Distefano v. Westminster Club

1

DOMINIC P. DISTEFANO, DOMINIC V. DISTEFANO, and DEBRA C. DISTEFANO, Plaintiffs, v. WESTMINSTER CLUB, Defendant.

No. N20C-09-016 SPL

Superior Court of Delaware

February 27, 2024

ORDER

Sean P. Lugg, Judge

This 27th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiffs', Dominic P. DiStefano,^[1] Dominic V DiStefano,^[2] and Debra C. DiStefano (the "DiStefanos"), motion for summary judgment,^[3] Defendant's, Westminster Club ("Westminster"), motion for summary judgment,^[4] the parties' responses to the cross-motions,^[5] and their November 29, 2023 arguments,^[6] it appears to the Court that:

Background

1. On September 1, 2020, the DiStefanos initiated this lawsuit against Westminster, seeking adverse possession of a part of Westminster's land where the DiStefanos had installed a concrete pad and shed in 2006, and a declaratory judgment asserting their rightful ownership of the land.^[7]

2. Westminster answered the complaint^[8] and asserted a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment "declar[ing] that [the DiStefanos] may not use [an existing right of way] except for ingress and egress and not for parking."^[9]Westminster asserts "that the Distefano property is subject to a 25-foot right of way ("ROW")"^[10] "to allow unrestricted and unobstructed access to Westminster's swimming complex."^[11] Westminster contends "[p]arking on the ROW is not a reasonable use of it[,]"^[12] and the DiStefanos "have been warned to not park cars in the ROW but ignore/refuse to do so."^[13] 3. The DiStefanos answered Westminster's counterclaim, and asserted their own counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment "to allow [the DiStefanos] reasonable use of the ROW [and] prohibit [Westminster] from utilizing the ROW for anything other than access."^[14] The DiStefanos acknowledge that their "property is subject to a 25-foot [ROW]"^[15] but argue that they "are permitted to use the ROW on their property so long as such use does not inhibit use of the ROW by [Westminster]."^[16] The DiStefanos seek permission "to continue to use the ROW as historically used."^[17]

4. On December 15, 2022, the parties settled Plaintiffs' claim for adverse possession, leaving only the declaratory judgment counterclaims to be litigated.^[18]On September 22, 2023, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment.^[19]

Standard of Review

5. Under Superior Court Civil Rule 56 summary judgment will be granted where "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."^[20]Summary judgment will not be granted if there is a material fact in dispute or if it "seems desirable to inquire thoroughly into [the facts] in order to clarify the application of the law to the circumstances."^[21] The Court will not "indulge in speculation and conjecture; a motion for summary judgment is decided on the record presented and not on evidence potentially possible."^[22] "Where cross motions for summary judgment are filed and neither party argues the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, the Court shall deem the motions to be the equivalent of a stipulation for decision on the merits based on the record submitted with them."^[23] The questions before the Court "are questions of law not of fact, and the parties by filing cross motions for summary judgement have in effect stipulated that the issues raised by the motions are ripe for a decision on the merits."^[24]

Analysis

I. The Superior Court's Jurisdiction To Address Easements On Real Property Through A Declaratory Judgment Action

6. The parties have framed their dispute as a declaratory judgment action under Chapter 65 of Title 10 and contend that this Court is an appropriate forum for addressing, and resolving, their dispute.^[25] "The decision to entertain an action for declaratory judgment is discretionary with a trial court, the only limitation being that the Court cannot abuse its discretion."^[26] The Declaratory Judgment Act provides "prospective, i.e., forward-looking relief,"^[27] but it neither broadens nor narrows the jurisdiction of this court; "[j]urisdiction under the Act hinges upon whether law or equity would independently have jurisdiction without reference to the Act."^[28] And where the declaratory judgement is sought "within a common law or statutorily authorized cause of action," this Court maintains jurisdiction.^[29] Within these established parameters, an action to establish the scope of an easement may be within the Superior Court's jurisdiction.^[30]

