District of Columbia v. Vinyard

901 F.Supp.2d 77

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Plaintiff,

v.Laura VINYARD and William Vinyard, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 12–01604 (CKK).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Nov. 2, 2012.

Laura George, Office of Attorney General, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Michael J. Eig, Michael J. Eig & Associates, PC, Chevy Chase, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

COLLEEN KOLLAR–KOTELLY, District Judge.

Plaintiff the District of Columbia (“the District”) seeks judicial review of a Hearing Officer's Determination and Order (“HOD”) rendered in favor of Defendants Laura Vinyard and William Vinyard (“Defendants”), parents and next friends of their minor son, G.V.,¹ following an administrative due process hearing under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEA”),²20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.See Compl., ECF No. [1]. The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants' [3] Motion for Preliminary Injunction seeking a “stay-put” order pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j), requiring the District to maintain G.V.'s placement at the Lab School of Washington, a private special education school, and the District's [11] Motion to Stay the HOD pending the District's appeal to this Court. Both motions are now fully briefed ³ and ripe for adjudication. After considering the parties' submissions and the applicable authorities, Defendants' [3] Motion for Preliminary Injunction shall be GRANTED, and the District's [11] Motion to Stay shall be GRANTED–IN–PART and DENIED–IN–PART. Specifically, the HOD shall be stayed pending a resolution by this Court of the District's appeal insofar as the HOD orders the District to reimburse Defendants for all costs associated with G.V.'s education at the Lab School of Washington for the 2011–2012 school year and to develop an individualized education program for G.V. for the current school year. However, because the Court finds the Lab School of Washington to be G.V.'s current educational placement for stay-put purposes, the portion of the HOD directing the District to maintain and fund G.V.'s placement at the Lab School pending a judicial determination on the merits or agreement by the parties otherwise shall remain in effect.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory Framework

The IDEA was enacted to “ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education [“FAPE”] that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Once a child is identified as disabled, the school district within which the child resides must convene a meeting of a multi-disciplinary team to develop an individualized education program (“IEP”) for the student. See § 1414.⁴ “The IEP is in brief a comprehensive statement of the educational needs of a handicapped child and the specially designed instruction and related services to be employed to meet those needs.” Leonard v. McKenzie, 869 F.2d 1558, 1560 n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1989) (citing Sch. Comm. of the Town of Burlington v. Dept. of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 368, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985)). As such, it represents the “ modus operandi ” of the IDEA. Id. The IEP must be formulated in accordance with the terms of the IDEA and “should be reasonably calculated to enable the child to achieve passing marks and advance from grade to grade.” Bd. of Educ. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 204, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). Once the IEP is developed, the school system must provide an appropriate educational placement that comports with the IEP. Alston v. Dist. of Columbia, 439 F.Supp.2d 86, 90 (D.D.C.2006). “If no suitable public school is available, the school system must pay the costs of sending the child to an appropriate private school.” Reid ex rel. Reid v. Dist. of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 519 (D.C.Cir.2005) (citation and internal editing omitted).

The IDEA guarantees parents of disabled children the opportunity to participate in the evaluation and educational placement process. See§ 1415(b)(1). Parents who believe their child's IEP or school placement is inadequate may request an administrative “due process hearing” before an impartial hearing officer. See§ 1415(f). Following such a hearing, “[a]ny party aggrieved by the findings and decision ... shall have the right to bring a civil action ... in a district court of the United States.” § 1415(i)(2)(A). During the pendency of an appeal to a district court, the IDEA provides that the child will “stay-put”—that is, remain in his “current educational placement” until the matter is resolved. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j).

B. Factual Background⁵

As alleged in the District's complaint, G.V. is a seven year old student residing with his parents, Defendants, in the District of Columbia, Compl. ¶¶ 4–6, who has been identified by the District of Columbia Public Schools (“DCPS”) as a student with a disability under the IDEA. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 7. G.V. has always attended private schools at Defendants' expense ⁶ and by unilateral parental placement. Id. at ¶ 7. He is currently enrolled as a first-grade student at the Lab School of Washington (“Lab School”), located in the District of Columbia. Id. at ¶ 6. Prior to beginning at the Lab School, G.V. attended Aiden Montessori School (“Aiden Montessori”) for the 2010–2011 school year. Id.

