Dillon v. Toler

ALICIA MAY DILLON PLAINTIFF v. KYLE TOLER, et al. DEFENDANTS

No. 4:19-cv-00219-KGB

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division

September 10, 2021

OPINION AND ORDER

Kristine G. Baker, United States District Judge

Plaintiff Alicia May Dillon brings this case pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1983 alleging violations of her First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights and violations of Arkansas state law (Dkt. No. 2). Before the Court is defendant Officer Kyle Toler's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 57). Ms. Dillon has not responded to Officer Toler's motion. For the following reasons, the Court grants Officer Toler's motion (Dkt. No. 47).

I. Statement Of Facts

The Court's recitation of facts is drawn from Officer Toler's statement of undisputed facts (Dkt. No. 59). Ms. Dillon has not responded to Officer Toler's statement of undisputed facts nor filed her own statement. Therefore, Officer Toler's statement of undisputed facts is deemed admitted, pursuant to Local Rule 56.1(c) of the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Eastern and Western Districts of Arkansas.

On October 3, 2018, a notice of eviction was served on Ms. Dillon (Dkt. No. 59, ¶ 1). On October 16, 2018, Lilly Mae Fair, LLC, filed a cause of action against Ms. Dillon based on unlawful detainer (Id., ¶ 2). On October 16, 2018, the summons and complaint of unlawful detainer was served on Ms. Dillon (Id., ¶ 3). On October 23, 2018, the Circuit Court of White County issued a writ of possession to the Sheriff of White County, Arkansas (Id., ¶ 4). On October 24, 2018, at 1:30 p.m., the writ of possession was served on Ms. Dillon (Id., ¶ 5). On October 25, 2018, at 2:25, Ms. Dillon was removed from the property and arrested (Id., ¶ 6).

To date, the writ of possession has not been invalidated (Id., ¶ 7). On October 25, 2018, Ms. Dillon was charged with obstructing governmental operations (Id., ¶ 8). On December 17, 2018, Ms. Dillon entered a not guilty plea, and a trial was set (Id., ¶ 9). On May 31, 2019, a trial was held, and Ms. Dillon failed to appear (Id., ¶ 10). On November 12, 2019, Ms. Dillon pled guilty to obstructing governmental operations (Id., ¶ 11). To date, Ms. Dillon's conviction for obstructing governmental operations has not been overturned (Id., ¶ 14). See Arkansas Judiciary Website, Docket Search, http://caseinfo.arcourts.gov; State v. Alicia May Dillon, SES-18-3311.^[1]

It is the policy of the White County Sheriff's Department that “[l]aws of arrest, search, and seizure are defined by the United State Constitution, Arkansas Statutes, and judicial interpretation to protect individual rights of all persons. It is the policy of this agency to always use legal justification and means for any arrest, search, or seizure.” (Id., ¶ 15). The White County Sheriff's Department Arrest Procedures policy states, “[y]ou may arrest when you have an arrest warrant, reasonable belief there is an outstanding arrest warrant, or probable cause to believe a crime has been committed.” (Id., ¶ 16). It is the policy of the White County Sheriff's Department that officers making an arrest shall “as promptly as is reasonable under the circumstances, inform the arrested person of the cause of the arrest.” (Id., ¶ 17). It is the policy of the White County Sheriff's Department “to (1) provide techniques to accomplish a thorough and legal search; (2) observe the constitutional rights of the person(s) the warrant is being served upon; (3) minimize the level of intrusion experienced by those who are having their premises searched; (4) provide for the highest degree of safety for all persons concerned; and (5) establish a record of the entire execution process.” (Id., ¶ 18).

II. Legal Standard

Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court may grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine if a reasonable jury could render its verdict for the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “The mere existence of a factual dispute is insufficient alone to bar summary judgment; rather, the dispute must be outcome determinative under prevailing law.” Holloway v. Pigman, 884 F.2d 365, 366 (8th Cir. 1989). Mere denials or allegations are insufficient to defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment. See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Schmidt, 967 F.2d 270, 271-72 (8th Cir. 1992); Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir. 2008).

