Disability Rights Tex. v. Hollis

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DISABILITY RIGHTS TEXAS, Plaintiff, v. ROY HOLLIS, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 4:22-CV-00121

United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division

February 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Keith P. Ellison United States District Judge.

Currently pending before the Court are Plaintiff Disability Rights Texas and Defendant Roy Hollis's Motions for Summary Judgment. (Docs. 20, 22.) For the reasons discussed below the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request for declaratory judgment and GRANTS IN PART Plaintiff's request for injunctive relief. The Court DENIES Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Parties

Under the Protection and Advocacy for Mentally Ill. Individuals Act, 42 U.S.C. § 10801, et seq.; the Developmental Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 15001, et seq.; and the Protection and Advocacy for Individual Rights Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794e (collectively the “P&A Acts”), Congress mandates states to designate nonprofits (“P&A systems”) to protect and advocate for civil rights of individuals with disabilities. Texas designates Plaintiff Disability Rights Texas (or “DRTx”) to perform this mandate. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 7.) The P&A Acts authorize Plaintiff to access confidential records of programs serving people with disabilities to investigate allegations of abuse and neglect. Id. ¶ 11.

Plaintiff sues Defendant Roy Hollis in his official capacity as the Chief Executive Officer and registered agent of Houston Behavioral Healthcare Hospital, LLC. (Doc. 1 at ¶ 9.) Houston Behavioral is a for-profit company that provides treatment and stabilization for acute psychiatric conditions. Id. ¶ 14. The P&A Acts require the facility to provide Plaintiff access to records where Plaintiff fulfills specific criteria. (Doc. 10 at ¶ 27.) The Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320d et seq. (“HIPAA”) authorizes disclosures of otherwise-protected documents where required by the P&A Acts. (Doc. 10 at ¶ 26.)

B. Alleged Events

This case stems from the involuntary confinement of G.S., an individual with mental illness, at Defendant's facility. Id. ¶ 14. In August 2021, G.S. was detained in a locked psychiatric inpatient program at Defendant's facility. Following his release, G.S. filed a complaint with Plaintiff alleging he was abused at Defendant's facility and signed a waiver allowing Plaintiff to access his records. Id. ¶¶ 15-16. Specifically, G.S. alleged staff improperly and unnecessarily medicated him against his will. Id. ¶ 15. Defendant cooperated with Plaintiff's first set of requests for information. Id. ¶ 17. However, Defendant subsequently refused to provide Plaintiff with video record requests. Defendant stated that only one of the three requested videos was preserved and denied the request for this video. Id. ¶¶ 19-20.

At the time, Defendant cited 42 C.F.R. Part 2 (“Part 2”), stating that the videos covered Part 2 programs and that the regulation restricts the facility's disclosure of records relating to substance use disorder patients. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff sent a letter explaining that Part 2 did not apply to G.S.'s program and that it would not be possible to identify any individual on the video as someone with a substance abuse disorder. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant subsequently abandoned this argument.

When Defendant continued to deny Plaintiff access to the video, Plaintiff filed suit. Meanwhile, Plaintiff has requested-and Defendant has denied-access to videos relating to other individuals' allegations. Defendant preserved these videos pending the Court's adjudication of this issue. (Doc. 23-1 at ¶¶ 15-17.)