7. Here, Westminster contends the DiStefanos "physically interfered with their right to possession and use" of the easement and, thus, the scope of the easement may be assessed within a trespass action.^[31] While this Court may be authorized to address the scope of the easement within a cause of action within this Court's jurisdiction, it is unlikely this declaratory judgement will fully resolve the parties' concerns.^[32] In the absence of "mutual accommodation," the parties may need to seek to define the day-to-day contours of the easement; to the extent additional prospective judicial guidance may be required, the Court of Chancery instructs that "[a]n injunction is a proper way to prevent continued interference with an easement."^[33]

II. A Retrospective Assessment of the Scope of the Easement Burdening 810 Cheltenham Road 8.

The DiStefanos' property is "[subject] to a twenty-five (25) foot right of way along the northeasterly property line leading from Cheltenham Road to lands of the Westminster Club."^[34] "Deeds are specialized forms of contract, and like other contracts are not subject to construction unless the language is ambiguous."^[35] By its terms, this easement permits access to and from the Westminster Club over the property presently owned by the DiStefanos. The parties do not contend, and the Court does not find, that further interpretation on this point is warranted.

9. In its simplest terms, the issue before the Court is whether the DiStefanos may park vehicles on a portion of the easement. And, the short answer is, yes. The Delaware Supreme Court has explained:

Generally speaking, the owners of a servient estate burdened by an easement in favor of a dominant estate may use the premises as they choose, but may not interfere with the proper and reasonable use by the owner of the dominant estate of their dominant right. To determine what constitutes interference with one's reasonable use of an easement, the court must consider the purposes for which the easement was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement and the manner in which it has been used and occupied.^[36]

There is no record evidence that the DiStefanos' parking along one side of the easement with one side of the parked cars' tires off the paved roadway unreasonably interfered with Westminster's ingress or egress. Westminster's hypothetical scenarios are not far-fetched, but there is no record evidence to support their occurrence, and this Court must not engage in speculation or conjecture when addressing a motion for summary judgment. Of course, what is reasonable under varying circumstances may require a more nuanced prospective assessment beyond what this Court may provide in this declaratory judgment action.

10. To resolve easement disputes, the Delaware Supreme Court has turned to the Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 4.9 for guidance.^[37] The Restatement suggests "maximizing the aggregate utility of the servitude and the servient estate .... Aggregate utility is generally produced by interpreting an easement to strike a balance that maximizes its utility in serving the purpose intended while minimizing the impact on the servient estate."^[38] Further, "[t]he person who holds the land burdened by a servitude is entitled to make all uses of the land that are not prohibited by the servitude and that do not interfere unreasonably by the uses authorized by the easement."^[39] The Restatement also addresses situations where the servient owner locates improvements upon an easement and instructs "[w]hether the improvement is an unreasonable interference with the servitude depends on the character of the improvement and the likelihood that it will make future development of the easement difficult. If the improvement is temporary and easily removed, it is generally not unreasonable."^[40] The Court must not interpret a servitude in a manner that would deprive the easement owner "that to which it was legally entitled."^[41]

11. Thus, the DiStefanos, owners of property burdened by an easement (the "servient estate"), may use the property as they choose, provided they do not unreasonably interfere with Westminster's, the easement holder (the "dominant estate"), reasonable use.^[42] The Court will assess "the purposes for which the easement was made, the nature and situation of the property subject to the easement, and the manner in which the easement has been used and occupied"^[43] in determining whether the DiStefanos' use of a portion of the easement for occasional parking constituted an unreasonable interference.

12. Since 1964, Westminster, a seasonal swim and recreation club has owned the property located at 808 Cheltenham Road, and has used the easement over the property at 810 Cheltenham Road for its members' ingress and egress.^[44]During the summer months, club members use the easement every day of the week.^[45]While the pool is closed from October through April, members use the easement on a more limited basis to access the tennis and basketball courts and occasional events on Westminster's grounds.^[46] Westminster also uses...