Dingess v. The Sygma Network, Inc.

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CHRISTOPHER DINGESS, Plaintiff, v. THE SYGMA NETWORK, INC., Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:22-cv-00275

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Charleston Division

July 31, 2024

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Thomas E. Johnston, Chief Judge.

Pending before the Court is Defendant Management Specialty Services 109, Inc.'s (“MSS”) Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' Claims. (ECF No. 262.) For the reasons set forth below, the motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of a vehicle accident that occurred on March 10, 2022. (ECF No. 28 at 4, ¶ 13.) On that date Plaintiff Christopher Dingess was driving on U.S. Route 119 in Mingo County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 262-10 at 42:08-11.) While on the road, Mr. Dingess observed a white truck travelling in the right lane at a pace slower than everyone else. (Id. at 45-46:18-05.) The truck was allegedly owned by Defendant The Sygma Network, Inc. (“Sygma”) and driven by Defendant Vontize Conerly (“Conerly”). (Id. at 45-46:18-05; ECF No. 262-4 at 14-24.) Mr. Dingess was in the left lane and began to try to pass the Sygma truck. (ECF No. 262-10 at 46:0506.) At that moment, the Sygma truck cut in front of Mr Dingess, drove into the intersection, and proceeded to make an unsafe U-turn. (Id. at 46:06-08; ECF No. 262-5 at 49-50:06-18.) During this maneuver, the Sygma truck blocked both northbound lanes of traffic. (ECF No. 262-12 at 1315.) Mr. Dingess applied his brakes and swerved right to avoid colliding with the truck. (ECF No. 262-10 at 51:08-24.) Although Mr. Dingess avoided hitting the Sygma truck, his car crashed into a guardrail, went into the air, and crashed in a ravine. (Id. at 52-56:18-20.)

Following the crash, Conerly did not stop the truck, but instead, he proceeded on his way. (ECF No. 262-12 at 16:15-17.) There were at least two eyewitnesses who saw the crash, helped Mr. Dingess, and called 911. (Id. at 23:03-09, 18:16-22 .) On the day of the accident, amongst other injuries, Mr. Dingess bit off parts of his tongue, broke his C2 and C3 vertebra in his neck, sustained a maxillary fracture on the left side of his face, had ruptured blood vessels in his left eye, lost some teeth, and broke his nose. (ECF No. 262-10 at 67-68:21-08.) As a result of the crash, Mr. Dingess continues to suffer from physical, psychological, and emotional injuries. (Id. at 6893:14-15; 95-97:08-03.)

Sygma and Management Specialty Services 109, Inc. (“MSS”) have stipulated that the services agreement applicable to this matter is the October 2020 Services Agreement (“Agreement”). (ECF No. 262-3.) Under that Agreement, MSS, doing business as Regional Supplemental Services, Inc. (“RSS”),^[1]provided personnel to Sygma at its Ohio location. (Id. See ECF No. 262-13 at 9-12:01-03.) Conerly was one of the drivers provided to Sygma by MSS. (ECF No. 262-13 at 8:21-23.)

Plaintiffs Christopher and Tiffany Dingess (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) initiated this action by filing a complaint in Mingo County, West Virginia. (ECF No. 1.) Sygma removed the action to this Court on June 30, 2022, invoking diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. (See ECF No. 1.) Initially, only Sygma was named as a defendant. (ECF No. 1-1.) Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint on August 2, 2022. (ECF No. 8).

On October 25, 2022, Sygma provided its first responses to written discovery. (ECF No. 22.) Sygma then supplemented those responses on December 2, 2022. (ECF No. 25.)

Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint and Sygma did not object. (ECF No. 26.) Plaintiffs' Second Amendment Complaint (“SAC”) was filed on January 9, 2023. (ECF No. 28.) With their SAC, Plaintiffs added additional defendants: Conerly, RSS, and MSS. (ECF No. 28.)

The SAC contains general allegations of Vicarious Liability and Joint Venture of Defendants. (ECF No. 28.) Additionally, Count One of the SAC is a claim of Negligence; Count Two is a claim of Grossly Negligent/Willful, Wanton & Reckless Operation of Motor Vehicle; Count Three is a claim of Negligent Failure to Render Aid; and Count Four is a claim of Grossly Negligent/Willful, Wanton and Reckless Failure or Refusal to Render Aid/Fleeing Scene of a Crash. (Id.)

