DiMaggio v. Comm'r Of Soc. Sec.

1

ROCCO A DIMAGGIO, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:21-CV-01406

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania

August 26, 2022

MEMORANDUM

KAROLINE MEHALCHICK, CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Plaintiff Rocco A DiMaggio (“DiMaggio”) brings this action under section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C § 405(g), for judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (the “Commissioner”) denying his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 1). This matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge on consent of the parties, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Rule 73 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 10). For the following reasons, the undersigned shall order that the Commissioner's decision be AFFIRMED.

I. Background and Procedural History

On January 6, 2016, DiMaggio protectively filed an application under Title II for disability insurance benefits, alleging disability beginning July 17, 2015. (Doc. 13-3, at 25). The Social Security Administration initially denied the application on March 4, 2016, prompting DiMaggio's request for a hearing, which Administrative Law Judge Scott M. Staller held on August 3, 2017. (Doc. 13-3, at 25). In a written decision dated November 27, 2017, the original Administrative Law Judge determined that DiMaggio “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 17, 2015, through [November 27, 2017]” and therefore is not entitled to benefits under Title II. (Doc. 13-3, at 37). The Appeals Council granted DiMaggio's request for review and on September 5, 2019, remanded his case back to an Administrative Law Judge for review. (Doc. 13-3, at 42, 44). Specifically, the Appeals Council directed an Administrative Law Judge to further consider “the severity and effects of [DiMaggio's] obesity” and “[his] maximum residual functional capacity.” (Doc. 133, at 44).

On March 16, 2020, a hearing was held by Administrative Law Judge Richard E. Guida (the “ALJ”) in which DiMaggio claimed a closed period of disability from July 17, 2015, to June 30, 2018. (Doc. 13-2, at 16). In a written decision dated April 13, 2020, the ALJ determined that DiMaggio “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 17, 2015, through [April 13, 2020,]” and therefore is not entitled to benefits under Title II. (Doc. 13-2, at 25).

On August 12, 2021, DiMaggio commenced the instant action. (Doc. 1). The Commissioner responded on October 29, 2021, providing the requisite transcripts from DiMaggio's disability proceedings. (Doc. 12; Doc. 13). The parties then filed their respective briefs, with DiMaggio raising one base for reversal or remand. (Doc. 16; Doc. 17; Doc. 18).

II. Standards of Review

To receive benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, a claimant must demonstrate an “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. To satisfy this requirement, a claimant must have a severe physical or mental impairment that makes it impossible to do his or her previous work or any other substantial gainful activity that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1505(a).^[1] Additionally, to be eligible to receive Title II benefits, a claimant must be insured for disability insurance benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1)(a); 20 C.F.R. § 404.131. To establish an entitlement to disability insurance benefits under Title II, the claimant must establish that he or she suffered from a disability on or before the date on which they are last insured.

A. Administrative Review

The “Social Security Administration, working through ALJs, decides whether a claimant is disabled by following a now familiar five-step analysis.” Hess v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., 931 F.3d 198, 200-01 (3d Cir. 2019). The “burden of proof is on the claimant at all steps except step five, where the burden is on the Commissioner of Social Security.” Hess, 931 F.3d at 201; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1). Thus, if the claimant establishes an inability to do past relevant work at step four, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to show that jobs exist in significant numbers in the national economy that the claimant could perform consistent with his or her residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1).

B. Judicial Review

The Court's review of a determination denying an application for Title ii benefits is limited “to considering whether the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence.” Katz v. Comm'r Soc. Sec., No. 19-1268, 2019 WL 6998150, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 20, 2019). Substantial evidence “does not mean a large or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). The quantum of proof is less than a preponderance of the evidence but more than a mere scintilla. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). A single piece of evidence is not substantial if the ALJ ignores countervailing evidence or fails to resolve a conflict created by such evidence. Mason v. Shalala, 994 F.2d 1058, 1064 (3d Cir. 1993). In an adequately developed factual record, substantial evidence may be “something less than the weight of the evidence, and the possibility of drawing two inconsistent conclusions from the evidence does not prevent [the ALJ's decision] from being supported by substantial evidence.” Consolo v.Fed. Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 620 (1966).

The question before the Court, therefore, is not whether DiMaggio is disabled, but whether the Commissioner's determination that DiMaggio is not disabled is supported by substantial evidence and was reached based upon a correct application of the relevant law. SeeArnold v. Colvin, No. 3:12-CV-02417, 2014 WL 940205, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 11, 2014) (“[I]t has been held that an ALJ's errors of law denote a lack of substantial evidence.”); Burton v. Schweiker, 512 F.Supp. 913, 914 (W.D. Pa. 1981) (“The [Commissioner]'s determination as to the status of a claim requires the correct application of the law to the facts.”); see also Wright v. Sullivan, 900 F.2d 675, 678 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that the scope of review on legal matters is plenary). “In determining if the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence the court must scrutinize the record as a whole.” Leslie v. Barnhart, 304 F.Supp.2d 623, 627 (M.D. Pa. 2003). If “the ALJ's findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence in the record,” the Court is bound by those findings. Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83 (3d Cir. 2000).

III. The ALJ's Decision

In his written decision, the ALJ determined that DiMaggio “has not been under a disability, as defined in the Social Security Act, from July 17, 2015, through the date of this decision.” (Doc. 13-2, at 25). The ALJ reached this conclusion after proceeding through the five-step sequential analysis provided in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).

A. Step One

At step one of the five-step analysis, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(i). If a claimant is engaging in substantial gainful activity, the claimant is not disabled, regardless of age, education, or work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). Substantial gainful activity is defined as work activity requiring significant physical or mental activity and resulting in pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1572. The ALJ must consider only the earnings of the claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1574(a)(2). Here, the ALJ determined that DiMaggio engaged in substantial gainful activity from the fourth quarter of 2018 through the third quarter of 2019. (Doc. 13-2, at 18). However, the ALJ stated that “there has been a continuous 12-month perio[d] during which [DiMaggio] did not engage in substantial gainful activity,” and therefore proceeded to step two of the analysis.^[2] (Doc. 12-2, at 19).

B. Step Two

At step two, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment-or a combination of impairments-that is severe and meets the 12-month duration requirement. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). If the ALJ determines that a claimant does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limits the claimant's “physical or mental ability to do basic work activities,” the ALJ will find that the claimant does not have a severe impairment and is therefore not disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c). If, however, a claimant establishes a severe impairment or combination of impairments, the ALJ proceeds to consider step three. Here, the ALJ found that DiMaggio had three severe medically determinable impairments - major depressive disorder, panic disorder, and alcohol dependence. (Doc. 13-2, at 19). The ALJ also considered the effects of DiMaggio's obesity and found that it was a non-severe impairment. (Doc. 13-2, at 19).

C. Step Three

At step three, the ALJ must determine whether the severe impairment or combination of impairments meets or equals the medical equivalent of an impairment listed in the version of 20 C.F.R. § Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1 that was in effect on the date of the ALJ's decision. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). The sections in...