Dingle v. State

ANTONIO DINGLE v. STATE OF MARYLAND

No. 1414

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2016

July 12, 2017

UNREPORTED

Woodward, C.J., Shaw Geter, Kenney, James A., III (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Kenney, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

Appellant, Antonio Dingle, was indicted in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, Maryland, and charged with attempted first degree murder, robbery with a dangerous weapon, theft of a motor vehicle, and several other related counts. Prior to trial, appellant's motion to suppress bloodstain and DNA evidence was denied following a hearing. Following a jury trial, appellant was convicted of attempted second degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, robbery, robbery with a dangerous weapon, theft of property with a value between $1,000 and $10,000, theft of a motor vehicle, and reckless endangerment. Appellant was sentenced to twenty years for attempted second degree murder, to be followed consecutively by ten years for robbery with a dangerous weapon and accompanied by a concurrent sentence of five years for theft of a motor vehicle. The remaining counts merged at sentencing. Appellant timely appealed and presents the following questions for our review:

1. Did the lower court err by allowing admission of bloodstain and DNA evidence, improperly seized from Mr. Dingle without a warrant, when Mr. Dingle was restrained, under police surveillance, and when there was no cause for foregoing a warrant to preserve the evidence sought?

2. Did the trial court err by instructing the jury that a witness had identified Mr. Dingle as a person who committed "the crime" when there were multiple crimes at issue and no testifying witness observed Mr. Dingle attack the victim?

3. Did the trial court err by denying Mr. Dingle's motion for acquittal where the State's case was purely circumstantial and where no reasonable jury could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that because Mr. Dingle was near the crime scene he must have attacked the victim?

For the following reasons, we shall affirm.

BACKGROUND

Motions Hearing

On November 11, 2014, at approximately 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., Detective Jay Rose, of the Baltimore Police Department, responded to 2817 Winchester Street in Baltimore, for a report of an aggravated assault and robbery. When he arrived at the scene, Detective Rose observed blood throughout the residence, including on the front door, the wall in a middle room, and a hallway leading into the kitchen. He also saw a trail of blood going up the stairs into the second floor bedroom associated with the victim, Gregory Smith. There was blood on the bed in that room. More blood was found in the residence, including down into the basement on a pile of laundry.

Detective Rose learned that appellant and one Jessica Flagg also lived at the same residence. Appellant was considered a person of interest in the investigation based on the fact that he was not at home when the police responded to the 911 call. However, when he spoke to the victim at Shock Trauma, Smith "did not know who assaulted him."

While they were still at the crime scene, police learned that Smith's Acura TL vehicle was stolen. Detective Rose explained that he spoke with one of Smith's neighbors, Cynthia Young, who told the detective that Smith's car was gone and that "Mr. Smith never let anybody drive that vehicle." This information was confirmed by the victim, Smith, who told Officer Ronald Ulmer at the crime scene that, "[m]y car is gone and they took it."

Based on information that the victim's car was stolen, Detective Rose put out "be on the lookout" ("BOLO") flyers through departmental e-mail about both the stolen vehicle and appellant, because appellant was wanted for questioning concerning the incident. TheAcura was found at approximately 2:00 a.m. on November 12, 2014, the day after the assault. It was stopped in Baltimore by Officer Ronald Ulmer. Appellant, the driver, and Jessica Flagg were inside the stolen Acura at the time of the stop.¹

Detective Rose testified that appellant was arrested at the scene of the stop for being in possession of stolen property, i.e., the vehicle. After the car stop, appellant was placed in a police wagon and brought to an interview room located in the Southwest District Police Station.

Detective Rose, and Detective Michael Witmer, met with appellant "[a]lmost immediately" after he was stopped and brought to the police station. Appellant, who was handcuffed to a wall in the interview room, declined to waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Pertinent to our discussion, after appellant declined to speak to the police, Detective Rose noticed that appellant was wearing a vest, a gray t-shirt, "Adidas style" running pants, tennis shoes and black socks. Some of the clothes still had price tags attached. Detective Rose observed "what appeared to be blood drops on his socks, on the top side of his socks," near the shin. Detective Rose was familiar with what blood looked like, having bled before, and that he also knew what blood looked like on clothing. Detective Rose clarified that he saw blood on just one sock, as well as appellant's t-shirt. The detective then seized the socks and t-shirt appellant was wearing.