MSS filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment on May 14, 2024. (ECF No. 262.) Plaintiffs responded on May 28, 2024, (ECF No. 275), and MSS replied on June 4, 2024, (ECF No. 307.) On May 28, 2024, Sygma also responded to some of MSS's arguments, (ECF No. 278), and MSS replied to Sygma on June 4, 2024, (ECF No. 306). As such, this motion is fully briefed and ripe for adjudication.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs motions for summary judgment. In pertinent part, this rule states that a court should grant summary judgment if “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.” Summary judgment should not be granted, however, if there are factual issues that reasonably may be resolved in favor of either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). “Facts are ‘material' when they might affect the outcome of the case, and a ‘genuine issue' exists when the evidence would allow a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” News & Observer Publ. Co. v. Raleigh-Durham Airport Auth., 597 F.3d 570, 576 (4th Cir. 2010). When evaluating these factual issues, the Court must view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970).

“The burden is on the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial . . . by offering ‘sufficient proof in the form of admissible evidence' ....” Guessous v. Fairview Prop. Invs., LLC, 828 F.3d 208, 216 (4th Cir. 2016). “This burden may be met by use of the depositions and other discovery materials.” Barwick v. Celotex Corp., 736 F.2d 946, 958 (4th Cir. 1984). Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to “make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Should a party fail to make a sufficient showing on one element of that party's case, the failure of proof “necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Id. at 323.

“[A] party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 256. “The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party is not enough to withstand summary judgment; the judge must ask whether “the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff.” Id. at 252.

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiffs' SAC contains four counts of negligence against all of the defendants. (ECF No. 28.) Plaintiffs seek to hold Sygma and MSS liable for the actions of Conerly through vicarious liability. The issue of whether Sygma and/or MSS can be liable for Conerly's actions, turns on whether either or both of them were in an employer-employee relationship with him at the time of the underlying crash. In their motion for summary judgment, MSS contends that Sygma, not MSS, was Conerly's employer, and therefore, MSS is not vicariously liable for his actions. MSS also argues that Sygma and MSS were not operating in a joint venture.

A. Vicarious Liability

MSS primarily relies on two theories of vicarious liability in an attempt to show that Sygma is vicariously liable, and MSS is not: 1) under the Federal Motor Carrier Regulations (“FMCSR”), specifically 49 C.F.R. § 390.5, Sygma was the statutory employer of Conerly; and 2) Sygma was the common law employer of Conerly at the time of the crash. The Court begins with the statutory employer argument.

1. Statutory Employer

Plaintiffs seek to establish that Conerly was MSS and Sygma's employee. (See ECF No. 28.) To defeat this, in addition to arguing that Conerly was not a common law employee of MSS, MSS also argues that under the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Act (“FMCSA”) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (“FMCSR”), Conerly was the statutory employee of Sygma. (ECF No. 263.) Plaintiffs argue that both MSS and Sygma could be the employer under the federal regulations, (ECF No. 275), and Sygma argues that the FMCSA and its associated regulations are irrelevant to the instant case because the FMCSA does not create a private cause of action, (ECF No. 278).

To resolve this issue, the Court must first decide whether 49 C.F.R. § 390.5 creates a private cause of action for tort liability for personal injuries. In doing so, the Court first reviews the pertinent regulations, then, surveys how other courts have addressed this issue.

49 U.S.C. § 31132(2) defines “employee” as “an operator of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor when operating a commercial vehicle) . . . or an individual not an employer, who . . . directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety in the course of employment.” Similarly, 49 C.F.R. § 390.5, which defines terms for purposes of the FMCSR, states in pertinent part:

Employee means any individual, other than an employer, who is employed by an employer and who in the course of his or her employment directly affects commercial motor vehicle safety. Such term includes a driver of a commercial motor vehicle (including an independent contractor while in the course of operating a commercial motor vehicle).

The majority of courts considering this have found that the FMCSA and the FMCSR do “not create a private right of action for personal...