Dinkins v. State

NICOS L. DINKINS, Plaintiff, v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants.

No. 19-CV-08447 (PMH)

United States District Court, S.D. New York

July 26, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

PHILIP M. HALPERN, United States District Judge.

Nicos L. Dinkins (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law against Town of Ramapo Police Officer Michael Samora (“Defendant”) in connection with an arrest effectuated on November 27, 2018. (Doc. 2 “Compl.”).^[1] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant: (1) used excessive force in apprehending him, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) subjected him to an unreasonable search, in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (3) subjected him to “racial profiling” in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (4) harassed him in violation of New York law. (Id. at 2).^[2]

Pending presently before the Court are two separate motions. The first, filed by Defendant on February 18, 2021, seeks summary judgment and dismissal of all claims against him under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. (Doc. 52; Doc. 53 “Def. Br.”). Plaintiff's opposition brief was filed on May 14, 2021 (Doc. 59, “Opp.”), and the motion was submitted fully with the filing of

Defendant's reply brief on May 21, 2021 (Doc. 60, “Reply”). The second, filed by Petranker, the Rockland County Jail Medical Administrator, Rockland County Sheriff Falco, and Rockland County Executive Ed Day (collectively, “County Defendants”) on November 20, 2020, seeks entry of a final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). (Doc. 42; Doc. 43). Plaintiff did not file any opposition to that motion; the Court therefore deems that motion unopposed.

For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED and the County Defendants' motion is DENIED as moot.

BACKGROUND

The facts recited herein are drawn from the Complaint Defendant's Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (Doc. 48, “Def. 56.1 Stmt.”) Plaintiff's opposition brief^[3] (see Opp.), and the Affirmation of Roselina Serrano in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment along with the exhibits annexed thereto (Doc. 54, “Serrano Aff.”), which include, inter alia: (1) excerpts of Defendant's testimony in People v. Dinkins, No. 14/2019, in the Rockland County Court, dated August 2, 2019 (Doc. 54-4, “Serrano Ex. D”); (2) a copy of the Rockland County District Attorney's Office Evidence/Property Intake & Disposition Sheet for “P.D./Agency: Case #RP-2922-18” (Doc. 54-6, “Serrano Ex. F”); (3) a copy of the Felony Complaint filed by Defendant in the Ramapo Town Court in People v. Dinkins, “Case #: RP-2922-18, ” dated November 27, 2018 (Doc. 54-7, “Serrano Ex. G”); (4) an excerpt from the New York State Incident Report for Case No. RP-02922-18 prepared by Defendant in connection with Plaintiff's arrest (Doc. 54-8, “Serrano Ex. H”); (5) the Grand Jury Indictment in People v. Dinkins, Indictment No. 2019-014, in the Rockland County Court, dated November 27, 2018 (Doc. 54-9, “Serrano Ex. I”); (6) a copy of a printout from the New York State Unified Court System's WebCriminal application for Defendant Nicos L. Dinkins, Case No. 00014-2019, in the Rockland County Court (Doc. 5410, “Serrano Ex. J”); and (7) a copy of the medical records Plaintiff submitted in support of his cross-motion against Petranker (Doc. 54-11, “Serrano Ex. K;” see also Doc. 33 at 15-29). The Court assumes the parties' familiarity with the facts and legal conclusions reached in its September 23, 2020 Memorandum Opinion and Order. (Doc. 36); see also Dinkins, 2020 WL 5659554.

A little before noon on November 27, 2018, the residents of 46 Mariner Way in Ramapo, New York, reported a suspicious vehicle parked near their home. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 10; Compl. at 7; Serrano Ex. D at 5-6; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 1; Opp. at 2-3). The vehicle, a black Nissan Altima, contained two men and had been parked on the street for roughly two hours when police were called. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11; Serrano Ex. D at 6-7; Serrano Ex. H at 1). Defendant responded and, upon arrival, parked behind the Altima. (Serrano Ex. H at 1). Defendant saw two men in the car: one in the driver's seat and one in the backseat on the passenger side of the car. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 11; Serrano Ex. D at 7; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 1). Defendant approached the vehicle and asked the driver to identify himself. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 12; Serrano Ex. D at 7; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano H at 1). The driver complied, provided his license, identified himself as Jeandany Vilburn, and claimed to be an Uber driver waiting to pick up a passenger he had taken to a doctor's office about one quarter of a mile away. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 12-13; Serrano Ex. D at 7-8; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 1). Defendant then asked the man in the backseat, Plaintiff, for identification. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14; Serrano Ex. D at 8-9; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 1).

