Distefano v. E. Greenwich Sch. Dist.

WILLIAM and KIMBERLY DISTEFANO, et al., Plaintiffs v. EAST GREENWICH SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants

C.A. No. PC 12-4970

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS PROVIDENCE, SC. SUPERIOR COURT

DATE DECISION FILED: September 30, 2013

DECISION

CARNES, J. Before this Court is an administrative appeal from a residency determination made by the Commissioner of Education for the State of Rhode Island (Commissioner) from which the parents of a minor child with a disability (Appellants) appeal. The Commissioner found that Appellants were residents of North Kingstown for educational purposes, determining that the residency requirement for school enrollment purposes as proscribed by G.L. 1956 § 16-64-1 was not satisfied. Thus, the Commissioner denied Appellants' request seeking to maintain the student's special education placement in the East Greenwich School District (School District). This Court's jurisdiction is pursuant to §§ 16-39-4, 42-35-15, 42-35-15.1, and 16-64-6.

IFacts and Travel

Appellants established their residency in North Kingstown, Rhode Island in 2001, when the family purchased and moved into a home therein. In 2007, the Appellants purchased a second home in East Greenwich, Rhode Island and registered their son in the East Greenwich School District, using the East Greenwich property address on the required enrollment forms. Theminor child has been in attendance at the school since that time, though the family still resides in their North Kingstown home.

In May 2012, the principal of the East Greenwich School District was made aware of the family's living arrangement, and a school attendance officer investigated the matter. Upon completing its observation, the School District immediately directed the Appellants to withdraw their son from the school, thus giving rise to the present residency dispute.

The School District conducted a hearing on the instant matter on August 2, 2012.¹ There, Appellants argued that the School District's investigation did not establish lack of residency in East Greenwich, and that the family's home ownership and "constellation of interests" in East Greenwich were sufficient to establish residency for school purposes. The School District argued that the compilation of evidentiary support established that the minor child resided in NorthKingstown according to the definition of "residence," citing to the Commissioner's prior decisions, the school attendance officer's surveillance results and insufficient testimony.

On August 27, 2012, the Commissioner issued a Decision affirming the School District's decision. After considering the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by the parties, the Commissioner relied on his prior relevant decisions to support his findings that the family resided in North Kingstown. The Commissioner found that "[t]he evidence in this case does not show that [Appellants] conduct their household activities or sleep in its East Greenwich house . . . therefore [the family] does not reside in East Greenwich . . . and [the minor child] has no entitlement to educational services from the East Greenwich public schools." In re Residency of W. Doe, Aug. 27, 2012.

IIStandard of Review

This Court's review of a decision of the Commissioner of Education is controlled by G.L. 1956 § 42-35-15(g) of the Administrative Procedures Act, which provides the following:

"The Court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the agency as to the weight of the evidence on the questions of fact. The court may affirm a decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings, or it may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are:

(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;

(2) In excess of the statutory authority of the agency;

(3) Made upon unlawful procedure;

(4) Affected by other error or law;

(5) Clearly erroneous in view of reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or(6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion."

This section precludes a reviewing court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency in regard to the credibility of witnesses or the weight of evidence concerning questions of fact. Costa v. Registry of Motor Vehicles, 543 A.2d 1307, 1309 (R.I. 1988); Carmody v. R.I. Conflict of Interest Commission, 509 A.2d 453, 458 (R.I. 1986). Therefore, this Court's review is limited to determining whether substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's Decision. See Newport Shipyard v. Rhode Island Commission for Human Rights, 484 A.2d 893 (R.I. 1984). "'Substantial evidence" is that which a "reasonable mind might accept to . . . support a conclusion.'" Id. at 897. (quoting Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., 120 R.I. 1981, 424 A.2d 646, 647 (1981)). This is true even in cases where the court, after reviewing the certified record and evidence, might be inclined to view the evidence differently than the agency. Berberian v. Dept. of Employment Security, 414 A.2d 480, 482 (R.I. 1980). This Court will "reverse factual conclusions of administrative agencies only when they are totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record." Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981).