First, the burden is on the party seeking summary judgment to demonstrate an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); Farver v. McCarthy, 931 F.3d 808, 811 (8th Cir. 2019). If the moving party satisfies its burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to establish the presence of a genuine issue that must be determined at trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Hinkel, 121 F.3d 364, 366 (8th Cir. 1997). The non-movant “‘must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,' and must come forward with ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'” Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 587). “The evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255.

III. Motion for Summary Judgment

Officer Toler brings his motion for summary judgment arguing that he did not violate Ms. Dillon's constitutional rights, that Ms. Dillon's claim of illegal search is invalid under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, that Ms. Dillon's claim of unlawful arrest is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, that he is entitled to qualified immunity, and that there is no basis for official liability (Dkt. No. 57, at 2).

A. Analysis Of Individual Capacity Claims Against Officer Toler

1. Illegal Search Claims

Ms. Dillon alleges that officers, including Officer Toler, “bust my apartment door in using force and without a warrant” and “police illegally searching my apartment.” [sic] (Id.). Officer Toler asserts that no search warrant was implicated, as Officer Toler was not performing a search of Ms. Dillon's apartment. Rather, he was tasked with removing Ms. Dillon from her apartment pursuant to a writ of possession (Dkt. No.58, at 3-4). Officer Toler argues that he attempted to remove Ms. Dillon from her apartment pursuant to the writ, but Ms. Dillon refused to vacate and exit the apartment (Id.). Therefore, officers entered her apartment to facilitate her removal (Id., at 4). See Dkt. No. 59, Ex. A.

Officer Toler argues that, in accordance with Rooker-Feldman, a federal court other than the United States Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction to hear challenges to state court judgments (Id.). “The basic theory of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that only the United States Supreme Court has been given jurisdiction to review a state-court decision, so federal district courts generally lack subject-matter jurisdiction over attempted appeals from a state-court judgment.” Dodson v. Univ. of Ark. for Med. Scis., 601 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted); see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923). Officer Toler argues that Ms. Dillon is “essentially asking this federal district court to decide that the state court's writ of possession was invalid.” (Dkt. No. 58, at 4).

The Court agrees with Officer Toler. By alleging that Officer Toler's entry into the apartment was unlawful, Ms. Dillon is asking this Court to declare the properly served state-issued writ of possession invalid. This Court may not make such a finding pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.

Even if the Court were to consider Ms. Dillon's claims under the Fourth Amendment, the Eighth Circuit caselaw, as well as caselaw from other jurisdictions, generally indicates that an individual loses his or her reasonable expectation of privacy when he or she has been justifiably ejected from the property. See United States v. Molsbarger, 551 F.3d 809, 811 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[W]hatever expectation of privacy Molsbarger may have had, it ceased when he was justifiably evicted from the hotel.”); Young v. Harrison, 284 F.3d 863, 869 (8th Cir. 2002) (“When Young was justifiably evicted from the hotel because his friends created a disturbance, the control over the hotel room reverted to the management and Young cannot assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled.” (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Rambo, 789 F.2d 1289, 1295 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding defendant “was justifiably ejected from the hotel under Minnesota law” and he could not “assert an expectation of being free from police intrusion upon his solitude and privacy in a place from which he has been justifiably expelled”); see T.K. by Gagnon v. Cleveland, No. 2:19-CV-04100-NKL, 2020 WL 3947276, at *14 (W.D. Mo. July 10, 2020) (collecting cases).

While Ms. Dillon was removed from her residence, not a hotel room as in Molsbarger, Young, and Rambo, she had been properly served with a notice of eviction on October 16, 2018, and properly served with the writ of possession on October 24, 2018. See Dkt. No 59-1, Ex. A. Ms. Dillon does not dispute service or the validity of the notice or writ, nor has she put forward any record evidence that calls either into question. Therefore, it is likely that Ms....