At the time of this interaction, Plaintiff-by his own admission-was “on the run” from law enforcement. (Compl. at 8). The precise reason for Plaintiff's belief that he was a fugitive at that time is unclear, but it appears linked to a voluntary parole violation. (See Compl. at 7 (admitting that while Plaintiff was “asked to re-report to parole because [his] parole officer . . . forgot to have [him] sign some papers, ” he “refused” to do so)). The reason for that belief is inconsequential, but its import is significant because it caused Plaintiff to lie to Defendant about two things: (1) that he did not have any identification on his person; and (2) that he was Travis Mann, born on July 31, 1988. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 14; Compl. at 8; Serrano Ex. D at 9; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 1-2). The stories diverge at this juncture.

According to Defendant, after asking Plaintiff and the driver for their names, he returned to his patrol car, ran their names through dispatch, learned that Travis Mann had an outstanding warrant, and called for backup. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 15-17; Serrano Ex. D at 9-10; Serrano Ex. G at 1; Serrano Ex. H at 2). As Defendant waited for backup, Plaintiff exited the Altima and asked, “What's the problem, officer?” (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 18; Serrano Ex. D at 10-12; Serrano Ex. G at 12; Serrano Ex. H at 2). When Defendant explained that Plaintiff-or, rather, Travis Mann-had an active warrant and would have to come back to the police station, Plaintiff fled on foot and Defendant gave chase. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 18-20; Serrano Ex. D at 12; Serrano Ex. G at 2; Serrano Ex. H at 2). Defendant, in this version of the story, commanded Plaintiff to stop running multiple times and Plaintiff ignored him. (Serrano Ex. H at 2). Defendant waited until Plaintiff reached a grassy area and discharged his taser once, missing Plaintiff. (Serrano Ex. D at 12-13; Serrano Ex. H at 2). Plaintiff was apprehended after he decided to lay down on a driveway and surrender. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 24; Serrano Ex. D at 13; Serrano Ex. H at 2). The pursuit lasted for approximately one minute. (Serrano Ex. D at 13). As Plaintiff got down onto the driveway, Defendant watched Plaintiff remove a wallet from his pocket and toss it underneath a vehicle parked next to him. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22; Serrano Ex. D at 13; Serrano Ex. G at 2; Serrano Ex. H at 2).

In Plaintiff's version, after knowingly giving Defendant a false name, Defendant advanced immediately on Plaintiff in a way that made Plaintiff fear “for [his] life” and caused him to flee. (Compl. at 8; see also Opp. at 4). Plaintiff insists that Defendant fired his taser at Plaintiff at least twice and, with the second shot, hit his target. (Compl. at 8; Opp. at 4). In this rendition, the taser brings Plaintiff to the ground and ends the pursuit. (Opp. at 4). Plaintiff makes no claim about the length of the pursuit or throwing his wallet. (See generally Compl.; Opp.). Plaintiff maintains that, after being handcuffed, Defendant and other unidentified officers beat him “viciously.” (Opp. at 9; see also id. at 11 (“Plaintiff suffered from an[] intense beat[ing] from . . . Samora and the other officers who joined him.”); Compl. at 8 (“I was then attacked after I was handcuffed.”)).

Regardless of how the incident unfolded, Defendant recovered from the wallet Plaintiff discarded (along with a valid New York State driver's license with Plaintiff's name and picture) the following false documents: (1) a forged New York State driver's license with Plaintiff's picture in the name of William Cooper; and (2) three fake credit cards issued to William Cooper. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 23; Serrano Ex. D at 15-16; Serrano Ex. F; Serrano Ex. G at 2; Serrano Ex. H as 2). A grand jury on this evidence indicted-and a trial jury convicted-Plaintiff of four counts (i.e., one for each fake document) of Criminal Possession of a Forged Instrument in the Second Degree in violation of N.Y. Penal Law § 170.25. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 25-29; Serrano Ex. I; Serrano Ex. J). The conviction has not been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or otherwise been disturbed. (Def. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31; Opp. at 1 (admitting that Plaintiff is awaiting sentencing on “all four counts”)).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, a “court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P 56(a). “A fact is ‘material' if it ‘might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law,' and is genuinely in dispute ‘if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'” Liverpool v Davis, 442 F.Supp.3d 714, 722 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty...