Dinkins v. Missouri

ROBERT O. DINKINS, Plaintiff, v. STATE OF MO, et al., Defendants.

No. 4:20-cv-00809-JAR

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

October 1, 2020

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of plaintiff Robert O. Dinkins for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. (Docket No. 2). Having reviewed the motion, the Court has determined that plaintiff lacks sufficient funds to pay the entire filing fee, and will not assess an initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss plaintiff's complaint without prejudice. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his or her prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner's account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner's account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month's income credited to the prisoner's account. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the prisoner's account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid. Id.

Plaintiff has not provided a copy of his inmate account statement as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). However, in his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, plaintiff states that he has no prison job due to being in a wheelchair, receives no income from family, and has no property. As such, he indicates that he is unable to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, the Court will not assess an initial partial filing fee at this time. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(4) ("In no event shall a prisoner be prohibited from bringing a civil action or appealing a civil or criminal judgment for the reason that the prisoner has no assets and no means by which to pay the initial partial filing fee").

Legal Standard on Initial Review

Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a "mere possibility of misconduct." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must "accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements." Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8^th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8^th Cir. 2016) (statingthat court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to "accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation").

When reviewing a pro se complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8^th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8^th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8^th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to "assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint"). In addition, affording a pro se complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).

The Complaint

Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant currently incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Atlanta, Georgia (USP-Atlanta). He brings this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 389 (1971); and the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). His complaint names the following defendants: the State of Missouri; the City of St. Louis; the St. Louis Police Department; the United States District Court; the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit; the Missouri Secretary of State; plaintiff's defense attorney; the United States of America; and "judges." Plaintiff does not indicate the capacity in which defendants are sued.

Plaintiff's complaint is handwritten and not on a Court-provided form. At times, plaintiff's handwriting is difficult to read, and his claims are hard to decipher. To the best of the Court's understanding, it appears that the basis of plaintiff's action is his contention that he was wrongly convicted in United States v. Dinkins, No. 4:15-cr-314-ERW-1 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 7, 2015), and that his subsequent postconviction motions have been improperly denied.¹

Plaintiff begins his complaint by broadly stating that he is suing defendants because of their "deliberate deprival of plaintiff['s] equal access, protection of law and due process of law...failing to protect [plaintiff] from [cruel] and unusual punishment... violating color of state [and] federal law...acts and omissions constituting [cruel] and unusual punishment and discrimination [and] fraud." (Docket No. 1 at 2). In particular, plaintiff states that defendants failed to grant his motions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and § 2255, used fabricated evidence and testimony against him, and caused him both physical and emotional harm. Plaintiff alleges that the courts and the government were "at all times aware of" plaintiff's factual innocence claims but failed to "adequately investigate and release [him]." (Docket No. 1 at 3).

Plaintiff accuses the United States District Court of deliberately overlooking his medical records, complaints, and reports of injury, and of fraudulently stating that he did not specify any suffering. (Docket No. 1 at 4). According to plaintiff, the Clerk of the United States District Court, also failed to submit his criminal complaint to the district attorney and "file charges against the [accused] criminals." Further, plaintiff states that the United States District Court has been reviewing his "order records instead of [his] written [Rehaif v. United States] claims which show [he is] entitled to relief."

In a document within the complaint titled "Affidavit of [D]eliberate Contempt of Legislature," plaintiff states that Judge Webber of the United States District Court was aware of his factual innocence claim and deliberately "showed disrespect for the authority or dignity of [the] legislature by [delay] of judgement and [fabricating] evidence." (Docket No. 1 at 5).

In another document within the complaint titled "questions attachments," plaintiff lists a number of seemingly rhetorical questions suggesting that various entities violated his rights. (Docket No. 1 at 7). For instance, he asks whether the United States District Courts in Atlanta and St. Louis, as well as both the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals abused their discretion by failing to dismiss the indictment against him, failing to recall the "mandate in [the] face of extraordinary circumstances," and failing to rule on the merits of his petition. Plaintiff further suggests that his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition, seeking relief under Rehaif v. United States, should not have been dismissed as a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.² In support, he argues that he belonged to "a relevant category of persons...that [was not] barred from [temporarily] transitioning illegal and stolen guns."

Plaintiff alleges that the United States District Court in Atlanta "overlooked [his] tort claim" and wrongfully dismissed his tort; that the United States District Court in St. Louis "overlooked claims relating to his" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion; that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit likewise "overlooked claims relating to [his]" Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion; and that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit "overlooked claims in [his] 2241 relating to" his Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion. (Docket No. 1 at 8). Based onthese claims, plaintiff contends that there is an "organized secret conspiracy to deprive [him] of [his] constitutional and civil rights." He also questions whether the aforementioned courts "have a history of errors and abuse of [discretions]," and whether changing his § 2241 petition to a § 2255 motion was "[fraudulent] and unconstitutional." (Docket No. 1 at 8-9).

Plaintiff contends that he "is entitled to justification defenses" as to his criminal charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. (Docket No. 1 at 11). He states that based on the Second, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as declarations by the Missouri Secretary of State, and his social, political, and economic...