Dingle v. City of Stamford

Kevin DINGLE et al. v. CITY OF STAMFORD et al.

No. X06CV186044501S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Waterbury, Waterbury, Complex Litigation Docket

June 12, 2019

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

OPINION

BELLIS, J.

The plaintiffs, four members of the Stamford Fire Department (the department), bring the present matter against the city of Stamford and three affiliated defendants, specifically: the Stamford Personnel Commission; the Stamford Director of Legal Affairs, Katherine Emmett; and the Stamford Director of Personnel, Clemon Williams, alleging that the plaintiffs were unfairly denied promotions within the department due to improper methodology employed in making promotional decisions. The defendants have moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint in its entirety, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to first exhaust the administrative remedies available to them. For the reasons discussed herein the defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied with respect to counts one through four of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and is granted with respect to count five of the plaintiffs’ amended complaint.

The following facts are relevant to the determination of the defendants’ motion. Each plaintiff is a member of Stamford’s classified service.^[1] Pursuant to the charter of the city of Stamford (charter), the Director of Personnel is tasked with implementing and enforcing various rules pertaining to the classified service, including, inter alia, providing "[f]or open competitive or promotion examinations to test the relative fitness of applicants for such positions ..." Stamford Charter, § C5-20-10(2). The rules regarding such examinations are detailed in rule 5 of Stamford’s classified service rules, which provides in relevant part: "Objective measuring techniques and procedures, determined by the Director, shall be used in rating the results of tests and determining the relative ranking of candidates." The ultimate selection of candidates for promotion, meanwhile, is governed by rule 6 of Stamford’s classified service rules, which governs the creation of "eligible lists" for promotion and requires in relevant part: "Whenever a vacancy is to be filled, the Director shall certify the names of the persons with the three (3) highest scores on the appropriate eligible list to the appointing officer." Rule 6 of Stamford’s classified service rules also provides for the process of "banding"^[2] to be applied in certain cases and requires in relevant part: "Bands shall be established based on psychometric properties of the test score distribution or on job analysis information." Finally rule 7 of Stamford’s classified service rules enumerates the procedures by which a candidate can appeal various grievances with the examination process. Rule 7.2 of Stamford’s classified service rules, entitled "General Appeal of Examination Results," provides in relevant part "All appeals relating to Rule 5 should be made in writing to the Director and filed within thirty (30) days of the notification date of exam results."

The plaintiffs allege that in mid-2017, the department held promotional examinations for the positions of fire lieutenant and fire captain. Two of the plaintiffs (Dingle and Wagoner) took the exam seeking promotion to captain, while the remaining two plaintiffs (Pickering and Whitbread) took the exam seeking promotion to lieutenant. Based on the raw scores of their exams, Wagoner and Dingle each allege that they alone were tied for the sixth-highest score among the candidates for captain. Pickering and Whitbread, meanwhile, allege that their raw scores placed them sixth and eighth, respectively, among the candidates for lieutenant.

The plaintiffs aver that "following the calculation of total scores, the Director rounded the total scores to whole numbers" and that this rounding created numerous additional tied exam scores among candidates. The plaintiffs allege that this practice of rounding scores had no basis in either the charter or the classified service rules, but that it was nonetheless employed in the creation of the eligible lists for the positions they sought, thus greatly expanding the pool of candidates eligible for appointment to these positions. The plaintiffs further allege that, ultimately, none of the plaintiffs were selected for the positions they had sought.

The plaintiffs initiated the present matter on July 18, 2018, and did not seek to resolve their concerns through any internal administrative appeal processes with the city of Stamford or any related entities. In their original seven-count complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ actions violated the charter and deprived the plaintiffs of their constitutional right to due process. On November 8, 2018, the plaintiffs filed a five-count amended complaint, clarifying their original claims and adding a claim that the defendants had engaged in discriminatory employment practices in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, General Statutes § 46a-60. Specifically, the defendants claimed: (1) violations of the charter; (2) violation of the plaintiffs’ equal protection rights as set forth in article first, § 20 of the Connecticut constitution; (3) that the court should issue a writ of mandamus appointing them to the positions originally sought; (4) that the court should issue a declaratory judgment determining the plaintiffs’ entitlement to the positions originally sought as well as the legal validity of the promotional procedures discussed previously; and (5) violation of § 46a-60.

With respect to the fifth count of their complaint, the plaintiffs allege that they have filed a related complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (the commission) but admit that they "have not yet exhausted their administrative remedies." Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that they suffered emotional harm in addition to economic loss as a result of the defendants’ purportedly discriminatory practices, and seek, inter alia, compensatory damages and attorneys fees.

The defendants filed the present motion to dismiss on January 29, 2019, arguing that the plaintiffs have failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to them by (1) failing to challenge the aforementioned promotional policies through the process set forth in rule 7 of the classified service rules, and (2) failing to exhaust their administrative remedies before the commission prior to bringing their claims under § 46a-60. In support of their arguments, the defendants submitted an affidavit from Emmett attesting that none of the plaintiffs filed an internal appeal concerning the exams in question, as well as copies of the classified service rules in effect at the time of the exams and the charter.

The plaintiffs filed an objection to the present motion to dismiss on March 29, 2019, rebutting the defendants’ arguments with respect to the first four counts of the plaintiffs’ complaint by arguing (1) that resort to any available administrative remedies would be futile^[3] and (2) that, in any event, the defendants’ motion to dismiss should be barred by estoppel due to the defendants’ having concealed certain information pertaining to the plaintiffs’ cause of action. With respect to count five, the plaintiffs argue that the defendants’ employment practices constituted a continuing violation from which the plaintiffs would suffer immediate and irreparable harm if forced to exhaust their remedies before the commission. Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that they sought relief for the defendants’ allegedly discriminatory practices in the form of compensatory damages for emotional harm and attorneys fees, both of which the commission would be incapable of awarding. In support of their objection, the plaintiffs submitted several exhibits, including affidavits from two of the individual plaintiffs attesting, inter alia, that they had no concerns with their "score on the exam or with the manner in which the raw scores were calculated." The defendants filed a reply to the plaintiffs’ objection on April 26, 2019.

On May 17, 2019, the court heard oral arguments on the defendants’ motion. The plaintiffs’ argument focused largely on their assertion that the present matter arises as a result of the defendants’ creation of the eligible lists in question rather than the conduct of the promotional exams, and that the appeal process set forth in rule 7 is thus inapplicable.

DISCUSSION

Practice Book § 10-30(a) provides in relevant part: "A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter ..." "[T]he plaintiff bears the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. New London, 265 Conn. 423, 430 n.12, 829 A.2d 801 (2003). Nevertheless, while "[i]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of jurisdiction in his favor ... clearly to allege facts demonstrating that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the dispute ... It is well established that, in determining whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction every presumption favoring jurisdiction should be indulged." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Financial Consulting, LLC v. Commissioner of Insurance, 315 Conn. 196, 226, 105 A.3d 210 (2014).

"Under our exhaustion of administrative remedies doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an action that seeks a remedy that could be provided through an administrative proceeding, unless and until that remedy has been sought in the administrative forum." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Levine v. Sterling, 300 Conn. 521, 528, 16 A.3d 664 (2011). Nonetheless, this rule is not...