On October 5, 2012, while G.V. was attending Aiden Montessori, DCPS convened an IEP meeting, at which DCPS developed an IEP for G.V. Id. at ¶ 8. The IEP proposed six hours per week of specialized general education instruction and certain related services including speech/language therapy, occupational therapy, behavioral support, and physical therapy, all of which DCPS offered to implement at one of two DCPS elementary schools once G.V. enrolled and attended such school. Id. at ¶¶ 8, 10, 11. Defendants rejected the IEP offer and instead maintained G.V.'s enrollment at Aiden Montessori. Id. at ¶¶ 11–14. In early 2011, G.V.'s parents applied, and G.V. was accepted for admission, to the Lab School for the 2011–2012 school year. Id. at ¶ 16. Defendants' legal representative subsequentlysent DCPS a letter, requesting DCPS to pay for G.V. to attend the Lab School for the 2011–2012 school year, to which DCPS responded with an explanation as to why it would not do so. Id. at ¶¶ 17–18. Several months later, Defendants provided to DCPS a copy of a neuropsychological evaluation of G.V. that Defendants had independently procured. Id. at ¶ 17. After reviewing the evaluation, DCPS notified Defendants that if G.V. enrolled in and attended a DCPS school, G.V. could receive the IEP previously proposed in October 2010, or, if the parents wished for G.V. to remain in private school, DCPS would instead provide G.V. with an Individualized Service Plan (“ISP”).⁷Id. at ¶ 21, 25. Defendants again rejected DCPS's offers, and G.V. has remained in attendance at the Lab School as of the date this action was filed. Id. ¶¶ 6, 21–26.

On April 6, 2012, Defendants, on behalf of G.V., filed an administrative due process complaint, contending, inter alia, that DCPS had failed to provide G.V. with a FAPE for the 2011–2012 school year. See Defs.' Mem., Ex. 1(HOD). Specifically, Defendants asserted that the IEP that was offered to G.V. in 2010 and re-offered to him for the 2011–2012 school year was not appropriate insofar as it provided only 6 hours per week of specialized education, whereas G.V. required a full-time program. Id. at 3. Defendants further asserted that despite the fact that they informed DCPS of their interest in continuing the IEP process in the hopes of developing an appropriate program, no IEP was developed due to DCPS's refusal to continue the process because G.V. was not enrolled in a public school. Id. at 3. By way of relief, Defendants requested reimbursement for the costs of placing G.V. at the Lab School during the 2011–2012 school year and prospective placement at the Lab School for the 2012–2013 school year. Id. at 18 n. 18.

Following a three-day hearing, the hearing officer issued a ruling on June 30, 2012. In brief, the hearing officer found that the District denied G.V. a FAPE, as, despite Defendants' requests to convene an IEP meeting, it did not offer G.V. an IEP for the 2011–2012 school year, and the IEP developed for G.V. on October 5, 2010 was not appropriate under the applicable standards. Id. at 16–20, 27. Further, the hearing officer found that G.V.'s program and services at the Lab School are beneficial and thus, the Lab School was an appropriate placement during the 2011–2012 school year. Id. at 17, 26, 27. By way of relief, the hearing officer ordered DCPS to reimburse Defendants for all costs associated with G.V.'s education at the Lab School for the 2011–2012 school year ⁸ and to convene a meeting with Defendants and others to develop an IEP designed to address G.V.'s educational needs and an appropriate placement for implementation of the IEP. Id. at 28. Further, the HOD orders as follows:

[G.V.] is to continue attending the Lab School throughout this IEP and placement development process, and [the District] is to continue to fund this program and placement throughout the IEP and placement development process. The Lab School is deemed [G.V.]'s current placement for stay-put purposes until either [Defendants] and [the District] agree otherwise or another hearing officer or court of appropriate jurisdiction decides otherwise.

Id.

As of the date of this Order, the District has not proposed a new IEP for G.V. and has declined Defendants' requests for tuition reimbursement. Defs.' Mem. at 8, 10. On September 26, 2011, the District filed its complaint with this Court, appealing the HOD. Several weeks later, the parties filed their respective motions for injunctive relief. While the District's appeal seeks reversal of several of the HOD's factual and legal findings, see generally...