Disedare v. Brumfield

1

CLYDE DISEDARE, Plaintiff v. SGT. COLTER BRUMFIELD, ET AL., Defendants

Civil No. 22-2680

United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

March 13, 2024

SECTION “E” (2)

ORDER AND REASONS

SUSIE MORGAN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Colter Brumfield, Randall Williams, Darryl Mizell Kevin Luper, and the State of Louisiana.^[1]Plaintiff opposed.^[2] Defendants replied.^[3] For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Clyde Disedare is incarcerated at Rayburn Correctional Center (“RCC”),^[4]where he was held at all times relevant to this action.^[5] Defendants in this case are state correctional officers Brumfield, Williams, Mizell, and Luper (collectively, the “Defendant officers”), and the State of Louisiana through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (the “DPSC”).^[6] Plaintiff alleges that over a four-day period in March 2021, the Defendant officers, suspecting Plaintiff had stored contraband in his rectum, repeatedly ordered him to ingest laxatives, perform bowel movements in full restraints, submit to strip searches, and undergo x-rays.^[7] No contraband was found.^[8] Plaintiff originally sued in Louisiana state court on July 6, 2022, bringing claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983 (“Section 1983”) and Louisiana state law.^[9] Under Section 1983, Plaintiff alleges the Defendant officers violated the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments by housing him in unconstitutionally unsanitary conditions of confinement,^[10] exercising excessive force by corporal punishment,^[11] and breaching their duty to protect.^[12] Under Louisiana state law, Plaintiff asserts claims of negligence against the Defendant officers and respondeat superior against the DPSC for the alleged tortious acts committed by its employees, the Defendant officers.^[13]

On August 16, 2022, Defendants removed the case to this Court from the 22^nd Judicial District Court for the Parish of Washington in the State of Louisiana.^[14] On July 21, 2023, Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment.^[15] In the motion, Defendants move this Court for summary judgment “on the grounds that Defendants are entitled to Qualified Immunity and Plaintiff's [Section] 1983 claims of cruel and unusual punishment, failure to protect, and State law claims of battery and negligence against [the Defendant officers], as well as the State law claims of respondeat superior against DPSC, cannot be supported.”^[16]

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense- on which summary judgment is sought.”^[17] Summary judgment is appropriate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”^[18] Indeed, “[i]f the moving party fails to meet this initial burden, the motion must be denied, regardless of the nonmovant's response.”^[19] “An issue is material if its resolution could affect the outcome of the action.”^[20] When assessing whether a material factual dispute exists, the Court considers “all of the evidence in the record but refrains from making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence.”^[21] All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the nonmoving party.^[22] There is no genuine issue of material fact if, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party, thus entitling the moving party to judgment as a matter of law.^[23]

If the dispositive issue is one on which the moving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party “must come forward with evidence which would ‘entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial.'”^[24] Pursuant to Rule 56(c), the party asserting a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must provide support for the assertion by:

(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or

(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.^[25]

“The court need consider only the cited materials.”^[26] If the moving party fails to carry this burden, the motion must be denied. If the moving party successfully carries this burden, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to direct the Court's attention to something in the pleadings or other evidence in the record setting forth specific facts sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact does indeed exist.^[27]

If the dispositive issue is one on which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of persuasion at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden of production by either (1) submitting affirmative evidence that negates an essential element of the nonmovant's claim, or (2) demonstrating there is no evidence in the record to establish an essential element of the nonmovant's claim.^[28] When proceeding under the first option, if the nonmoving party cannot muster sufficient evidence to dispute the movant's contention that there are no disputed facts, a trial would be useless, and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.^[29] When, however, the movant is proceeding under the second option and is seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmovant has no evidence to establish an essential element of the claim, the nonmoving party may defeat a motion for summary judgment by “calling the Court's attention to supporting evidence already in the record that was overlooked or ignored by the moving party.”^[30] Under either scenario, the burden then shifts back to the movant to demonstrate the inadequacy of the evidence relied upon by the nonmovant.^[31] If the movant meets this burden, “the burden of production shifts [back again] to the nonmoving party, who must either (1) rehabilitate the evidence attacked in the moving party's papers, (2) produce additional evidence showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial as provided in Rule 56(e), or (3) submit an affidavit explaining why further discovery is necessary as provided in Rule 56(f).”^[32] “Summary judgment should be granted if the nonmoving party fails to respond in one or more of these ways, or if, after the nonmoving party responds, the court determines that the moving party has met its ultimate burden of persuading the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact for trial.”^[33]

“[U]nsubstantiated assertions are not competent summary judgment evidence.”^[34]“The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports the claim.”^[35]“‘Rule 56 does not impose upon the district court a duty to sift through the record in search of evidence to support a party's opposition to summary judgment.'”^[36] The party opposing summary judgment, however, “need not respond to it with affidavits or other evidence ‘unless and until the movant has properly carried its burden.'”^[37]

II. Summary Judgment on Qualified Immunity Claims

The doctrine of qualified immunity operates “to ensure that before they are subjected to suit, officers are on notice their conduct is unlawful.”^[38] Thus, qualified immunity “shields ‘government officials performing discretionary functions . . . from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'”^[39] “In resolving questions of qualified immunity at the summary judgment stage, courts engage in a two-pronged inquiry.”^[40] “The first asks whether the facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show the officer's conduct violated a federal right.”^[41] “The second prong of the qualified-immunity analysis asks whether the right in question was ‘clearly established' at the time of the violation.”^[42] Courts may address the questions in either order.^[43]

Concerning the first prong of the qualified immunity analysis, the defense is “appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage when (1) a plaintiff has established that the defendant has engaged in the complained-of conduct or (2) the court ‘skip[s], for the moment, over . . . still-contested matters to consider an issue that would moot their effect if proved.'”^[44] “If resolution of [qualified immunity] in the summary judgment proceeding turns on what the defendant actually did, rather than on whether the defendant is immunized from liability . . ., and if there are conflicting versions of his conduct, one of which would establish and the other defeat liability,” then summary judgment is not appropriate.^[45] Although summary judgment ultimately may be appropriate based on a plaintiff's inability to prove the facts essential to recovery, this “has nothing to do with the qualified immunity defense.”^[46]

Thus “a plaintiff seeking to overcome qualified immunity must plead specific facts that both allow the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the harm [the plaintiff] has alleged and [] defeat a qualified immunity with equal specificity.”^[47]“Therefore, even where the qualified immunity defense is raised by motion for summary...