Disability Rights N.Y. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision

DISABILITY RIGHTS NEW YORK, Plaintiff, v. NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, ANTHONY J. ANNUCCI, Defendants.

No. 1:18-CV-980 (GTS/CFH)

United States District Court, N.D. New York

August 16, 2021

APPEARANCES:

Disability Rights New York, Attorneys for plaintiff.

New York State Attorney General, The Capitol, Attorneys for defendants.

OF COUNSEL:

BRANDY L.L. TOMINSON, ESQ., CHRISTINA ABSEE, ESQ.

BRIAN W. MATULA, ESQ.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION & ORDER

CHRISTIAN F. HUMMEL, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE.

Pending before the Court is defendants New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) and Anthony J. Annucci's motion to compel plaintiff Disability Rights New York (“DRNY”) to respond to its first set of interrogatories^[1] and document demands. See Dkt. No. 71. Plaintiff opposed. See Dkt. No. 72. For the following reasons, defendants' motion is granted in part and denied in part.

I. Background^[2]

Plaintiff commenced this action on August 15, 2018. See Dkt. No. 1. On ° October 19, 2018, in lieu of an answer, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 15. On December 14, 2018, plaintiff opposed and cross moved for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 25. On January 15, 2019, defendants filed their reply and opposition to plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 31. On September 24, 2019, as relevant here, the Court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 41. On March 2, 2020, defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 59. Plaintiff opposed the motion and moved for reconsideration of the Court's denial of plaintiff's motion for summary judgment as it related to “its interpretation of the [DD Act] and [PAIR Act] and relevant regulations to correct the misinterpretation of the statute and regulation and prevent manifest injustice.” Dkt. No. 60. Defendants replied and opposed plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. See Dkt. No. 61. On March 30, 2020, the United States of America filed a statement of interest. See Dkt. No. 62. On April 1, 2020, defendants responded to the United States' statement of interest. See Dkt. No. 63. On November 4, 2020, the Court (1) granted plaintiff's motion for reconsideration in part; and (2) granted defendants' second motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing all claims against defendant Annucci except for plaintiff's claims under the PAIMI Act, DD Act, and PAIR Act as to the inmates specified on page 94 of the Court's September 24, 2019, Decision & Order. See Dkt. No. 73.

II. Legal Standard

'' Rule 26(b)(1) states, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . . Information within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence in order to be discoverable.” FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). “Under Rule 37, following a good-faith effort to meet and confer, upon to all parties notice, “a party may move for an order compelling disclosure or discovery.” FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a). “Motions to compel made pursuant to Rule 37 are ‘entrusted to the sound discretion of the district court.'” Harris v. Bronx Parent Hous. Network, Inc., No. 18-CV-11681, 2020 WL 763740, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 14, 2020) (quoting United States v. Sanders, 211 F.3d 711, 720 (2d Cir. 2000)).

III. Arguments^[3]

In its motion to compel, defendants seek the Court to compel plaintiff to respond to discovery demands and interrogatories relating, generally, to: (1) inmates' medical and mental health conditions, (2) whether defendants were “clients” of plaintiff, and (3) complaints plaintiff received relating to allegations of abuse or neglect. See Dkt. No. 71-1. More specifically, defendants contend that for plaintiff to meet its burden of demonstrating that defendant violated the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Rights Act of 2000 (“DD Act”), Protection and Advocacy for Individuals with Mental Illness Act of 1986 (“PAIMI Act”), and Protection and Advocacy of Individual Rights Act (“PAIR Act”) (collectively “P&A Acts”), it “will need to establish that the inmate, whose records are at issue in each request, fit[s] within the protection of one or more of the statutes.” Dkt. No. 71-1 at 4. Defendants argue that plaintiff must also demonstrate “that they were entitled to the records sought” as “each of these statutes have very particularized circumstances where access to records is permitted.” Id. Defendants further state, “[t]he Court's prior Decision and Order in this case did not relieve Plaintiff of its obligations to prove each of the elements of its claims at trial. In fact, Plaintiff's cross motion for summary judgment was denied in its entirety.” Id. at 4-5. Defendants note that, at the time they filed their initial summary judgment motion, there had been no discovery, and “[a]t no point in this case did this Court ever consider proof of the inmates' underlying medical condition, the factual basis for Plaintiff's assertion of the client relationship and whether or not there were complaints of abuse or neglect which would trigger an obligation to respond under one of the asserted Acts.” Id. at 5. Because of this, defendants argue that “the facts establishing the particularized elements of each statute, as applied to each inmate and record request, is very much still a valid subject of discovery and ‘not beyond the scope of the remaining issues in this case.'” Id. Defendants also object to plaintiff's “vague claims to attorney-client and work-product privileges without any log to identify what documents it is purporting to withhold so that Defendants can meaningfully determine whether the privileges apply.” Id.