Additionally, pursuant to § 42-35-15, the Superior Court acts in the capacity of an appellate court when reviewing a decision of an administrative agency. Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Berry, 620 A.2d 1255, 1259 (R.I. 1993). The Superior Court is confined to "'an examination of the certified record to determine if there is any legally competent evidence therein to support the agency's decision.'" Johnston Ambulatory Surgical Associates, Ltd. v. Nolan, 755 A.2d 799, 805 (R.I. 2000) (quoting Barrington School Committee v. Rhode Island State Labor Relations Board, 608 A.2d 1126, 1138 (R.I. 1992)). If the agency decision was based on sufficient competent evidence in the record, the reviewing court must affirm theagency's decision. Nolan, 755 A.2d at 805 (citing Barrington School, 608 A.2d at 1138). "'A judicial officer . . . may reverse [the] findings of the administrative agency only in instances where the conclusions and the findings of fact are 'totally devoid of competent evidentiary support in the record,' (Bunch v. Board of Review, 690 A.2d 335, 337 (R.I. 1997); Milardo v. Coastal Resources Management Council, 434 A.2d 266, 272 (R.I. 1981), or from the reasonable inference that might be drawn from such evidence.'" Bunch, 690 A.2d at 337 (quoting Guarino v. Department of Social Welfare, 122 R.I. 583, 588-89, 410 A.2d 425, 428 (1980)). However, questions of law are not binding upon the court and are reviewed de novo. Narragansett Wire Co. v. Norberg, 118 R.I. 596, 376 A.2d 1, 16 (R.I. 1977); Bunch, 690 A.2d at 337.

IIIAnalysis

The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that residence "is not a word of fixed legal definition but must be interpreted according to the context and the purpose of the statute in which it is found.² See also, Flather v. Norberg, 377 A.2d 225, 228 (R.I. 1977).³ The absence of astatutory definition of the term "resides" in Sec. § 16-64-1 necessarily has resulted over the years in judicial divination of precisely what the General Assembly intended that term to mean in that statute. Meyer, 68 A.3d 571 at 588.

Except as provided otherwise by statute, children of parents who are not residents of a school district generally may not attend school in such district; however, under some statutes, children living outside a school district or town may attend school therein with the consent of the school authorities of the district in which the school is located. 17A Am. Jur. 2d Residence - Children Residing Outside District § 990 at 309 (1980). In order to fulfill the criteria for a child's residency for school purposes, however, Rhode Island law clearly provides in pertinent part: "[e]xcept as provided by law or by agreement, a child shall be enrolled in the school system of the city or town where he or she resides. A child shall be deemed to be a resident of the city or town where his or her parents reside." Sec. 16-64-1.

Here, after listening to the testimony and reviewing the language of § 16-64-1, the Commissioner found that at all relevant times, the Appellants were residents of North Kingstown. In Re: Residency of W. Doe, Aug. 27, 2012. The Commissioner considered its prior relevant decisions⁴—In Re: Residency of T. Doe, Jan. 28, 2005; In Re: Residency of J.R., Commissioner of Education, Aug. 23, 2000; In Re: Residency of John Doe (CS) and Jane Doe (LS), Feb. 2, 2000—for his determination of residency. As such, the minor child was not a resident of East Greenwich for school purposes. Thus, the Commissioner found in his Decision that the minor child does not reside in the East Greenwich home and is therefore not entitled to attend East Greenwich public schools.⁵

Contrarily, Appellants maintain that they do, in fact, own a residence within the School District and pay taxes on said residence. (R. at 56 ¶¶ 15-24.) Appellants argue that the legislature's intent was designed to protect school districts against having to educate those without any connection to the district and/or those seeking a tax-free education, asserting that neither scenario exists in the present matter. Appellants heavily rely on In re Residency of J.R., Commissioner of Education, Aug. 23, 2000 for the proposition that "the determination of residency where a dwelling overlaps district boundaries is 'based on the whole constellation of interests including both geography and the community orientation of the student and the family.'" Id. (quoting Rapp, Education Law § 5.03(4)(g)). Appellants argue that unlike the "self-serving cache of documents" exclusively relied upon in that case, Appellants here...