Dingess v. The Sygma Network, Inc.

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CHRISTOPHER DINGESS, Plaintiff, v. THE SYGMA NETWORK, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-00275

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

July 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

THOMAS E. JOHNSTON CHIEF JUDGE

Pending before the Court is Defendant The Sygma Network, Inc.'s (“Sygma”) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Claims. (ECF No. 264.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a vehicle accident that occurred on March 10, 2022. (ECF No. 28 at 4, ¶ 13.) On that date Plaintiff Christopher Dingess was driving on U.S. Route 119 in Mingo County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 262-10 at 42:08-11.) While on the road, Mr. Dingess observed a white truck travelling in the right lane at a pace slower than everyone else. (Id. at 45-46:18-05.) The truck was allegedly owned by Sygma and driven by Defendant Vontize Conerly (“Conerly”). (Id. at 45-46:18-05; ECF No. 262-4 at 14-24.) Mr. Dingess was in the left lane and began to try to pass the Sygma truck. (ECF No. 262-10 at 46:05-06.) At that moment, the Sygma truck cut in front of Mr. Dingess, drove into the intersection, and proceeded to make an unsafe U-turn. (Id. at 46:06-08; ECF No 262-5 at 49-50:06-18.)

During this maneuver, the Sygma truck blocked both northbound lanes of traffic. (ECF No. 262-12 at 13-15.) Mr. Dingess applied his brakes and swerved right to avoid colliding with the truck. (ECF No. 262-10 at 51:08-24.) Although Mr. Dingess avoided hitting the Sygma truck, his car crashed into a guardrail, went into the air, and crashed in a ravine. (Id. at 52-56:18-20.)

Following the crash, Conerly did not stop the truck, but instead, he proceeded on his way. (ECF No. 262-12 at 16:15-17.) There were at least two eyewitnesses who saw the crash, helped Mr. Dingess, and called 911. (Id. at 23:03-09, 18:16-22 .) On the day of the accident, amongst other injuries, Mr. Dingess bit off parts of his tongue, broke his C2 and C3 vertebra in his neck, sustained a maxillary fracture on the left side of his face, had ruptured blood vessels in his left eye, lost some teeth, and broke his nose. (ECF No. 262-10 at 67-68:21-08.) As a result of the crash, Mr. Dingess continues to suffer from physical, psychological, and emotional injuries. (Id. at 6893:14-15; 95-97:08-03.)

Sygma and Management Specialty Services 109, Inc. (“MSS”) have stipulated that the services agreement applicable to this matter is the October 2020 Services Agreement (“Agreement”). (ECF No. 262-3.) Under that Agreement, MSS, doing business as Regional Supplemental Services, Inc. (“RSS”),^[1]provided personnel to Sygma at its Ohio location. (Id. See ECF No. 262-13 at 9-12:01-03.) Conerly was one of the drivers provided to Sygma by MSS. (ECF No. 262-13 at 8:21-23.)

Plaintiffs Christopher and Tiffany Dingess (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action by filing a complaint in Mingo County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 1.) Sygma removed the action to this Court on June 30, 2022, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See ECF No. 1.) Initially, only Sygma was named as a defendant. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on August 2, 2022. (ECF No. 8).

On October 25, 2022, Sygma provided its first responses to written discovery. (ECF No. 22.) Sygma then supplemented those responses on December 2, 2022. (ECF No. 25.)

Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and Sygma did not object. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiffs' Second Amendment Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on January 9, 2023. (ECF No. 28.) With their SAC, Plaintiffs added additional defendants: Conerly, RSS, and MSS. (ECF No. 28.)