C. Remedies Sought

Plaintiff seeks declaratory and permanent injunctive relief. It asks the Court to “[i]ssue a declaratory judgment that Defendant's policies, procedures, regulations, and practices of denying DRTx access to Houston Behavioral video tape records violates the [P&A Acts].” (Doc. 1 at 9.) It also asks the Court to “[g]rant permanent injunctive relief that enjoins Defendant, his agents, and employees from denying DRTx access to the requested video tape records of G.S., as well as any future silent video tape records of individuals receiving treatment in Houston Behavioral's locked adult psychiatric inpatient program.” Id.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment under Rule 56 “is proper ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C)). A GENUINE ISSUE AS TO A MATERIAL FACT ARISES “IF THE EVIDENCE IS SUCH THAT A REASONABLE JURY COULD RETURN A VERDICT FOR THE NONMOVING PARTY.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court must draw all “reasonable inferences . . . in favor of the nonmoving party, but the nonmoving party ‘cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.'” Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Turner v. Baylor Richardson Medical Center, 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007)). “[T]he movant bears the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact with respect to those issues on which the movant bears the burden of proof at trial.” Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Avenell, 66 F.3d 715, 718 (5th Cir. 1995). “For any matter on which the non-movant would bear the burden of proof at trial, however, the movant may merely point to the absence of evidence and thereby shift to the non-movant the burden of demonstrating by competent summary judgment proof that there is an issue of material fact warranting trial.” Id. at 718-19.

III. ANALYSIS

Parties agree that no material issues of fact exist. The only issue for this Court's adjudication is whether Plaintiff, as part of its investigation into G.S.'s allegation of abuse, can access surveillance videos of G.S. that may also include the faces of individuals undergoing treatment without those individuals' authorization.

The (1) plain language of the law, (2) purpose of the P&A Acts, and (3) existence of stringent statutory privacy protections for P&A systems provide clear and consistent evidence for Plaintiff's position that Defendant must grant Plaintiff access to the video.

First, the plain language of the P&A Acts indicates that P&A systems may access records that contain confidential third-party information without these individuals' authorization. 42 U.S.C. § 10805(a)(4) requires Defendant to provide Plaintiff with “all records-of any individual” once that individual or their legal guardian provided consent to investigation. While the Fifth Circuit has not ruled on the issue of whether P&A systems may access records containing third-party information, federal courts have consistently read this language to provide P&A systems with broad access to records. District courts, including at least one in this circuit, have explicitly allowed access to unredacted video records based on the expansive statutory language. See, e.g., Disability Rts. Texas v. Bishop, No. 1:21-CV-124-H, 2022 WL 2817983, at *7-8 (N.D. Tex. July 19, 2022) (“Neither the phrase ‘of any individual' nor the statutory definition requires ‘records' to be limited to those exclusively produced as part of the care, treatment, or investigation into the abuse or neglect of a particular individual.”); see also Disability Rights New York v. Wise, 171 F.Supp.3d 54, 59 (N.D.N.Y. 2016) (finding that the P&A Acts “make clear that P&A systems . . . are entitled to all records of subject individuals, and give no indication that investigative agencies should redact or withhold portions of their reports.”).

Second, the purpose of the P&A Acts necessitates Plaintiff's access to relevant evidence, including video evidence, even where other individuals' privacy rights may be implicated. The stated statutory purpose of P&A systems' investigative powers is to “investigate incidents of abuse and neglect of individuals with mental illness” and “to ensure the rights of individuals with mental illness are protected.” 42 U.S.C. § 10801(b). Final rule guidance pertaining to the P&A Acts, published by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, discusses the importance of systems' broad access for the effective implementation of the Acts. “In order for the P&A system to carry out its mandate to . . . investigate allegations of abuse or neglect in public and private facilities, they must be empowered to access information contained in all records relevant to [a full investigation of a report or complaint].” 62 Fed.Reg. 53548, 53560 (Oct. 15, 1997). The guidance further notes that several respondents to its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking emphasized “the importance of including records which do not only relate to the individual who is the object of a full investigation and felt it particularly important that the decision regarding which records are relevant be at the sole discretion of the system,” and agreed that providers should have reasonable access to “all ‘relevant' records.” Id. Finally, Plaintiff provides a declaration from one of its employees discussing video evidence's critical role in its investigations. (Doc. 32-1 at ¶¶ 18-21.) These sources demonstrate that Defendant's ability to block Plaintiff from reviewing video records would significantly hinder Plaintiff from fulfilling its federal mandate.

Third the risk of allowing P&A systems to access third-party information is minimal. The P&A Acts require systems to “maintain the confidentiality of such records to the same extent as is required...