Plaintiff argues that, in reviewing defendants' first motion for summary judgment, this Court decided - and rejected - the claims they raise in their motion to compel. See Dkt. No. 72 at 4. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that even the Court deems these issues discoverable, the Court should deny the motion to compel because discovery is closed and defendants failed to demonstrate good cause for their delay in seeking discovery regarding “client of the system and disability status of the inmates.” Id. at 7-8. Plaintiff provides that defendants filed the motion to compel “five months after Plaintiff attempted to resolve this issue, and only a few short days before the scheduling order ended all discovery[, ]” making their request “untimely and without good cause for the delay.” Id. at 8. Plaintiff further accuses defendants of “engag[ing] in a pattern of failing to meet the discovery deadlines required by the FRCP, and its Motion to Compel is an attempt to further delay discovery to make up for lack of diligence.” Id. Next, plaintiff argues that the information sought cannot be disclosed as the P&A Acts prohibit plaintiff “from disclosing and re-disclosing confidential information and records that it has received pursuant to its access under federal law.” Id. at 9. Plaintiff opines that disclosing the information sought to defendants “infringes on the very purpose of the P&A system and will have a chilling effect if Plaintiff is forced to reveal the identity of complainants[, ]” which it argues as “no bearing on the remaining triable issues in this case.” Id.

IV. Discussion

A. Relevant Procedural History

In its September 24, 2019, 94-page Decision & Order, as relevant here, the Court held, “[w]hen making a request for access, a P&A system is not required to expressly include a showing of the developmental disability or mental illness of the individual whose records are sought[, ]” and “imposing such a threshold requirement would appear inconsistent with the purposes of the P&A statutes.” Dkt. No. 41 at 57 (citing Protection ° & Advocacy for Persons with Disabilities v. Armstrong, 266 F.Supp.2d 303, 314 (D. Conn. 2003); Kentucky Prot. & Advocacy Div. v. Hall, 01-CV-0538, 2001 WL 34792531, at *2 (W.D. Ken. 2001). The Court observed that “several courts to consider this issue have held that ‘evidence that a facility has previously housed individuals who are mentally ill, as well as evidence that some current residents may be mentally ill is sufficient under PAIMI to merit access by [a P&A system].” Id. (quoting Armstrong, 266 F.Supp.2d at 314). The Court extended this rationale to the DD Act and PAIR Act after noting the “similar framework shared by the three P&A statutes.” Id. Applying this logic, the Court observed that defendants did not dispute the fact that the record shows that DOCCS “houses at least some individuals with developmental disabilities and/or mental illness” and that defendants “cited no legal authority to support their contention that Plaintiff was required to include a specific assertion or information about each inmate's developmental disability or mental illness in its record requests.” Id. Thus, the Court concluded, “in the absence of evidence that any of the inmates' status has been misrepresented, Plaintiff is not required to identify an inmate's developmental disability or mental illness in its requests pursuant to the P&A Acts.” Id. at 57-58.

Next the Court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiff's failure to identify explicitly all inmates as “clients” in its letter requests means that it was not entitled to those inmates' records. Dkt. No. 41 at 58. The Court noted that plaintiff included authorizations for all living inmates allowing plaintiff to access their records, and defendants had “not offered any facts that would give the Court any reason to doubt the authenticity of those signed authorization forms” nor “cited any legal...