.]").

Libel is written defamation, Quality Auto Parts Co. v. Bluff City Buick Co. , 876 S.W.2d 818, 820 (Tenn. 1994), and to state a claim for libel, a plaintiff must establish that "1) a party published a statement; 2) with knowledge that the statement is false and defaming to the other; or 3) with reckless disregard for the truth of the statement or with negligence in failing to ascertain the truth of the statement," Sullivan v. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. , 995 S.W.2d 569, 571–72 (Tenn. 1999) (citations omitted). Under § 28-3-104(a)(1)(A), a libel claim begins to accrue "upon the date the alleged defamatory language was published." Riley v. Dun & Bradstreet , 172 F.2d 303, 308 (6th Cir. 1949) (citation omitted). The term " ‘[p]ublication’ is a term of art meaning the communication of defamatory matter to a third person." Sullivan , 995 S.W.2d at 571–72 (...