The SAC contains general allegations of Vicarious Liability and Joint Venture of Defendants. (ECF No. 28.) Additionally, Count One of the SAC is a claim of Negligence; Count Two is a claim of Grossly Negligent/Willful, Wanton & Reckless Operation of Motor Vehicle; Count Three is a claim of Negligent Failure to Render Aid; and Count Four is a claim of Grossly Negligent/Willful, Wanton and Reckless Failure or Refusal to Render Aid/Fleeing Scene of a Crash. (Id.) Plaintiffs seek compensatory and punitive damages against all defendants. (ECF No. 28.)

Sygma filed the pending Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Claims on May 14, 2024. (ECF No. 264.) Plaintiffs responded on May 28, 2024, (ECF No. 274), and Sygma replied on June 4, 2024, (ECF No. 308.) On May 28, 2024, MSS also responded in opposition to certain statements Sygma put forth in their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Plaintiffs' Claims, (ECF No. 276),^[2] and Sygma addressed MSS in the same reply to Plaintiffs, (ECF No. 304).

As such, this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. In pertinent part, this rule states that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Summary judgment should not be granted, however, if there are factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). When evaluating these factual issues, the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

“The burden is on the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial . . . by offering ‘sufficient proof in the form of admissible evidence' ....” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). “This burden may be met by use of the depositions and other discovery materials.” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

Should a party fail to make a sufficient showing on one element of that party's case, the failure of proof “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.

“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party is not enough to withstand summary judgment; the judge must ask whether “the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

Sygma moves for summary judgment on the joint venture claim, punitive damages claim, and Counts Three and Four of the SAC. (ECF No. 264.) The Court begins with the joint venture claim.

A. Joint Venture between MSS and Sygma

As a theory to hold MSS and Sygma liable, Plaintiffs contend that the two parties are vicariously liable for the actions of Conerly insofar as MSS and Sygma were in a joint venture.

Joint ventures are “an association of two or more persons” to “carry out a single business enterprise for profit,” for which purpose the parties “combine their property, money, effects, skill, and knowledge.” Armor v. Lantz, 535 S.E.2d 737, 742 (W.Va. 2000). “‘Another essential ingredient to an allegation of joint venture is control of the joint venture by the participants.'” Young v. Apogee Coal Co. LLC, No. 2:12-cv-01324, 2014 WL 1900791, at *4 (S.D. W.Va. May 13, 2014) (quoting Croye v. GreenPoint Mortgage Funding, Inc., 740 F.Supp.2d 788, 800 (S.D. W.Va. 2010). See also Robinson v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 988 F.Supp.2d 615, 635-36 (S.D. W.Va. 2013) (quoting Armor, 535 S.E.2d at 737) (“Joint venturers should also have ‘equal control over the common commercial pursuit,' though ‘the control required ... is not actual physical control, but the legal right to control the conduct of the other with respect to the prosecution of the common purpose.'”). These sorts of ventures require a contract, but it “may be oral or written, express or implied.” Id.

If the aforementioned elements are shown, the members of the venture are “jointly and severally liable for all obligations pertaining to the venture, and the actions of the joint venture bind the individual co-venturers.” Id. at 743. To succeed on this claim, Plaintiffs need to produce facts demonstrating that there is a real and binding “agreement” to “share in the profits and losses” of the enterprise. Pyles v. Mason Cnty. Fair, Inc., 806 S.E.2d 806, 812 (W.Va. 2000). While an agreement “for the sharing of profits is generally considered essential to the creation of a joint adventure,” “the sharing of losses is not essential.” Armor, 535 S.E.2d at 743.

Generally, the question of whether two entities were involved in a joint venture is a question for the jury. Bowers v. Wurzburg, 528 S.E.2d 475, 484 (W.Va. Dec. 16, 1999). However, here, it appears that Plaintiff can prove no set of facts to support his claim such that a reasonable trier of fact could find for Plaintiff. See Robinson, 988 F.Supp.2d at 635-36. Clearly missing from the record is evidence of control and profit sharing.

First it is not clear that there is a “common commercial pursuit” that both Sygma and MSS were jointly working toward. Pursuant to the Agreement, MSS...