The court then attempted to clarify how the detective came to be in possession of appellant's socks and t-shirt:

THE COURT: When you say recovered, explain to me what that means.

[THE WITNESS]: I took the socks and put - and then they were submitted into evidence control.

THE COURT: Well, you took the socks. Did you say, "Mr. Dingle, I want your socks," or -

[THE WITNESS]: Yeah.

THE COURT: - "Mr. Dingle, I'm going to take your socks"? I mean, tell me how it happened.

[THE WITNESS]: So I helped him remove his shoes and then he took his socks off.

THE COURT: Well, what did you say to him?

[THE WITNESS]: I said, "I'm going to take your socks because I - they're evidence," I guess. I don't recall the exact words that I used.

THE COURT: And then you helped him?

[THE WITNESS]: I helped him take his shoes off and then he took his socks off.

THE COURT: Okay. And how about the shirt?

[THE WITNESS]: I think he just took the shirt off.

Appellant was wearing a gray t-shirt and a vest. The court inquired further:

THE COURT: And where was it that you observed what you thought may have been blood on that t-shirt when you were speaking with Mr. Dingle?

[THE WITNESS]: I didn't see the blood until we started recovering [the] socks and so then we looked at the rest of it.

THE COURT: I don't understand what you mean by that.

[THE WITNESS]: So once I saw the blood on his socks, then I checked - we checked the rest of him to see if there was any other blood.

THE COURT: What do you mean you checked the rest of him?

[THE WITNESS]: Like, his arms and his clothes to see if there was any blood on him that -

THE COURT: So you just basically take a careful look at the clothing he's wearing?

[THE WITNESS]: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: Did you unzip his vest?

[THE WITNESS]: It was already unzipped. I believe the blood was on the body of the t-shirt.

THE COURT: So I understand this, after you recover or remove, which is after Mr. Dingle removes his own socks and I guess hands them to you -

[THE WITNESS]: Uh-huh.

THE COURT: - you then engage to take a closer look at the clothing he's wearing; is that what -

[THE WITNESS]: Yes.

THE COURT: - you're saying?

[THE WITNESS]: Yes.

THE COURT: And is it at that time that you observed what you thought might've been blood on his t-shirt, his -

[THE WITNESS]: Yes.

THE COURT: - gray t-shirt? And where would that blood have been seen by you? What part of his t-shirt did you see -

[THE WITNESS]: It was on the body of the t-shirt. I can't - I don't -

THE COURT: What -

[THE WITNESS]: - recall where.

THE COURT: - what does that mean, on the body?

[THE WITNESS]: Like the torso.

THE COURT: Okay. Front torso? Rear torso?

[THE WITNESS]: I don't recall where.

Detective Rose confirmed that he "told [appellant] to take his t-shirt off." The detective believed the t-shirt was evidence "[b]ecause I saw what appeared to be blood on it." And that evidence "could place [appellant] at the scene where I saw an obscene amount of blood." The same was true for appellant's socks, according to Detective Rose, because "there was blood droplets on - well, what appeared to be blood droplets on the tops of the socks."

After the appellant's socks and t-shirt were taken and packaged for further evidentiary purposes, appellant remained attired in his vest and shoes. Using the computers located at the Southwest District Police Station, Detective Rose then prepared an application for statement of charges, charging appellant with armed robbery and attempted murder. He also prepared a "toe tag," which included appellant's "vital information, his name and date of birth and his band number, which is the number that we use in order to complete his booking on the computer." Appellant was temporarily moved from the interview room to a holding cell, where he remained for a "couple hours." According to Detective Rose, while in the holding cell, appellant asked to speak to Detective Witmer and then "made statements that he took the car and some guys made him take the car, he -and that he had been to the scene." Detective Rose confirmed that these statements were made after appellant's socks and t-shirt were seized.²

Appellant was eventually transported to Central Booking. It was Detective Rose's understanding that appellant's remaining clothes would have been taken there and retained as his personal property until his release. Detective Rose also testified that his prepared statement of charges was submitted electronically to a District Court Commissioner, and that it was ultimately up to the...